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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis we examine exchange rates and monetary policy of 
four emerging Asian countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and South Korea. We model equilibrium exchange rates using a 
general behavioural specification consistent with a variety of theoretical 
approaches; and short-run dynamics using a general non-linear adjustment 
model. We find in all countries examined, equilibrium nominal and real 
exchange rates are a function of permanent relative output and one or more 
variables from domestic and foreign price levels, nominal and real interest 
rate differentials, the level of and changes in net foreign assets, and a time 
trend. These results imply that individual countries present significant 
elements of idiosyncratic behaviour, casting doubt on empirical models 
using panel-data techniques. We also obtain evidence of non-linear 
exchange rate dynamics, with the speed of adjustment to equilibrium being 
in all cases a function of the size, and in two cases, the sign of the 
misalignment term. 
With respect to monetary policy, we examined these countries' 
monetary policy reaction function based on an open economy augmented 
Taylor rule including the exchange rate and the foreign interest rate. Using 
a formal testing approach, our tests reject linearity, suggesting that 
monetary authorities in these four emerging economies are subject to non-
linear inflation effects and that they respond more vigorously to inflation 
when it is further from the target. Our results also lead us to speculate that 
policymakers in three countries may have been attempting to keep inflation 
within the range, while those in the other country may have been pursuing 
a point inflation target. Finally, we also find monetary policy is asymmetric 
as policy makers respond differently to upward and downward deviations 
of inflation away from the target. 
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policymakers in three countries may have been attempting to keep inflation 
within the range, while those in the other country may have been pursuing 
a point inflation target. Finally, we also find monetary policy is asymmetric 
as policy makers respond differently to upward and downward deviations 
of inflation away from the target. 
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Introduction 
The process of tinancial liberalization initiated back in late 1980s and tht: 
subsequent dismantl ing of most capital controls have led emerging economies to attract 
an incrl'asing volume of direct investment and international portfolio funds. The grO\ving 
importance of emerging economies to global economic stability has been abl~ 
demonstrated 11\ financial crises such as those of Mexico in 1994. South-East Asia and 
Russia in 1997/98 and of Argentina in 2002. The global repercussions of these e\ enls 
highlights the importance of emerging economies. both for the purpose of determining 
optimal international il1\t:stment strategies. as \\ell as for designing and implementing 
economic policy. 
A common feature of most financial crises in emerging economies is that the~ 
were triggered by turbulence in the foreign exchange market, typically resulting in 
discrete devaluation of the domestic currency. Therefore, identifying the determinants of 
exchange rate fundamentals and obtaining proper explanation of these currency 
movements, whether they represent movements in the underlying equilibrium and 
therefore the currency are correctly priced or whether they represent misalignment. are 
important diagnostic tools to assess the overall financial prospects of these countries. 
In the first part of this thesis we aim to offer such an analysis for the nominal as 
well as the real exchange rates of four emerging Asian-Paciiic economies. namely 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea. These countries are particularly 
worthy of study on a number of grounds. Firstly, they have undergone rapid structural 
changes, particularly on the supply side, following the implementation of market reforms 
and financial liberalization in the early 1980s. These changes can bring about significant 
changes in the relative price structure between traded goods and non-traded goods in 
individual countries and eventually the equilibrium nominal and real exchange rate will 
adjust in response to these structural changes. Secondly, they all experienced turbulence 
period in the nineties characterized by frequent changes in the nominal and real exchange 
rate and speculative attacks.' In particular, during the financial crisis of 1997/98. the 
nominal and the real exchange rate depreciated and appear to be non-stationary. This 
evidence cannot be explained by the benchmark model of nominal and real exchange rate 
I Kaminski et. al (1997) suggest that an overvalued currency may lead to an unsustainable current account 
deficit. increasing external debt and the risk of possible speculative attacks with unfavourable cost ~or the 
economy. On the other hand. Razin and Collins (1997) say that an undervalued currency has an equivocal 
effect on growth. 
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determination, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which predicts a constant real exchange 
rate or a cointegrated nominal exchange rate with domestic and foreign price levels. 
However, as discovered in many industrial countries, earlier studies on the 
exchange rate of Asian Economies in fact has produced mixed evidence with regards to 
the validity of exchange rate models such as the PPP (see Ajayi and Karemera ( 1996). 
Lee (1996), Cheung and Lai (1998), Allsopp and Zurbruegg (2004). Liew et al (2004). 
Wu et al (2004)). These studies, which typically model real rather than nominal exchange 
rates, produce findings broadly supportive to some form of PPP. However, they also 
obtain evidence of trend-breaks in real exchange rates, which is not consistent with the 
textbook version of PPP, and their results are very sensitive to the testing methodology 
employed to test for real exchange rate stationarity. This may be a reflection of the 
relatively small sample sizes used by some of these studies or, for those employing 
longer data sets, the risks of bias associated with mixing periods of fixed with floating 
exchange rates. 
In order to avoid such biases, we consider only those periods during which the 
countries examined followed a managed floating exchange rate policy. These are 
1978(3)-2003(4) for Indonesia; 1975(3)-1998(3) for Malaysia, 1981 (4)-2003(4) for the 
Philippines; and 1980(1 )-2003(4) for South Korea. For the purpose of modelling 
exchange rates, these sample periods are better described as medium- rather than long-
run. In such a context, fundamentals' based models suggest that exchange rates can be 
affected by a number of factors. such as price rigidities preventing the ratio of prices fully 
adjusting to changes in nominal exchange rates,2 demand shocks,3 shifts in real interest 
1 See Dornbush (1976). Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). Rogers (1999). 
~ See Clarida and Gali (1994). Taylor (1995). Rogoff (1996). Chadha and Prasad (1997). 
3 
rates,4 Balassa (1964)-Samuelson (1964) effects caused by productivity gains.s current 
account imbalances and net foreign assets accumulation.6 
By concentrating on PPP only, previous studies on Asian economies have not 
accounted for all these factors. We do so by estimating a general behavioural equation 
such as those discussed by MacDonald (2000), nesting PPP as well as a number of other 
theoretical approaches. The specification we use, which to the best of our knowledge has 
not been used for modelling exchange rate in the Asia-Pacific Basin region. enables us to 
identify the behavioural determinants of nominal and real exchange rates and extract a 
measure of fundamental misalignment which previous studies have not been able to 
obtain. In addition, by working within a time-series rather than panel-data framework. 
our analysis is able to capture aspects of idiosyncratic behaviour in the nominal and real 
exchange rate of individual countries, which we would not be able to capture by using 
tixed parameters panel cointegration analysis. 
The second topic of our analysis is to model the process of adjustment of the 
nominal and real exchange rate to its equilibrium. We do so first by estimating 
benchmark linear models of exchange rate adjustment, then testing formally for non-
linear dynamics in the adjustment process and, finally, by estimating non-linear exchange 
rate models. 
Short-run exchange rate fluctuations are known to be notoriously volatile and 
often very difficult to reconcile with mainstream theoretical models of exchange rate 
determination. In recent years, the excess volatility of the nominal and real exchange rate 
.j See Frankel (1979). Boughton (1987). 
5 See, among others. Di boogl u ( 1996) and Canzoneri et al. ( 1999). 
h See Branson (1983). Dornbusch and Fischer (1980). Hooper and Morton (1982). Faruqee (1995). and 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) 
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has been partially explained by the development of theoretical models of non-linear 
exchange rate dynamics.7 In these models. transactions costs and other market 
imperfections8 imply that within a certain range around its equilibrium level. the nominal 
and real exchange rate does not respond to changes in its fundamental determinants. But 
when nominal and real exchange rate misalignment exceeds certain thresholds. arbitrage 
forces ensure its reversion to its equilibrium level. 
A number of empirical studies, mainly focusing on G7 economies. have provided 
substantial evidence in favour of the existence of non-linear exchange rate dynamics. 
finding the speed of adjustment to equilibrium to increase with the size of the 
misalignment term.9 For Asian economies. evidence of non-linear exchange rate 
adjustment has been provided by Chen and Wu (2000). Baharumshah et al (2002). Lestari 
et.al (2003), and Liew et al (2003, 2004). However. like most of the non-linear exchange 
rate empirical literature, these studies use econometric models such as the Threshold 
Autoregressive (TAR)IO and the Exponential Smooth Transition Autoregressive 
(ESTAR), II which impose symmetric reaction of the real exchange rate to episodes of 
over- and under-valuation. But such a restriction may in practice lJe invalid. Consider. for 
example, a situation where a policy-maker prefers to boost the export of domestic goods. 
This policy-maker is likely to tolerate higher values of undervaluation than overvaluation. 
as the former results in temporary positive trade balance while the latter leads to negative 
7 See Benninga and Protopapadakis (1988), Dixit (1989). Dumas (1992). Uppal (1993). Sercu et al (1995). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). and O'Connell (1998). 
8 Such as taxation. subsidies. actual or threatened trade restrictions. the existence of non-traded goods. 
imperfect competition. foreign exchange market interventions. and the differential composition of market 
baskets of price indices across countries 
<) See Michael et al (1997). Obstfeld and Taylor (1997). Sarantis (1999). Taylor and Peel (2000). BaUln et al 
(200 I). Taylor et al (200 I). Lo and Zivot (200 I). O'Connell and Wei (2002). 
10 See Tong (1990). 
II See Granger and Terlisvirta (1993). 
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trade balance. Symmetry-imposing models such as the TAR and EST AR cannot capture 
this kind of asymmetric policy preferences. We account for such effects by estimating a 
... 
more general model of non-linear adjustment, namely the Quadratic Logistic Smooth 
Transition Error Correction Model (QL-STECM), allowing for the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium to be a function of both the size and the sign of misalignment term. In this 
way we are able to capture a richer range of features of process characterizing nominal 
and real exchange rate adjustment. 
Our econometric analysis yields a number of interesting results. Firstly. in all 
countries examined, equilibrium nominal and real exchange rates in the first two chapters 
are a function of permanent relative output and one or more variables from domestic and 
foreign price levels, nominal and real interest rate differentials, the level of and changes 
in net foreign assets, and a time trend. 
In particular, in the case of Indonesia, we find that permanent relative output and 
nominal interest rate differentials play significant roles when we model both nominal and 
real exchange rate determination. However, the behaviour of nominal exchange rate 
discussed in chapter I differs from that of real exchange rates discussed in chapter 2 in 
that the latter takes into account the deterministic time trend in its long-run model to help 
capture the effects of missing fundamentals .. 
In the case of Malaysia, we find that all variables determining the nominal 
exchange rate model discussed in chapter I also play similar roles when modelling real 
exchange rate behaviour discussed in chapter 2. These include permanent relative output, 
real interest rate differentials, the level of and changes in net foreign assets. The only 
distinction between the nominal exchange rate model and the real one is the latter' 
6 
positive sign for real net foreign assets, while we find a negative sign when modelling 
nominal exchange rate behaviour. 
In the case of the Philippines, while we consider real interest rate differentials and 
the changes in net foreign assets in modelling nominal exchange rates. our real exchange 
rate model fails to take these two variables into account. Moreover. our real exchange 
rate model differs from the nominal exchange rate model in that it takes into 
consideration the time trend. However, there is no evidence to suggest that this time trend 
is added to replace missing fundamentals, in particular, real interest rate differentials and 
the changes in net foreign assets. 
In the case of Korea, we find more interesting results as equilibrium real exchange 
rates are a function of all the variables considered in chapters I alld 2; permanent relative 
output, nominal and real interest rate differentials, and the level of and changes in net 
foreign assets. The fact that all important fundamentals have been included in our real 
exchange rates model is probably the reason for our not obtaining a time trend variable in 
this case. This is in contrast to the results obtained in chapter I when modelling nominal 
exchange rates, where we find our nominal exchange rates model fails to take into 
account nominal and real interest rate differentials along with changes in net foreign 
assets. 
Secondly, we suggest that it is more appropriate to use time-series data 
techniques. rather than fixed-parameter panel-data techniques applied by many empirical 
exchange rate studies. as our results show that when the former is used. individual 
currencies present elements of idiosyncratic exchange rate behaviour. 
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Thirdly, in relation to this, a new empirical finding is that the relationship 
between exchange rates on the one hand and real net foreign assets and/or current account 
balances on the other may be non-monotonic, depending upon the sign of net foreign 
assets and the current account balance. 
Fourthly, for all countries we obtain strong evidence of non-linear exchange rate 
adjustment, with the speed of reversion to equilibrium being in all cases a function of the 
size. Nominal and real exchange rates follow a random-walk pattern when close to their 
equilibrium, but revert to it at high speed when the misalignment term becomes large. 
Fifthly, in Indonesia nominal and real exchange rate adjustment is asymmetric, 
while in Malaysia only real exchange rate adjustment is asymmetric/:! both with 
fundamental undervaluation corrected faster than overvaluation (a finding consistent with 
the monetary policy implemented by these countries for the larger part of the post-
Bretton Woods period). 
Finally, we find that the devaluations that took place in 1997-98 are justified by 
economic fundamentals, as prior to the crisis all exchange rates were significantly 
overvalued against the US dollar, particularly the one of the Indonesian Rupiah. 
In the second part of this thesis, we examine monetary policy in these four 
economies. In chapter 3, we investigate the monetary policy reaction function and 
attempt to assess whether central banks in these four emerging economies are primarily 
concerned with fluctuations in inflation and output. or whether they are also concerned 
with fluctuations in the exchange rate and/or foreign interest rates. To do this we use a 
simple model of the augmented Taylor Rule including exchange rates and foreign interest 
I:! This is to say that we obtain strong evidence of non-linear exchange rate adjustment. with the sp«:t of 
reversion to equilibrium being a function of the sign. of the misalignment term 
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rates. We consider both backward-looking and forward-looking specifications. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no research exploring this type of augmented Taylor rule 
for these four emerging economies. 
The evidence in this chapter suggests that all central banks in these emerging 
market economies focus on pursuing the objective of price stability and maintaining 
output stability. In all four countries other objectives also play a role. monetary 
authorities adjusting interest rates systematically in response to foreign interest rates and 
exchange rates. The response to the foreign interest rate is typically strong in all countries 
in the sample. Additionally, in Indonesia and the Philippines, the response is found to be 
even more marked than that to changes in the inflation rate or the output gap. This 
emphasizes the importance of foreign interest rate fluctuations. The augmented Taylor 
rule including the exchange rate and the foreign interest rate is a better empirical model 
because it captures how a small open economy attempts to stabilize the exchange rate and 
the financial market. Finally, we also find evidence that monetary policy reaction 
functions in Indonesia and Korea were a combination of forward and backward-looking. 
while in the Philippines were a combination of forward-looking and contemporane0us 
and in Malaysia were essentially forward-looking. Surprisingly, we do not find any 
central bank considering purely backward-looking or contemporaneous specifications. 
In chapter 4, we estimate models to test the hypothesis of non linear monetary 
policy responses to the inflation rate at Bank Indonesia, Bank of Korea. Bank ng 
Pilipinas. and Bank Negara Malaysia. In the presence of such non linear responses. we 
then create a model of non-linear interest rate behaviour in these four countries. 
9 
We obtain a number of novel and interesting findings. Firstly, using a formal 
testing approach proposed by Saikkonnen and Luukkonen (1988), Luukkonen et al 
(1988), Granger and Terasvirta (1993), Terasvirta (1994), we reject linearity. 
Secondly, when we use a two-regime model based on quadratic logistic function. 
we find that policy makers appear to behave asymmetrically. That is to say, in these four 
countries the monetary authority respond differently according to the size of intlation 
deviations, increasing the interest rate by a larger amount when inflation is far above or 
below the target than it will reduce it by when inflation is close to its target (a size effect). 
Thirdly, we find that policy makers in all countries respond differently depending 
on whether inflation is above or below the target (a sign effect). 
Fourthly, we find that when inflation is close to the target, the sole determinant of 
policy in Indonesia is inflation, whereas in Malaysia, the determinants are output gap and 
foreign interest rates. In the case of Korea and the Philippines, we find none of the 
variables - inflation, output gap, exchange rates, and foreign interest rates - are 
statistically significant, so interest rates are close to random walk. 
Fifthly, when inflation is far from the target, we find that the most important 
determinant of all countries' monetary policy is inflation, although other variables such 
as output also playa role in the determination of monetary policy in Indonesia and Korea. 
The exchange rate is also important in Indonesia' and the Philippines' monetary policy. 
The U.S interest rate also plays a significant role in the determination of monetary policy 
in all countries, with the exception of Indonesia. 
Finally. in the case of Indonesia, we find that the long-run response of interest 
rates to inflation in the inner and outer regime are statistically significant and positive. 
10 
suggesting that the central bank pursued a point target rather than a target range. \\ hi II: in 
the case of the other three countries, we find that the long-run response of interest rates to 
inflation only statistically significant and positive in the outer regime. suggesting that 
these central banks pursued a target range rather than a point target. Policymakers have 
been attempting to keep inflation within the range of 1.2% to 8.7% in Korea. 5.7°'0 to 
9.20/0 in the Philippines, and 2.70/0 to 3.50/0 in Malaysia. 
\I 
PART 
I 
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CHAPTER I 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE DETERMINATION 
IN EMERGING ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIES: 
A behavioural, non-linear analysis 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years emerging markets ha\e become increasingly important for thl.' 
global financial system by attracting increasing \ olumes of portfolio and forl'ign direct 
in\l~stl1lent. underpinned by fast economic growth and high rates of portfolio ill\ estment 
retllrn (Solnik. ~OO-n. HO\\e\i.~r. ill\esting in emerging ecolwmies can be risk) (Sl.'l.' 
Bekaert et al 19(8). Financial crises slich as tho"e in \ k\.ico in 199~. SOllth-Ea"t Asia 
and Russia in 1997/98 and Argentina in 2002 have shown that adverse economic 
developments in emerging markets can have wider destabilizing repercussions \\ ith direct 
relevance to the economic performance of these economies themselves as well as those of 
major industrial countries. Therefore, obtaining an understanding of the determinants of 
economic developments in emerging economies is an issue of importance both for 
international investors and policy-makers. 
A common denominator of most financial crises in emerging economies is that 
their starting point has been a speculative attack against the domestic currency. typically 
resulting in sizeable devaluation. Therefore. studying the determinants of exchange rates 
and being able to identify pronounced currency movements is an important diagnostic 
tool to assess the vulnerability of emerging economies to a wider financial crisis. In this 
chapter, we attempt to assess whether currency movements represent misalignment or 
changes in the underlying equilibrium and therefore whether the currency is correctly 
priced. We do this for four emerging Asian-Pacific economies, namely Indonesia. 
Malaysia. the Philippines and South Korea. all of which were at the epicentre of the 
South-East Asia crisis of 1997/98. 
Empirical modelling of exchange rates has proved over the years to be a difficult 
task for economic researchers, giving rise to what has been defined as the two "puzzles" 
in exchange rate economics (see Rogoff 1996. Taylor et al 2001). The first puzzle is that 
many studies fail to support the long-run validity of mainstream theoretical models of 
exchange rate determination based upon the fact that no cointegration is found in familiar 
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models of exchange rate determination such as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP): I. the 
second is that even when these models are found to hold in the long-run. the estimated 
speed of adjustment of exchange rates to their fundamental values is very slow. 
A popular explanation for the empirical failure of mainstream exchange rate 
models is the low power of the cointegration tests used to test for their validity. A number 
of authors have sought to increase the tests' power either by allowing for longer sample 
periods (see, for example, Abuaf and Jorion (1990). Diebold et al (1991). Lothian and 
Taylor (1996), and Cheung and Lai (1998». or by using panel unit root tests (see. for 
example, Wei and Parsely (1995), Frankel and Rose (1996). Sarno and Taylor (1998». 
These studies typically obtain more favourable results,14 however they have their own 
drawbacks: longer-span data sets usually involve mixing periods from fixed and flexible 
exchange rates. which affects the statistical properties of the tests employed (Hegwood 
and Papell, 1998). In addition, although tests on very long run series reject unit roots. 
these tests often assume invariance of data generating process (Ahmad and Glosser. 
2006). On the other hand, most panel data sets studied impose the null hypothesis that all 
exchange rates examined are not consistent with the model tested, which implies a high 
probability of rejecting the null. even when only one of the series is consistent with the 
theory (Taylor and Sarno, 1998). In other words, while tests on panels reject unit roots. in 
fact these tests frequently do not allow sufficient heterogeneity. Also. by using exchange 
rates relative to a common currency, panel data tests lead to cross-sectional dependence 
I~ Every cointegration test and unit root test ever invented has been used to test PPP. The results mostly 
confirm that the nominal exchange rate is not cointegrated with relative domestic and foreign prices or the 
real exchange rate does not follow a random walk. 
101 For a review of the empirical literature on exchange rate modelling see Taylor (1995). Rogoff ( I (96). 
Sarno and Taylor (1998.20028, 2002b). 
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in the time series involved in the analysis, which reduces the probability of rejecting the 
null when in reality it is not valid (O'Connell 1998). 
Another explanation is that standard unit root tests are likely to be biased and 
have low power in rejecting the null of a unit root because exchange rates follO\\ a 
non linear adjustment process. In recent years, authors such as Dixit (1989), Dumas 
(1992), Uppal (1993), Sercu et at. (1995), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Michael et al 
(1997), O'Connell (1998), Bergman and Hansson (2000), Yilmaz (200 I), De Grauwe and 
Vansteenkiste (2001), and Kilian and Taylor (200 I) have developed theoretical models of 
non-linear exchange rate behaviour, in which arbitrage costs and other market frictions l :' 
lead rational optimizing agents to correct large but not small deviations of the exchange 
rate from its fundamentals-consistent equilibrium value. This implies that the exchange 
rate will change in periods of large misalignment of exchange rates from fundamental. 
but not in periods of small misalignment of exchange rates from fundamentals. 16 If this 
hypothesis is upheld by the data, empirical models of the exchange rate estimated within 
a linear estimation framework making no distinction between periods of large and small 
currency misalignment will be mispecified. 
15 Kilian and Taylor (2003) argue that heterogeneity in agents' expectations. given different investment 
horizons. risk profiles. and institutional constraints. can also cause nonlinearity in the exchange rates. On 
the other hand. Feenstra and Kendall (1997) and Haske! and Wolf (2001) suggest that local-to-currency 
pricing (LCP). under which producers selling abroad are assumed to set prices in the currency of consumers 
rather than their own. is considered as another source of nonlinearity in exchange rates. 
16 The initial thought of deviations from PPP are assumed not corrected if they are small relative to the 
costs of trading can be credited to EI i Heckscher (1916) and Gustav Cassel (1922). Proportional costs form 
thresholds/band for nominal rates in that the marginal cost of arbitrage exceeds the marginal benefit. On the 
other hand. Dixit (1989) and Krugman (1989) say that sunk costs of international arbitrage and the 
tendency for traders to wait for sufficiently large arbitrage opportunities before entering the market may 
rise thresholds. Meanwhile. Dutta and Leon (2002) claim that government intervention when the exchange 
rate beyond its fundamental rate can generate thresholds. They find that governments more concern atxlut 
large and persistent exchange rate deviations from its desired value since these circumstances will change 
net exports. as well as the cost of servicing debt denominated in foreign currency. 
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Papers such as those by Obstfeld and Taylor () 997). Michael et al. () 997). 
Sarantis () 999), Taylor and Peel (2000), Taylor et al (2001) and Baum et al CWO I) hm e 
found evidence of non-linear exchange rate adjustment, thus restoring some faith in 
fundamental based models of exchange rate determination. To model non-linearities. 
these studies typically use the TAR (Tong, 1990) or the EST AR model (Granger and 
Terasvirta, ) 993) both of which make a distinction between an inner regime, where the 
exchange rate either follows a random-walk or adjusts to its equilibrium very slowly. and 
an outer regime where adjustment to equilibrium is fast. The inner regime is defined by 
two threshold values which in the context of the TAR and ESTAR models are by default 
symmetric. This is justified on the grounds that there is no reason to assume that agents 
will change their behaviour according to whether a currency is undervalued or 
overvalued. 
More recently, the use of symmetry-imposing models such as the TAR and the 
ESTAR has been criticized on the grounds that it is unnecessarily restrictive. Consider, 
for example, a policy-maker attaching in their policy loss function a higher weight to 
output rather than inflation gains. This policy-maker is likely to tolerate higher values of 
undervaluation than overvaluation, as the former results in temporary output gains while 
the latter leads to output losses. Symmetry-imposing models such as the TAR and 
ESTAR cannot capture this kind of asymmetric policy preferences. Papers such as those 
by Enders and Dibooglu (200 I) and Arghyrou et al (2005) have provided evidence of 
asymmetries in non-linear exchange rate adjustment. We follow the latter approach in our 
second topic of analysis based on their satisfaction results in employing Smooth 
Transition Error Correction Model (STEeM). We utilize its branch model namely 
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Quadratic Logistic Smooth Transition Error Correction (QL-STECM) model in order to 
capture the dynamics of exchange rates in this region. 
In order to avoid the risks of bias associated with mixing periods of tixed \\ ith 
floating exchange rates, as experienced by many researchers in the past. our first topic of 
analysis considers only those periods during which the countries examined followed a 
managed floating exchange rate policy. These are 1978(3)-2003(4) for Indonesia: 
1975(3)-1998(3) for Malaysia, 1981 (4)-2003(4) for the Philippines~ and 1980( I )-2003(4) 
for South Korea. For the purpose of modelling exchange rates. these sample periods are 
better described as medium- rather than long-run. In such a context. fundamentals' based 
models suggest that exchange rates can be affected by a number of factors. such as price 
rigidities preventing the ratio of prices fully adjusting to changes in nominal exchange 
rates,17 demand shocks,18 shifts in real interest rates,19 Balassa (I 964)-Samuelson (1964) 
effects caused by productivity gains,2o current account imbalances and net foreign assets 
I · "I accumu atlOn. ~ 
By concentrating on PPP only, previous studies on Asian economies have not 
accounted for all these factors in the context of the four Asia-Pacific countries we 
examine. We do so by estimating a general behavioural equation such as those discussed 
by MacDonald (2000). nesting PPP as well as a number of other theoretical approaches. 
The specification we use, which to the best of our knowledge has not been used for 
modelling exchange rates in the Asia-Pacific Basin region, enables us to identify the 
17 See Dornbush (1976). Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). and Rogers (1999). 
III See Clarida and Gal i ( 1994). Taylor (1995). Rogoff ( 1996). and Chadha and Prasad ( 1997). 
19 See Frankel (1979) and Boughton (1987). 
10 See. among others. Dibooglu ( 1996) and Canzoneri et al. ( 1999). 
:! I See Branson (1983). Dornbusch and Fischer (1980). Hooper and Morton (1982). Faruqee (1995). and 
Obstfeld and Rogoff ( 1995). 
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behavioural determinants of nominal exchange rates and extract a measure of 
fundamental misalignment which previous studies have not been able to obtain. In 
addition, by working within a time-series rather than panel-data framework. our anal~ sis 
is able to capture aspects of idiosyncratic behaviour in the exchange rates of indi\ idual 
countries, which we would not be able to capture by using fixed parameters panel 
cointegration analysis. 
The second topic of our analysis is to model the process of adjustment of the 
nominal exchange rate to its extracted equilibrium. We do so first by estimating 
benchmark linear models of exchange rate adjustment, then testing formally for non-
linear dynamics in the adjustment process and. finally, by estimating non-linear exchange 
rate models. For Asian economies, evidence of non-linear exchange rate adjustment has 
been provided by Chen and Wu (2000), Baharumshah et al (2002). Lestari et al (2003). 
and Liew et al (2003, 2004). However, like most of the non-linear exchange rate 
empirical literature. these studies use econometric models such as the TAR and the 
EST AR which cannot account for asymmetric exchange rate behaviour. We model non-
linear exchange rate adjustment using a more general model of QL-STECM, allowing for 
the speed of adjustment to equilibrium to be a function of both the size and the sign of 
misalignment term. 
Our econometric analysis yields a number of interesting results. Firstly. we find 
that in all four countries equilibrium exchange rates are a function of domestic and 
foreign price levels. relative output and. according to the case. nominal and real interest 
rate differentials. and the level of and changes in net foreign assets. Secondly. we find 
that individual currencies present elements of idiosyncratic exchange rate behaviour. 
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which confirms the risks of biases associated with the use of fixed-parameter panel-data 
techniques in exchange rate modelling. In relation to this, a new empirical finding is that 
the relationship between exchange rates on the one hand and real net foreign assets and/or 
current account balances on the other may be non-monotonic, depending upon the sign of 
net foreign assets and the current account balance. Thirdly, we obtain strong evidence of 
non-linear exchange rate adjustment, with the speed of reversion to equilibrium being in 
all cases a function of the size, and at least in one case the sign, of the misalignment term. 
Finally, we find that the devaluations that took place in 1997-98 are justified by 
economic fundamentals, as prior to the crisis all exchange rates were significantly 
overvalued against the US dollar, particularly the one of the Indonesian Rupiah. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 presents the 
literature review. Section 1.3 illustrates exchange rates regime in these four countries. 
Section 1.4 introduces the methodology we employ. Section ~.5 describes our data. 
Section 1.6.1 models equilibrium exchange rates. Section 1.6.2 estimates linear models of 
exchange rate adjustment. Section 1.6.3 tests formally for the existence of non-linearities 
in exchange rate behaviour. Section 1.6.4 estimates non-linear models of exchange rate 
behaviour. Finally, Section 1.7 summarises and offers concluding remarks. 
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1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.2.1. Purchasing Power Pari(v 
Of all the models of exchange rate determination. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
is probably the framework most commonly employed by economists to evaluate long-
term rate in the foreign exchange markets. It is also considered as an important input in 
other models of exchange rate determination. Absolute PPP states that a common basket 
of real goods, when quoted in the same currency, costs the same in all countries based 
upon an assumption of perfect inter-country commodity arbitrage. However. we may 
expect PPP to be valid only in the long-run because of transaction costs. taxation. 
subsidies, actual or threatened trade restrictions, the existence of non-traded goods. 
imperfect competition, foreign exchange market interventions. and the differential 
composition of price indices across countries. However, earlier studies by Corbae and 
Ouliaris (1988), Meese and Rogoff (1988), Grilli and Kaminsky (1991) and Edison and 
Fisher (1991) have had difficulty detecting convergence to long-run PPP, suggesting the 
absence of a link between nominal exchange rates and prices in open economies, thereby 
invalidating the PPP hypothesis. 
Previous studies on the exchange rates of Asian economies, typically model real 
rather than nominal exchange rates. They also produce mixed evidence with regard to the 
validity of exchange rate models such as PPP. Numerous studies reach different 
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conclusion, depending on the coverage of fixed versus flexible exchange rates. the 
countries and numeraire22 currencies considered, the length of data span. and so on. 
Lee (1999), using a generalized error correction model, examines the validity of 
the PPP hypothesis as a long run equilibrium for bilateral exchange rates between thirteen 
Asia Pacific economies- Australia, Canada, Chile, Hong Kong. Indonesia, Japan. 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand- and 
the United States. Eight bilateral exchange rates-Australia, Chile. Korea, Malaysia. 
Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia- are found to support PPP. However. unit 
root tests find evidence of PPP in only one case (the Mexican peso/U.S. dollar rate). 
Wu et al (2004) allow for a one-time structural change in panel data unit-root tests 
in order to re-examine the unit-root hypothesis of real exchange rates among countries in 
the Pacific Rim, namely Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Japan, and South Korea. Contrary to findings in the existing literature, their 
experiment, using monthly data from 1980 to 2000, provides evidence that real exchange 
rates among Pacific Basin countries are stationary, although subject to a one-time 
structural break. It implies that their empirical evidence supports long-run PPP. 
Cheung and Lai (\998) analyze the possible implications of economic growth on 
the behaviour of dollar-based real exchange rates of several fast-growing Asian countries. 
namely Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia. and Singapore. They find that when 
excluding trend breaks, unit-root tests reject stationarity in real exchange rates. implying 
that deviations from PPP are driven mainly by permanent disturbances. Conversely. by 
including a trend shift. unit-root tests reveal stationarity in real exchange rates for these 
:!:! "The numeraire is the money unit of measure within an abstract macroeconomic model in which there is 
no actual money or currency. A standard use is to define one unit of some kind of goods output as the 
money unit of measure for wages''.(http://economics.about.com!csleconomicsglossary/glnumeraire.htm) 
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countries, implying a large permanent component in the dynamics of PPP deviations are 
never exist. This finding suggests that real exchange rates may appear nonstationary 
when in fact they are not. It seems that trend shifts may be responsible. In conclusion. 
their empirical results support the trend-shift hypothesis and reject the unit-root 
hypothesis. 
Liew et al (2004) examine the stationary properties of II Asian real exchange 
rates using the stationarity test for nonlinear models proposed by Kapetanios et al (2003). 
Their results reveal that the null of a unit root in 8 US dollar based and 6 Japanese yen 
based rates are rejected, whereas the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test gives no 
rejection at all. This implies that exchange rate stationarity is allowed for nonlinearity and 
relevant for what follows. 
Ajayi and Karemera (1996) employ the variance ratio tests first proposed by 
Cochrane (1988), in testing the random walk hypothesis (R WH) for the currencies of 
eight economies of the Pacific Basin- Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia. the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Their results provide evidence against a 
random walk in exchange rates, supporting classical monetary models of exchange rates 
in which the PPP is a long-run equilibrium condition. The estimates of the variance 
ratios, using the data of daily closing (bid) exchange rates from I January 1986 to 12 
December 1991, which are generally observed to be less than unity, suggest that the 
exchange rate series exhibit negative serial correlation. A negative serial correlation in 
exchange rates implies that deviations from long-term paths are temporary. This 
phenomenon is consistent with PPP. 
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Allsopp and Zurbruegg (2004) re-examine the question of whether PPP holds in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, Japan and Malaysia. 
for a period that includes the 1997/98 crisis. They suspect that the crisis has hrought 
about a change in long run exchange rate dynamics which is incorporated into their 
cointegration analysis. Applying Inoue (1999) and Johansen et al (2000) cointegration 
procedures to bilateral exchange rates, deflated using consumer price indices. along \\ ith 
endogenously determining a structural break at the time of the crisis, the empirical results 
explain the significance of the East Asian crisis on long-run PPP within the region. Using 
monthly data for the period between 1990 and the beginning of 2002, the findings are 
generally supportive of PPP with the crisis leading to only shifts in long-run trends. 
The above studies produce findings broadly supportive of some form of PPP. 
However, they also obtain evidence of trend-breaks in real exchange rates, which is not 
consistent with the textbook version of ppp, and their results are very sensitive to the 
testing methodology employed. This may be a reflection of the relatively small sample 
sizes used by some of these studies or, for those employing longer data sets, the risks of 
bias associated with mixing periods of fixed with floating exchange rates. 
1.2.2. Augmented Purchasing Power Parity 
As current studies on the exchange rates have produced mixed evidence with 
regards to the validity of exchange rate models, such as the PPP, academics and poiicy 
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makers keep trying to establish sensible long-run relationships for a single currenc~ using 
data from the recent floating exchange rate regime. MacDonald and Marsh (1997) argue 
that the failure of strong-form PPP model is mainly caused by Dornbusch (1976), price 
rigidities in the face of nominal shocks and the impact of real disturbances. The~ \erit~ 
that proxing such real and nominal disturbances using intere5t rates gives sensible 
augmented PPP equilibrium exchange rates and also impressive out-of-sample forecasts. 
MacDonald (2000) argues that PPP is not a good model to estimate exchange 
rates if currencies are misaligned. He describes various ways of modelling an equilibrium 
exchange rate under floating exchange rates regime. one among others. the balance of 
payments exchange rate approach. This model states that the spot exchange rate is the 
function of domestic and foreign price level, domestic and foreign income. domestic and 
foreign interest rate, and net interest payment on net foreign assets. 
On the other hand. Chinn (1998) augments the monetary model by placing a 
relative productivity term.23 He employs data from 1974( I) to 1997(4) for the US dollar 
bilaterals of the Indonesian rupiah, Korean won. Malaysian ringgit. Philippine peso. 
Singapore dollar. Taiwanese dollar and the Thai baht. and finds that this augmented 
monetary model is valid and the adjustment speeds are relatively rapid. He also finds that 
all currencies. with the exception of Korea won and Philippine peso, are overvalued on 
the eve of the 1997 currency crisis. These results give evidence that the augmented 
monetary model overrule the basic so-called flex-price monetary model in which the 
nominal exchange rate is simply driven by relative excess money supplies. the difference 
between domestic and foreign income. and interest differential. 
1~ He is inspired by the fact that the monetary ~odel is basically an extension .of PPP which expand the 
detennination of prices in each country by enforcmg prolong money market cleanng. 
2S 
In another paper, Chinn (2000) extends the monetary model by the inclusion of a 
Balassa Samuelson effect, for the synthetic euro/U.S dollar.24 Employing Johansen" 
cointegration method on monthly data from] 99] to 1999, he finds that the model is valid 
and suggests an implied undervaluation of the euro against U.S dollar in December 1999 
of approximately] 2 per cent. 
Cavallo and Ghironi (2002) suggest that nominal exchange rate depends on the 
stock of real net foreign assets accumulated in the previous period. Their empirical results 
reveal that the predictive power of real net foreign assets for the nominal exchange rate is 
stronger the closer the net assets to non-stationary and the higher the degree of 
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods in consumption. They also find that 
the current level of the nominal exchange rate depends on the past GDP differential. 
along with net foreign assets. 
1.2.3. Non-linear dynamical models: TAR and its Variants 
We learn from varIOUS studies on modelling nominal exchange rates that the 
empirical results are obviously sensitive to the model specification and the econometric 
methods employed. Applying different econometric methodologies gives conflicting 
evidence. For instance, the standard Dickey-Fuller unit root tests typically reject the PPP 
hypothesis, while the more freshly developed panel unit root tests tend to support the PPP 
:!4 Synthetic euro consists of a weighted average of the currencies of all countries that comprise the Euro 
area. 
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hypothesis. The latter conclusion has been provided by Frankel and Rose (1996). 
McDonald (1996). Wu (1996) and Papell (1997), while O'Connell (1997) and Chortareas 
and Driver (2001) find evidence to the contrary. The model specification and the 
econometric methods adopted will also help to examine the short-run dynamic behaviour 
of our chosen exchange rates, in particular how an exchange rate returns to its 
equilibrium value after a disturbance. 
Innovations in time series methods have led researchers to develop nonlinear 
dynamical methods to portray the dynamics of exchange rates. Engle and Granger (1987) 
propose a linear cointegration methodology in which the speed of adjustment towards 
equilibrium is independent of the magnitude of disequilibrium. 
Other models, such as Balke and Fomby's (1997) threshold cointegration 
methodology, propose that the exchange rate can be modelled as a regime-switching 
process, with a band in place separating an inner regime. in which no adjustment takes 
place, from outer regimes in which equilibrating forces operate. 
Other researchers, such as Obstfeld & Taylor (1997), Zussman (2003), Sarno et al 
(2004). and Canjels et al (2004) apply a Threshold Autoregressive Models (TAR) 
specification in developed countries, incorporating non-linear dynamics in exchange 
rates. In the context of South East Asian economies, Lestari et al (2003) use this TAR 
method and provide evidence of non-linear exchange rate adjustment. TAR models imply 
that the evolution of the exchange rate for different sub samples may follow different 
time series processes. The particular time series process implemented depends on the 
observed historical value of that variable and the transition from one regime to another. 
TAR models have the characteristic that adjustment is slower when the exchange rate is 
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close to the equilibrium. On the contrary, adjustment is faster when it is far from the 
equilibrium or outside the threshold. 
Baum et al (2001) argue that this discrete threshold methodology may be suitable 
for those adopting regimes with an explicit band such as the EMS exchange rate 
mechanism. On the other hand, the real impacts of transaction costs in international trade 
may differ depending upon the combination of goods imported and exported by a pair of 
trading partners. In addition, beyond the analytical structure of a two-country, one-good 
world, the specification of fixed transaction costs and accordingly fixed thresholds turn 
out to be awkward. As a result, a crucial issue arises as to whether the shift from one 
regime to another takes place smoothly or suddenly. 
Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) suggest that reversion is sudden, while Michael et al 
(1997) claim the adjustment process to parity is smooth rather than discrete since 
heterogeneous economic agents do not act simultaneously. Michael et al (1997) replace 
the fixed thresholds of a standard TAR model with a "smooth function'. which need only 
be continuous and non-decreasing (Tong (1993), p.1 08), and ultimately name the model 
as the "smooth transition' threshold autoregressive (STAR) model. Dumas (1992) and 
Terasvirta (1994) also argue that nonsynchronous trading and time aggregation may be 
the cause of smooth transition between regimes. Therefore, in many applications a 
smooth transition model may be more attractive than a threshold model. 
Another crucial issue is whether the reversion on either side of the band generates 
symmetric or asymmetric adjustment behaviour. Lo and Zivot (200 I) argue that 
transactions costs imply symmetry of thresholds and adjustment parameters. Similarly. 
Michael et al (1997) propose a symmetric TAR model based on the assumption that 
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adjustment of the deviations of PPP from its equilibrium will be the same \\hether it is 
positive or negative value. Lundberg and Terasvirta (2003) propose a smooth transition 
autoregressive (STAR) target zone model to describe the dynamic behaviour of an 
exchange rate fluctuating within a target zone. They suggest that the exchange rate 
adjustment depends nonlinearly but symmetrically on the distance between the value of 
the process and the central parity of the target zone. 
Baum et al (2001) suggest to use the exponential threshold autoregressive 
(ESTAR) framework to investigate the dynamic behaviour of deviations from PPP may 
be more useful relative to the standard TAR framework in which regime changes occur 
abruptly. Echoing them, Taylor et al (200 I) estimate an ESTAR model assuming 
symmetric adjustment of the exchange rate above and below equilibrium because 
economic intuition suggests that both positive and negative deviations from equilibrium 
would have symmetric effects on the speed of adjustment. Coakley and Fuertes (200 I) 
also employ a symmetric model to examine market segmentation in Europe. Their 
nonlinear models exhibit random behaviour near equilibrium but mean-reverting 
behaviour for large departures from fundamentals. 
For Asian economies, evidence of such non-linear exchange rate adjustment has 
been provided by Chen and Wu (2000), Baharumshah et al (2002), and Liew et al (2003. 
2004). Chen and Wu (2000) re-examine the hypothesis of PPP allowing for the 
adjustment to follow a nonlinear process. The analysis is conducted using monthly data 
of the local currencies against the US dollar for two countries, Taiwan and Japan. over 
the period 1974: 1-1997: 12. The results reject the linear framework in favour of an 
exponential smooth transition autoregressive (ESTAR) process for PPP deviations. 
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offering another explanation for the failure of long-run PPP in the existing literature. 
Moreover, the results provide evidence that in the presence of transaction costs. 
equilibrium models of real exchange rate determination present a nonlinear adjustment 
process toward PPP. 
Liew et al (2004) find that deviations from long run PPP of the major ASEAN 
exchange rates follow a nonlinear adjustment process which may be characterised by the 
Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) model. 
Baharumshah et al (2002) employ formal nonlinear unit root tests as developed by 
Sarno (200 I) to provide robust evidence of nonlinear mean reversion in the real exchange 
rates of four (Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) out of five (the 
exception is Malaysia) ASEAN countries. Sarno expands the Augmented Dickey and 
Fuller (ADF) test to its nonlinear version based on practical evidence that exchange rate 
adjustment follows the STAR process. Baharumshah et al (2002) suggest that cllrrent 
massive evidence based on traditional unit root tests may lead to misspecification and be 
biased against long run PPP. 
1.2.4. Non-linear dynamical models: Smooth Transition Error Correction Models 
As we mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, more recently, the use of 
symmetry-imposing models such as the TAR and its variants: the STAR and the ESTAR 
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models have been criticized. Escribano and Jorda ( 1999) and van Dijk et al. ( 1999). \\ hen 
examining STAR models. find that the presence of outliers. due to data contamination or 
"aberrant" observations. can considerably misrepresent the distributional properties of the 
LM type tests used to reject linearity, and may eventually lead researchers following a 
Terasvirta (1994) type methodology to incorrectly reject linearity and conclude nonlinear 
dynamics. 
On the other hand, Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) find that in the post-Louvre 
period the monetary authorities in the USA and Germany appear to act "leaning-against-
the-wind" and responded to the appreciations of their currency more strongly than to 
depreciations, suggesting asymmetry in intervention behaviour. Symmetry-imposing 
models such as the TAR and its variant models cannot capture this kind of asymmetric 
policy response. Similarly, Dutta and Leon (2002) argue that countries may choose to 
defend depreciations more or less vigorously than appreciations, thereby generating 
asymmetric rather than symmetric adjustment behaviour. 
In a recent paper, Arghyrou et al (2005) have argued that an assumption that the 
symmetric adjustment of exchange rates to over- and under-'.'aluations of the same 
magnitude may not be true, considering the possibility that a policymaker may be more 
responsive to exchange rate over-valuations than to under-valuations. 
Cerrato et al (2004) use two recently developed nonlinear unit root tests by Sollis 
et al (2002) and Kapetanios et al (2003), and a unique set of monthly data on black 
market exchange rates to provide evidence on nonlinear mean reversion in real exchange 
rates from thirty five developing and emerging market economies. Contrary to the results 
obtained from the standard linear ADF test, they find in more than half of their countries 
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under observation that the black market real exchange rate exhibits significant nonlinear 
mean reversion behaviour, described by the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) 
model. Compared to that reported for industrial countries. this fact is considered much 
stronger. They also find that the mean reversion process for most real exchange rates is 
significantly asymmetric. However, their results appear to support the logistic STAR 
model of Sollis et al (2002) rather than exponential STAR mean reversion process of 
Kapetanios et al (2003). These experimental results indicate that the exchange rate adjust 
to its long-run PPP level through a nonlinear STAR process. Their empirical findings also 
suggest that the linear methods employed in the literature for estimating half-life 
deviations from PPP might be inappropriate when the mean reversion process is 
nonlinear. 
Liew et al (2004) use sequential tests as proposed in Terasvirta and Anderson 
(1993) to provide robust empirical evidence of asymmetrical adjustment dynamics in 
response of the appreciation and depreciation of real exchange rates and the 
overvaluation and undervaluation of nominal exchange rates towards the PPP equilibrium 
levels. These results appear to support the argument that the US dollar based real 
exchange rates of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand display more 
evidence in favour of LSTAR-type nonlinearity rather than EST AR type nonlinearity. 
This implies that the LSTAR model is a more effective tool to predict the future 
behaviour of these exchange rates. Choosing the appropriate form of nonlinear exchange 
rate adjustment towards its equilibrium level is necessary as the exchange rate may act as 
a policy tool in stabilizing the economy of this region. 
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Caporale and Spagnolo (2004) compare the ability of 'lonlinear and standard 
linear models to capture the dynamics of foreign exchanges rates in the presence of 
structural breaks. The analysis is conducted using monthly data of the local currencies 
against the US dollar for three countries, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, over the 
period 1970: 1-2001 :5. The results suggest that a Markov regime-switching model with 
shifts in the mean and variance is more appropriate than a STAR model and a standard 
random walk model to capture the nonlinearities in exchange rates. 
Given the finding of a unit root in the exchange rate is not robust to nonlinear 
specifications, Leon and Najarian (2003) use three alternative nonlinear models to 
examine the stationarity of deviations from PPP in the context of nonlinearity and the 
symmetry of adjustment toward PPP. These three alternative nor.linear models are: (i) a 
Time Varying Threshold Autoregressive Model (TVTAR), which allows asymmetrical 
adjustment when real exchange rates deviate from forecasts, (ii) a Bi-parameter Smooth 
Transition Regression (BSTR), which allows for asymmetric adjustment between the 
middle and outer regimes, and (iii) a Markov Switching Model (MSM), where the change 
in the regimes in exchange rates dynamics is governed by an unobservable Markov chain. 
Among these models, a 3-regime smooth transition autoregressive model with 
asymmetric speeds of adjustment between regimes performs best, but not across all 
countries, while the Markov-Switching model performed the least. 
Employing monthly data to estimate the models for 26 countries, their results 
provide evidence to support stationarity in almost every case when nonlinearity is 
allowed for. Their results also provide evidence to support asymmetric adjustment 
dynamics although that asymmetry differs across countries. In this case. they uncover 
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variations in magnitudes, frequencies, and durations of the deviations of exchange rates 
from fixed and time-varying thresholds, both between over-appreciations and over-
depreciations and between industrial (all G7 members) and emerging (Asia and Latin 
America) economies. In particular, deviations during periods when the exchange rate is 
below forecasts (over-valued) are double that of during periods of under-valued. and is 
larger for emerging than for industrial economies. 
Arghyrou et al (2005) use the Quadratic Logistic Smooth Transition Error 
Correction Model (QL-STECM), as introduced by van Dijk et al (2002), when 
investigating asymmetric adjustment in the nominal exchange rates between the Greek 
Drachma and the Turkish Lira against the ECU (the Euro since 1999). The QL-STECM 
is considered better than the TAR and EST AR models since it not only allows the 
response of exchange rates to depend on the size of the deviation from equilibrium. but 
also the sign of the deviation from fundamentals. This model allows for different 
responses to under-valuations and over-valuations, allowing assessment of the 
importance of asymmetry in the exchange rate. Employing quarterly data over the period 
of 1982( 1 )-2000(4) for Greece and 1986( I )-2001 (3) for Turkey where they model 
fundamentals using PPP and 1980( 1 )-2000(4) for Greece and 1987( 1)- 2001(3) for 
Turkey in the case of FPMM fundamentals, they present some results of non-linear 
adjustment. This evidence in moderate and high inflation environments, of which Greece 
and Turkey are representative examples, would suggest that non-linearity is persistent. 
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1.3. EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES IN EAST ASIA 
Over decades, most of these four emerging economies have shifted from tixed 
exchange rate regimes, to fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate regimes \\ ith sporadic 
abrupt devaluations, to managed floats, and finally, in the aftermath of the 1997 currenq 
crisis, to a free-floating exchange rate arrangement. Each regime has its advantages and 
disadvantages. Fixing the exchange rate helps to reduce transaction costs and exchange 
rate risk. It can also operate as a credible nominal anchor for monetary policy. However. 
the dollar peg system employed before the crisis is believed to be part of the cause of a 
loss of confidence in their currencies in 1997. Alternatively, a floating exchange rate 
regime enables the domestic central bank to pursue an independent monetary policy. 
Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines moved to a floating exchange rate regime following 
the crisis, while Malaysia started pegging its currency to the U.S. dollar in September 
1998. 
In the following discussion of each country's exchange rate regime. we refer to. 
firstly, Table I which shows the official IMF categorizations of exchange rate regimes for 
these four countries. which is based on their own declaration concerning their exchange 
rate regimes, and. secondly, Table 2 showing the de facto classifications of exchange rate 
regimes identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). These two tables explore 
contradictions between the prevailing exchange rate regime and the de facto way 
exchange rate policy is actually conducted. As an illustration, a regime that is categorized 
as floating-rate -independently or managed- might. in effect. be a peg with which the 
country keeps its exchange rate within a narrow margin close to a fixed rate. 
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Tables 1 and 2 compare the exchange rate regime for each of these economies. in 
particular with respect to three major categories; fixed, intermediate and floating regimes. 
We identify a contradiction between measures in the case of the Philippines. \\ hose 
exchange rate regime since 1984 is classified by the IMF as floating, while the de facto 
classification is intermediate before August 1995, fixed between September 1995 and 
June 1997, and intermediate from December 1997 until the present-day. 
1.3.1. Indonesia 
The government of Indonesia fixed the rupiah to the U.S. dollar between 1970 
and 1971. On 15 August 1971, following the floating of the U.S. Dollar. the Rupiah was 
devalued by 9.70/0 from Rp378.00 to Rp415.00 per American dollar.25 Since then. the 
floating of the U.S. Dollar has led to the continuing devaluation of the Rupiah and 
reduction of gold content, forcing the country to adopt the exchange rate arrangement of 
crawling band to US dollar. In November 1978. after a major devaluation, the Bank 
Indonesia de jure introduced an effective rate on a controlled, floating basis. with the 
external value of the Rupiah determined against a basket of currencies of its main trading 
partners. Although this attempt was considered by most economists to be of little help. 
the central bank insisted on maintaining the managed float policy and even considered a 
wider range of currencies in 1983, immediately following another major devaluation. By 
contrast, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) claim that the de facto exchange rate regime 
adopted by Indonesia during this period is a crawling peg to the U.S. dollar. in which the 
~~ See http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hklexchangeJateJegime 
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Rupiah sl ides by several percent per year to offset the inflation gap between home and 
abroad. 
In the face of free capital mobility and inadequate international reserves during 
prominent Asian financial crisis, on 14 August 1997, Bank Indonesia swapped a managed 
floating exchange rate regime for a free-floating one, implying that the exchange rate of 
the Rupiah against the US dollar was to be determined solely by the market. Thus. the 
ongoing exchange rate mirrors the crossing point of supply and demand of domestic 
currency in terms of the US dollar. During periods of irregular exchange rate fluctuation. 
the bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market, buying or selling Rupiah in order to 
counter, respectively excess demand for or supply of the dollar, and so facilitate a stable 
"6 
exchange rate.-
The free-floating exchange rate regime is designed to discourage imprudent 
overseas borrowing, since market players have to consider the cost of possible 
movements of the Rupiah. With imperfect domestic financial markets. such as a thin 
foreign exchange market and limited availability of hedging instruments, a floating rate 
system often leads to high volatility with adverse consequences for stability. Therefore 
although the bank formally adopts a floating rate system, in practice it considers that 
smoothing of exchange rate movements is necessary. This is in line with Calvo and 
Reinhart (2000),s proposition that very few countries adopting a floating rate system rule 
out interventions to curb volatility in their exchange rates. Such interventions are 
conducted both through direct intervention on the foreign exchange market and through 
the use of interest rates. 
~h This is commonly known as sterilization. 
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1.3.2. South Korea 
Korea pegged its currency to the US dollar between 1974 and 1980. during \\ hich 
time it suffered four major devaluations. The first devaluation occurred in mid 1971 in 
response to the establishment of a fluctuating certificate rate system. The Korean Won 
was cut from W327.40(8uy)/328.90(Sell) to W370.00/371.60 per U.S. Dollar.:!? The 
second devaluation happened in December of the same year when the government of 
Korea reduced the gold content of the Korean Won by 7.890/0, following the devaluation 
of the U.S. Dollar. The next devaluation came in mid 1972 when the Won declined to 
W399.00 per U.S. Dollar. Following the 1973 devaluation of the dollar. Seoul reduced 
the gold content of the Korean Won by 100/0 so as to retain the unit's exchange rate at 
W399.00 per U.S. Dollar. \\lith increasing oil prices and higher imports costs. the gold 
content of the Korean Won was cut by 46.88%, and the basic rate devalued to W480.00 
per U.S. Dollar. At the same time, the fluctuating certificate rate depreciated to W484.00 
per U.S. Dollar. The exchange rate in the exchange certificate market was maintained 
around W484.00 per U.S. Dollar.28 The Ministry of Finance delegated to the Bank of 
Korea additional powers to approve foreign exchange transactions. 
In February 1980, almost 19 years after it was implemented, the single currency 
peg system against the U.S. Dollar was abolished. The government introduced a 
controlled, floating effective rate, linking to a basket of its major trading partners' 
currencies. in particular the U.S dollar, the Japanese Yen, German Mark and Canadian 
17 World Currency Year Book 1984 
1R IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restriction (IMF) 
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Dollar. The regime, commonly known as the multiple currency basket peg system. allows 
the currency to fluctuate within a percentage range against the fundamental rate?) 
In March 1990, the bank swapped the effective rate for a Market Average Rate 
(MAR), which is known as a managed floating exchange rate regime, with the exchange 
rate determined by the market forces in the interbank market, the Seoul foreign exchange 
market. Under the MAR system, the intra-day variation of the Korean Won-U.S. Dollar 
spot rate is fixed within a narrow band. The central bank of Korea restricted the banks 
from quoting rates too close to the upper or lower limits of the band (Chung et ai, 2000. 
p. 9-11). The fluctuation range of the exchange rate in the inter-bank market was \videned 
from 0.4% to 2.250/0 during 1990-1995.30 
The contagion factor from the Thai Baht's steep devaluation and Thailand's 
decision to float its currency on 2 July 1997 pushed the Korean Won to depreciate 
rapidly. Attempting to defend the local currency, the Korean government widened its 
Won trading band from 2.25% to 10% on 19 November 1997, and finally abolished the 
band. allowing the Won to float on 12 December 1997 (Chung et. ai, 2000, p.12). 
1.3.3. The Philippines 
During the 1970s, the country had a multiple rate structure whereby rates for 
foreign exchange transactions on exports, imports and foreign debts were set on the basis 
2<) This is commonly known as crawling band. 
10 See http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hklexchange_rateJegime 
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ofa daily "guided rate". From 1970 to 1973, the government forced exporters to change 
around 80% of their foreign exchange earnings at an "official rate" which \\as tixed at 
3.90 peso per U.S dollar. The rate was considered low and detrimental to exporters. 
leading to massive complaints from business players. As a result, the government 
exchanged the policy for stabilization tax on traditional exports. However. this new 
policy was also considered to be another form of stealing from traditional exporters 
(Bautista, 1987). 
During the 1980s, following increasing economic growth in the region and the 
1983 financial crisis, the government of the Philippines liberalized the foreign trading 
sector. In October 1984, the multiple rate structure was abolished and a floating exchange 
rate regime introduced. Under the new regime, supply and demand in the exchange 
market determined the inter-bank rate. The central bank only intervened in the market in 
order to maintain an orderly market condition and any other objectives related to political 
interests. 
In 1992, the government liberalized and simplified exchange regulations for trade 
and non-trade transactions, allowing direct repatriation and remittances without preceding 
endorsement from the central bank. Exporters were allowed to buy and sell foreign 
exchange without restriction, as well as to maintain foreign currency accounts and 
transfer foreign exchange abroad for deposit or investment purposes. However. 
restrictions on foreign investments and foreign borrowings remained in place. The central 
bank continued to enforce a ceiling on foreign exchange positions in domestic banks' 
account balance and compel them to sell their excess foreign exchange to other 
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commercial banks or to the monetary authority. In mid 1993. the peso began to depreciate 
because of speculative pressures following a sizable trade deficit. 
Between September 1995 and June 1997, the bank tied its currency to the dollar. 
albeit rather loosely, by combining discretion and market pressure with varying \veights. 
However, following the end of a long period of relative exchange-rate stability in East 
Asia with the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997, the Philippine peso also devalued 
with monthly year-on-year depreciation jumping to 10.45% in July 1997. compared with 
only 0.69% the previous month and single digit annual rates of change prior to the 
crisis.31 A conventional prescription given by the IMF is to use contractionary monetary 
policy to counter depreciation pressures rather than targeting any particular exchange rate 
level (see Boorman et aI., 2000, p. 8). In the aftermath of this well known Asian financial 
crisis, the country adopted a free-floating regime in December 1997, which remains in 
place until the present. 
1.3.4. Malaysia 
Malaysia pegged its currency to the Pound Sterling during the Bretton Woods 
period. In June 1967. the unit of M$ was created but still linked to the British currency. In 
June 1972, following the floating of Sterling and the breaking up of the Sterling area. the 
government of Malaysia adopted the U.S. Dollar as the intervention currency replacing 
Sterling. As with most East Asian economies. during this period, Malaysia adopted U.S. 
31 The annual depreciation rate of the peso stood at 52.06% in 1997 compared with 0.28% in 1996. 
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dollar peg systems for its exchange rate mechanism. In support of the Malaysian 
Government, the Bank Negara Malaysia managed exchange rate controls in which the 
effective rate was set up with a variable range. 
In June 1973, Malaysia replaced the effective rate to its dollar on a controlled. 
floating basis, with the Bank Negara Malaysia intervening only to maintain orderly 
market conditions and to avoid excessive fluctuations in the value of the Ringgit in terms 
of Malaysia'S trading partners and the currencies of settlement (Ariff, p.329). 
In June 1975, the Malaysian government replaced the controlled. floating 
effective rate with a new exchange rate regime in which the external value of the Ringgit 
was to be determined in terms of a basket of representative major currencies, weighted on 
the basis of the major currencies of settlement, as well as that of currencies of countries 
which were the major trading partners of Malaysia (Ariff, p.159). 
From the time the M$ was officially renamed in August 1975, becoming the 
Ringgit (RM), it was stable against the dollar, although the monetary authority officially 
adopted a multiple currency basket system. However, following the Asian financial crisis, 
in July 1997, the exchange rate of the Ringgit ceased to be determined by the demand and 
supply in the foreign exchange market. In September 1998, the Bank returned to a fixed 
exchange rate system, pegging the Ringgit to the U.S. Dollar at a rate of RM3.80 per $1. 
The peg remains in place now. 
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1.4. Methodology 
1.4.1. Models of equilibrium nominal exchange rates 
Exchange rates are extremely complex variables that economists and tinancial 
engineers historically have found to be difficult to model effectively. However, a ne\\ 
approach concentrating on six popular explanations for nominal exchange rate 
determination as extended to the PPP, will be examined in this section. The first 
explanation is, naturally the PPP itself. According to PPP theory, the exchange rate \vill 
adjust so as to offset differences in domestic and foreign inflation rates, with the result 
that the same quantity of internationally traded goods can be bought at home as abroad 
with a given amount of the domestic currency.32 This condition should hold, otherwise 
there is an arbitrage opportunity to purchase goods in the country where they are cheaper, 
by converting money into the currency of that country, and resell them in the country 
where they are more expensive. 
The second explanation is the relative permanent output shock model. Balassa 
(1964) says that exchange rates appreciate when the differentials in the production of 
traded goods between two countries increases. In addition, Bahmani-Oskooee (1992) and 
Dibooglu (1996) employ cointegration analysis to show that exchange rates and 
productivity differentials are cointegrated and thus have a long-run relationship in 
developed economies when compared to the USA, supporting the Balassa model, 
evidence for which has also been found by Halpern and Wyplosz (1997). Grafe and 
,~ While the word parity basically means equality, the phrase purchasing power itself refers to the value of 
money. Accordingly, purchasing power parity is considered as the equal value of money. 
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Wyplosz (1999), Krajnyak and Zettelmeyer (1998). and Crespo-Cuaresma et al (2004 ).n 
Exchange rates will also appreciate permanently following positive and permanent 
demand shocks (Rogoff, 1996) relative to its main trading partners. Conversel\,. the 
exchange rate will depreciate if there are economy-wide supply shocks. On the other 
hand, in the Balance of Payment (BOP) flows model, a relative rise in domestic economic 
activity, which leads to increase imports and/or decrease export, results in a depreciation 
of the domestic currency value. 
The reason for this disparity is as follows. In the monetary model, an increase in 
domestic economic activity gives rise to an increase in the demand for domestic money. 
which leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency. By contrast, in the BOP flows 
model, an increase in domestic economic activity results in a deterioration of the 
domestic trade balance, leading to a depreciation of the domestic currency. So the overall 
effects of permanent output shocks are ambiguous. 
In the third explanation, the Flexible Price Monetary Model (FPMM), a rising 
interest rate differential is assumed to lead to a decline in the value of the domestic 
currency. The reason for this is that, in the monetary model, interest rate differentials 
reflect differences in expected inflation rates, which in turn reflect differences in 
expected future monetary growth rates. If a country experiences a rise in domestic 
interest rates, it is because inflationary expectations in that country have risen. Thus. 
according to the FPMM, a relative rise in domestic interest rates, which reflects an 
increase in domestic inflationary expectations, will give rise to a depreciation of the 
domestic currency's value. By contrast, the traditional BOP flows model of exchange rate 
U See also Bahamani-Oskooee and Rhee (1996). De Broeck and Siok (200 I), Sarno and Taylor (200 I). 
Egert (2002). Egert and Lahreche-Revil (2003). 
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determination, where a relative rise in domestic interest rates results in an appreciation in 
the value of the domestic currency. 
The reason for this disparity is as follows. In the case of a rise in domestic interest 
rates, the domestic currency will depreciate in the monetary model as the demand for 
domestic money declines. In contrast, in the BOP flows model, a rise in domestic interest 
rates increases the capital into the country, which results in an appreciation of the 
domestic currency. So the overall effects of interest rate differentials are ambiguous. 
In the next explanation, Shafer and Loopesko (1983) and Boughton (1987) 
present empirical results confirming a long-run relationship between exchange rates and 
interest rate differentials. Assuming perfect asset substitutability, the real exchange rate 
will appreciate significantly if the real interest differentials become wider. In addition, 
Frankel (1979) develops a model of real interest rate differentials in which he states that a 
rapid and unexpected domestic money supply growth may cause sizeable downward 
pressure on the value of domestic currency if it (1) works to lower real interest rates 
temporarily leading to capital out-flow and (2) indicates to the market that monetary 
growth wi II proceed at a new faster pace in the future. 
In the fifth model, we take empirical results from Dornbusch and Fischer (1980), 
Hooper and Morton (1982), Gavin (1991), Faruqee (1995), and Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995), in particular their finding that, in the long-run, the relationship between net 
foreign assets and the exchange rate is negative. This implies that, in equilibrium. a 
country suffering from negative net foreign assets must have a trade surplus in order to 
tinance their payments on interest and dividends which could be done through 
depreciating its exchange rates. Hence, any changes in net foreign assets have a long-run 
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effect on the exchange rate given that goods produced in different countries are not 
perfect substitutes. 
Finally, in the sixth explanation, Gross (1987) extends the popular asset market 
model of exchange rate determination when testing the model on DM. Yen. and UK 
pound exchange rates vis-a.-vis the dollar by examining the implications of having two 
large countries and allowing trade in assets denominated in multiple currencies. He 
presents a strong theoretical case for the importance of the current account in determining 
exchange rates in which nonzero current account balances imply changes in a country's 
net foreign asset position which affect exchange rates as investors rebalance their 
portfolios. On the other hand, Macfarlane and Tease (1989) say that it was ditlicult to 
find and quantify any systematic link between the current account and the exchange rate. 
Bring these various accounts together, we model equilibrium exchange rates using 
the general behavioural specification described in equation (1.1) below: 34 
( 1.1 ) 
In (1.1). s denotes the market (observed) exchange rate of the domestic currency 
against the US dollar. p the price level approximated by the consumer price index. /' the 
level of permanent output; rand i real and nominal interest rates respectively; rnfa real 
net foreign assets. llrnfa the change in real net foreign assets, which serves as a proxy for 
current account; and &, a white noise error term. All variables. except from nominal and 
, .. Equation (I) can be seen as the likely MacDonald (2003), general behaviour model. 
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real interest rates are expressed in logs, with the subscript USA denoting variables 
referring to the USA and L\ being the first difference operator. Given that the log of 
negative numbers is not defined, when a country's net foreign asset position is recorded 
by IFS to be negative, an extra variable, real net foreign liabilities (rnfl), is added in (1.1). 
In such cases, real net foreign liabilities (assets) are defined as the maximum of the log of 
the absolute value of the liabilities (assets) and zero. 
Equation (1.1) nests the benchmark model of exchange rate determination. PPP. 
which postulates that nominal exchange rates are a function only of the ratio of domestic 
to foreign price level. In particular, if a = 0 and /31= -/32 = 1 and /33 = /34 = /35 = A = P, = O. 
the absolute form of PPP holds, while relative PPP allows for a non-zero constant. 
However, measurement errors in price levels result in weak-form PPP. which only 
requires /3/> 0 and /32 < 0 (see Taylor, 1988). 
Our specification extends the benchmark PPP model by accounting for factors 
that can have an effect on exchange rates in the medium/long-run. First, it allows for the 
exchange rate effects of productivity shocks predicted by equ:librium models of the 
exchange rate, originally developed by Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982), and discussed 
by Taylor (1995, pp. 24-26). Equilibrium models assume two countries producing two 
separate goods under full price flexibility, in which case y and Yusa respectively denote 
domestic and foreign (USA) full-employment output levels. In equilibrium models. an 
increase in domestic output relative to the foreign one has two analytically separate 
effects. The first. defined by Taylor as a money demand effect, results in an increase in 
demand for money which in turn reduces equilibrium domestic prices and ultimately 
leads to real and nominal exchange rate appreciation. This outcome is identical to the one 
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caused by increases in domestic output in monetary models of exchange rate 
determination (see e.g. Frenkel, 1976). But monetary models do not account for a second 
possible effect captured by equilibrium models. This is defined by Taylor as a relative 
price effect according to which increased domestic output results in a reduction in its 
relative price vis-a-vis foreign production contributing towards real and nominal home 
currency depreciation. 
Ultimately, whether the exchange rate will finally appreciate or depreciate as a 
result of a shock in productivity depends on the degree of substitutability bet\\'~en 
domestic and foreign goods, with real and nominal appreciation (depreciation) being 
more likely the higher (lower) the degree of substitutability. Real and nominal 
appreciation as a result of increased domestic productivity becomes higher if the 
domestic economy experiences Balassa (1964) - Samuelson (1964) effects. Such effects 
take place within the context of a two-sector (traded and non-traded) economy, when the 
productivity shocks apply to the traded sector only. Increased productivity in the traded 
sector results in higher wages throughout the economy. Although the prices of the traded 
sector remain fixed as a result of international goods' arbitrage, higher wages increase the 
prices of non-traded goods and the general price level, thus leading to real exchange rate 
appreciation. 
Equation (1.1) also includes the nominal interest rate differential (i-h·s .. ,)" which 
aims to capture the effects of shifting medium-term inflation expectations, reflecting in 
turn demand conditions. In monetary models such as the one by Frenkel (1976). an 
increase in the domestic nominal interest rate relative to the foreign one signals an 
increase in domestic relative inflation and thus to nominal home-currency depreciation. 
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On the other hand. the real interest rate differential (r-rl'.S:4),. is included to capture the 
effects of price rigidities on exchange rates predicted by Dornbuch's (1976) sticky-price 
overshooting model. In Dornbuch's model, price rigidities imply that an increase in short-
term interest rates also results in increases in real interest rates, leading to capital inflows 
and, finally, domestic currency appreciation (see also Hallwood and MacDonald 2000. 
pp. 175-209). 
Modelling nominal exchange rates on price levels, relative output and nominal 
and real interest rate differentials is a variant of the hybrid monetary model proposed by 
Frankel (1979). We extend this specification by adding another two variables. The first is 
real net foreign assets (rnfa)" included to capture the wealth effects of accumulated 
current account imbalances. Portfolio balance models of the exchange rate. such as 
Branson (1983), predict that increasing the stock of foreign assets held by domestic 
agents results in expectations of future capital inflows, leading to a real appreciation of 
the domestic currency. More recently, however, authors such as Faruqee (1995) have 
developed stock-flow models of the exchange rate, arguing that in the medium-run the 
negative relationship between exchange rates and net foreign assets may be reversed. 
This is because the higher growth prospects of emerging economies cannot be financed 
by domestic savings only, but also through increased foreign borrowing leading to 
foreign liabilities. Nevertheless, in the long-run, payments on the existing stock of 
foreign liabilities would restore the negative relationship, as the higher the stock of 
foreign liabilities. the higher the need for real exchange rate depreciation to service the 
debt through an improved current account. 
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The last variable included in (1.1) is the change in the stock of real net foreign 
assets, (!J.rnfa)" which serves as a proxy for the movements of the current account. The 
effects of the latter on the exchange rate remain unclear and subject to debate. Rogoff 
(1996, p. 663) has described the literature's agnostic state by stating that. "from a 
theoretical perspective, virtually any correlation between the current account and the real 
exchange rate can be easily rationalise. Ultimately, the correlation between the current 
account and the real exchange rate is an empirical matter, one that remains the subject of 
debate". 
To summarize, in estimating (1.1) we expect to obtain /31> 0, /32 < 0, /33, /3.+, /3s, 
/36, and p, can take both a positive and a negative sign. The fitted values of (1.1), denoted 
by s, provide an estimate for the behavioural equilibrium level of the nominal exchange 
rate, in which case the estimated residuals of (1.1) represent the deviation of the market 
nominal exchange rate from its equilibrium level (the misalignment term). 
1.4.2. Linear-error correction models 
In this section we estimate benchmark linear models of exchange rate adjustment 
described by equation ( 1.2) below: 
/I 11/ 
&',= 'LP'&'/-I + 'Ly,!J.S,-, + 8(s-s),_1 + V, 
,=1 ,=0 
( 1.2) 
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where s denotes the market (observed) nominal exchange rate, s the equilibrium nominal 
exchange rate obtained from the fitted values of equation (1.1), ~ is the first ditTerence 
operator and v is a white-noise error term. The speed of adjustment of the market 
exchange rate towards its equilibrium level is given by the coefficient of the error 
correction term (8- S )/_1, which measures exchange rate misalignment.35 According to the 
Granger representation theorem, a cointegrating relationship can be represented as an 
error correction specification and vice-versa, therefore lack of statistical signiticance of 
the is coefficient suggests lack of cointegration in equation (1.1 ). 
1.4.3. Tests for non-linear exchange-rate adjustment 
Non-linearity is a hypothesis which we can test formally using the testing 
approach proposed by Saikonnen and Luukkonen (1988), Luukkonen et al (1988). 
Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Terasvirta (1994). This inv01ves estimation of the 
artificial regression given by (1.3): 
k 
(s - 8")/ = Poo + L {ro,l (s - 8"),-.1 + PI,I (s - 8"),_.1 (s - 8"),_d + P2,1 (s - 8"),_.1 (s - 8");_(/ 
.1=1 
(1.3) 
~s An alternative modelling approach would be to substitute (1.1) into (1.2) and estimate the resulting 
equation &, = P(L) & S,.I + r(L) & (11"=,) + t5(s - 11"= )'-1 + &'. with =~ defined as [p"puso". (y P-/'I1.~/J)" 
(r-r ) (,' - i ), rnl'a, and tvnfa,] We prefer equation (1.2) to this alternative because it requires usa " usa,.I' . . .. .. • 
estimation of a smaller number of parameters, an Important conSIderatIon when estlmatmg non-linear 
models using relatively short samples. 
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where (s - s), is the exchange rate misalignment measured by residual from 
equation (1.1), d is the delay parameter of the transition function to be used in the non-
linear models discussed below, u(t) is a white-noise error term; and the rest of the 
variables are defined as per above. The null hypothesis of linear adjustment of the market 
exchange rate s to its equilibrium level s is described by Ho: [p Ij= Pl.J = P3J =p 4 =Ps = 0] 
for allj E (I ,2 ... ,k), with the autoregressive parameter k being determined by the partial 
autocorrelation function of the transition function (s- S ).36 The testing procedure involves 
estimating (1.3) for all plausible values of d, testing in each estimation round the 
statistical significance of the linearity restrictions. If linearity is rejected for more than 
one values of d, the latter's optimal value is determined by the test score with the lowest 
p-value (i.e. the highest value for the test's score). 
1.4.4. Non-linear error correction models 
In this section we model the non-linear exchange rate dynamics identified above 
using the Quadratic Logistic Smooth Transition Error Correction Model (QL-STECM). 
discussed in detail by van Dijk et al (2002) and described by equations (1.4) to (1.7) 
below: 37 
~6 Granger and Teriisvirta (1993) and Terisvirta (1994) advise against choosing k using information criteria 
such as the Akaike on the grounds that this may result in a downward bias, affecting the results of the non-
linearity tests. 
17 Being a model of smooth transition, the QL-STECM is consistent with the assumptions of theoretical 
models of non-linear exchange rate dynamics which explicitly postulate a smooth adjustment between the 
inner and outer regimes (see e.g. Dumas, 1 992). In addition. even if individuals are assumed to switch 
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(1.4 ) 
n k 
RII = I /3" f::.s,_1 + I Yi/ f::.Sf-I + hi (s- S )/-1 + &11 ( 1.5) 
1=1 1=1 
n k 
Ro/ = I/3,()/~·S'-i + Iy,()f::.Sf-I + ~ (S-S)t-l + &01 ( 1.6) 
i=1 1=1 
1r, = pr { l:5, (s- S )t-d:5, ,U} = 1 - . -: I I. . -: , 1 + e -0'[(.1-.1 ),_,,-r j[(.I-.1 ),_,,-r I (1.7) 
The QL-STECM models non-linear exchange rate dynamics through equations 
(1.5) and (1.6). These are linear error-correction models describing exchange rate 
dynamics under conditions of small and large exchange rate misalignment, respectively. 
describing two regimes, the inner (Rtt) and outer (Ro,) regime. The regimes are detined 
by two threshold values, the upper (rv) and the lower (C), which define a band within 
which the speed of adjustment to equilibrium assumes a value different from the one 
prevailing outside the band. In addition, the regime is also determined by the value of the 
transition variable (s -S )/-d, a lagged value of the misalignment term which can be 
interpreted as the publicly available market signal whose size agents use in order to 
assess whether currency trading takes place in conditions of inner or outer regime. We 
expect r'- < 0 and rU >0. Nominal exchange rates are mainly determined by Rtl (the inner 
between random-walk and mean reverting behaviour in a sudden, discrete way, aggregate regime shifts are 
expected to be smooth rather than discrete, given that heterogeneous agents are unlikely to act 
simultaneously, even when making dichotomous decisions (Dumas, 1994). 
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regime) when the nominal exchange rate is close to its equilibrium value described b) 
(1.1) and mainly by Rot (outer regime) in periods of significant exchange rate 
misalignment. The speed of adjustment of the exchange rate differs between regimes if 81 
:/; bo. Size misalignment effects in the process of exchange rate adjustment would exist if 
bl < bo. A combination of bl = 0 and bo < 0 would be a special case of such effects. 
indicating that the exchange rate follows a random walk in the inner regime (R1) but 
converges to its fundamentals' consistent equilibrium in the outer regime (Ro). It implies 
that nominal exchange rates adjust towards its fundamental value in the outer regime. 
We could also see that the QL-STECM models actual exchange rate changes. /).s,. 
as a weighted average of RI and Ro, with the weights of each regime determined by lr,. 
the probability of the transition variable (s -."f )t-d taking values in the inner regime. This 
probability is modelled using the quadratic logistic function in equation (1.7). where 0 
denotes the speed of transition between the two regimes while -I and rl '. respectively 
denote the upper and lower limit of the inner regime. This functions has the properties 
that (i) lr, becomes constant as 0----.0 and (ii) as 0----'00, lr, = 0 if (s-s),_t/<-I or 
(s - '~)(-d > l' and 1ft = 1 if -I < (s - s), < l' (see Jansen and Terasvirta, 1996). All three 
parameters (cr, -I and l') are estimated by the model and suggest that the model also 
captures a certain type of sign effects implied from non-symmetric regime thresholds. 
This is another advantage of the QL-STECM as it implies that unlike the TAR and the 
ESTAR models38• it does not impose symmetry on the values of the inner regime 
.18 In the QL-STECM model. we test whether -l + I' = O. In the case where -l + I' = O. we conclude that 
the model is in effect equivalent to the EST AR model since the speed of adjustment depends only on the 
size of the deviation of exchange rates from fundamentals. If I + I' * O. we say that the model is more 
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thresholds, thus allowing the capture of asymmetries in the process of exchange rate 
adjustment. Such asymmetries exist if 1 + I' ::;: 0; in particular if 1 + l' > O. negative 
misalignment values are corrected faster than positive ones, which implies that 
fundamental undervaluation is more likely than overvaluation. If, on the other hand 
1+11<0, fundamental undervaluation is corrected faster than ovel'valuation. Finally. if l 
+ 'l = 0, exchange rate adjustment is symmetric, in which case the QL-STECM reduces 
to an EST AR type-model, since the speed of adjustment depends only on the size of the 
deviation of exchange rates from fundamentals. It implies that deviations of exchange 
rates from the equilibrium in either direction are seen as equally bad. 
1.5. DATA 
Our data source is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) made available through Datastream. Due to non-
availability of some of the series involved in our analysis on a monthly basis. we work 
with data of quarterly frequency. To avoid potential biases from mixing periods of fixed 
and floating exchange rate regime, we focus on those periods during which the exchange 
rates of the currencies we examine were not rigidly pegged to the US dollar. against 
which the countries examined followed a monetary policy of managed-floating. These are 
1978(3)-2003(4) for Indonesia; 1975(3)-1998(3) for Malaysia. 1981(4)-2003(4) for the 
general than the ESTAR model since the speed of adjustment depends both on the size and on the sign of 
the deviation from equilibrium. 
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Philippines; and 1980(1)-2003(4) for South Korea. Concentrating in periods of managed 
exchange rates makes our previous discussion on asymmetries in the process of exchange 
rate adjustment even more relevant. 
Nominal exchange rates are defined as number of units of domestic currency per 
unit of foreign currency, so that an increase (reduction) denotes depreciation 
(appreciation) of the domestic currency. The movements of nominal exchange rates 
during the periods covered by our samples are presented in Figure 1.1. For all countries 
we observe a depreciation trend, with spikes in periods of discrete devaluations. most 
notably during the crisis of 1997/98. Not surprisingly. the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root tests we have calculated and presented in Table 1.3 suggest that all series 
are non-stationary and they are integrated of order I. 
The econometric approach we use in section 1.4.1 above is based on a 
behavioural specification that includes variables accounting for a number of theoretical 
approaches to exchange rate determination. These are domestic and foreign (USA) price 
levels, relative permanent (full-employment) output levels, real and nominal interest rate 
differentials, current account imbalances and real net foreign assets. We define price 
levels to be consumer price indexes, and as shown in Table 1.3 all of which were found 
to be I( 1) series when tested by AOF tests. GOP data is not available for the countries we 
examine on a quarterly basis; as a result, we follow studies such as the one by Clarida et 
al ( 1998) and approximate output using industrial or manufacturing volume 
indexes.3Q,40.41 To smooth out the effects of demand shocks and thus obtain a measure of 
lQ For Indonesia. an industrial or manufacturing production series was not available for the whole of the 
sample period covered by our analysis. Given the high importance of oil production for this country. we 
approximate output using the crude petroleum production index provided by IFS. 
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full-employment output, we follow the same studies and de-trend the output-proxy series 
by means of using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) .. t~. 43 As shown 
in Table ].3, the ADF and PP tests applied to all relative permanent output series reject 
the stationarity hypothesis. 
Nominal interest rates are typically included in exchange rate modelling to 
capture the effects of inflation expectations and, by impl ication, cycl ical demand 
conditions. For this purpose, our preferred variable is long-term government bond yields. 
however such a series was not available for all countries. As the best available proxy, we 
use the long-term lending rate (working-capital loans' rate) for Indonesia; the one-year 
money market rate for Malaysia, the one-year lending rate for the Philippines; the IO-year 
government bond yield for South Korea; and the ] O-year government bond yield for the 
USA. Real interest rates are calculated using the Fischer equation, r = i_7r e where r, i and 
7r
e 
respectively denote real interest rate, nominal interest rate and expected inflation. 
Real interest rates are used in real exchange rate modelling to capture Dornbusch 
(1976) type overshooting effects. These are based on price rigidities and result from 
expected capital gains created by increases in short-term interest rates. As a result, for all 
countries real interest rates are calculated using a short-term nominal interest rate, namely 
-I() Given the high importance of manufacturing production for all four countries involved in our analysis. 
this approximation, also widely used in other econometric applications such as empirical models of 
monetary policy (see for example Clarida et ai, 1998), can be considered a reasonable one. 
41 We are certainly believe that using available GDP data is more appropriate to estimate this model. We 
reserve this for our further research. However, the industrial, manufacturing or crude petroleum production 
index seem to capture relatively well the fundamentals driving aggregate production and can in principle be 
considered as a good proxy available. 
-I~ To obtain the Hodrick-Prescott trend, we set the value of a smoothing parameter at the recommended 
value for quarterly data of 1600. 
·0 The size of our sample periods implies that in addition to permanent relative supply shocks. ultimately 
transitory yet relatively persistent demand shocks may also have an effect on the fitted output series. This 
implies that our relative permanent output series may capture both permanent supply and demand shocks 
dying out at a slow rate. As a highly persistent positive demand shock would result in real appreciation for 
the domestic country, this increases the possibility of obtaining a negative coefficient for A in equation 
(I.I ). 
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the domestic money-market overnight rate (federal funds rate for the USA). We define Jr 
to be CPI inflation over a period of a calendar year, with expected inflation Jr' 
approximated using actual CPI inflation rates four quarters ahead so that 
The AOF tests, as shown in Table 1.3, suggest that with two possible exceptions (the 
nominal interest rate differential in Korea and Malaysia), all interest rate differential 
series (both nominal and real) are stationary. 
Finally, regarding real net foreign assets and current account imbalances, we 
would have liked to include these series into the analysis as percentages in GDP. 
However, due to the lack of availability of GOP on a quarterly basis, that was not 
possible. We have therefore used the level of real net foreign assets, calculated by 
deflating the nominal net foreign assets series provided by IFS using the CPI index. We 
use the change in the stock of real net foreign assets as a proxy for a country's current 
account position. All real net foreign series were found to be I( I), with their changes 
being stationary. Non-stationarity for nominal exchange rates, relative output and real net 
foreign assets implies that any econometric analysis aiming to model the nominal 
exchange rate using the variables discussed above has to be undertaken within a 
cointegration framework . 
.w This approximation is very common in empirical models of monetary policy (see Clarida et al. 1998). 
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1.6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
1.6.1. Models of equilibrium exchange rates 
Our sample periods cover approximately twenty five years, a data-span which. for 
the purpose of modelling real exchange rates, is better described as medium- rather than 
long-run. Within this medium-term time horizon, ultimately transitory yet long-memory 
shocks, such as shifts in relative demand and real interest rate differentials. can cause 
exchange rate effects, along with those caused by changes of a more permanent nature. 
such as productivity gains. To capture the full range of these effects, we estimate (1.1) 
using a general-to-specific approach, involving sequential elimination of all statistically 
insignificant variables. 
Estimate of our parsimonious specifications are reported in Table 104. For all 
countries, p and PU.\<1 are statistically significant and have the theoretically expected 
signs. Relative output is also statistically significant for all equations, however its sign 
differs across countries. For Indonesia and the Philippines P3 is negative, which suggests 
that the Balassa-Samuelson and money demand effects discussed above dominate the 
relative price effect. The opposite holds for Malaysia and South Korea, countries for 
which we obtain a positive sign for ~3. Nominal interest rate differentials are significant 
for two countries (Indonesia and the Philippines), with the theory-consistent positive 
sign. while real interest rates are also significant for two countries, Malaysia and the 
Philippines, again entering (1.1) with the expected negative sign. 
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Turning to real net foreign assets, these are significant for three out of four 
countries but with varying sign. For the Philippines and South Korea, foreign assets 
accumulation results in nominal depreciation. This finding is consistent with the 
predictions of the stock-flow approach, and is not surprising, given the high-growth of 
these economies during the relatively short time period we work with. By contrast. in 
Malaysia, for which our sample period is larger, net foreign assets enter (1.1) with a 
negative sign, which is consistent with the predictions of traditional models of the 
nominal exchange rate, as well as with those of the stock-flow approach for the long-run 
horizon. It is interesting to note that in the case of Malaysia, the nominal exchange rate 
responses to the stock of net foreign assets only, not to those of net foreign liabilities. 
Similar non-monotonic results are obtained for the two countries for which our 
proxy for the current account, the change in real net foreign assets or liabilities, is 
statistically significant. In the case of Malaysia, the exchange rate responds (with a 
positive sign) to changes in real net foreign assets, but not to those of net foreign 
liabilities; in the case of the Philippines, the link is even more complex with the exchange 
rate depreciating when the change in real net foreign assets increases and appreciating 
when net foreign liabilities increase. These findings reaffirm the ambiguity of the nature 
of the link between exchange rates on the one hand and current account/real assets' 
accumulation on the other, but add an extra element to it, as they suggest that the nature 
of the link may differ not only across countries, but also within the same country, 
depending on the sign of the current account balance and the net foreign assets' position 
(surplus/deficit, net assets/net liabilities), Providing a theoretical explanation for this 
ambiguity exceeds the scope of an empirical study such as the present one; however our 
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empirical findings can motivate theoretical work rationalizing and formalizing the non-
monotonic link identified here. 
The cointegration ADF tests reported at the end of Table 1.4 suggest that three out 
of four equations are clearly cointegrated at the 5 per cent level or better, which ensures 
that the findings discussed above are not reflecting spurious correlation among the 
variables involved. For the remaining equation (Malaysia), the cointegration test is less 
clear, with the ADF score being significant only at the 1 ° per cent level. As discussed in 
the introduction, this ambiguity may reflect the low-power of the ADF test and/or the 
existence of non-linear cointegration, a hypothesis formally tested in section 1.6.3 below. 
Finally, it is worthy to note that as a test of robustness we have estimated equation (!.I) 
adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter by 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 percent upwards and 
downwards. The results reported in Table 1.4 remain robust to these changes. 
To summarise, our empirical findings in this section suggest that over the past 
three decades nominal exchange rates in all four Asian economies examined by our 
analysis have been influenced by both monetary and output shocks and, at different 
degrees and ways, by factors such as nominal and real interest rate differentials, foreign 
assets' accumulation and changes in current account balances. These, combined with the 
fact that the exchange rate effects of changes in relative output differs across countries, 
leads us to the conclusion that the exchange rates of the four Asian economies we 
examine presents similarities but, at the same time, strong elements of idiosyncratic 
behaviour, which confirms the possible biases that may arise by modelling exchange rate 
using fixed-parameter panel data techniques. 
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1.6.2. Linear-error correction models 
We estimate (1.2) using a general-to-specific approach starting with 16 lags and 
gradually reducing the model so that it only includes statistically significant terms. Table 
1.5 presents our parsimonious estimates. All equations were estimated including intercept 
dummy variables taking the value of I for periods of currency crises and other major 
economic events, zero otherwise. The dummies which proved to be statistically 
significant are reported at the bottom of the Table 1.5. Excluding the crisis dummies does 
not change significantly the qualitative nature of our findings, but results in non-
normality and heteroscedasticity in the residuals. 
The picture emerging from Table 1.5 is rather mixed. For two countries. the 
Philippines and South Korea, the error-correction coefficient is statistically significant, 
confirming our cointegration findings reported above; for Indonesia and Malaysia, the 
opposite holds. In addition, for the two countries for which we obtain cointegration, the 
speed of adjustment to equilibrium is rather slow, particularly in the case of Korea. These 
results may be yet another reflection of the two exchange-rate puzzles earlier discussed, 
or an indication of misspecification due to the existence of non-linearities in the process 
of exchange rate adjustment. 
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1.6.3. Tests/or non-linear exchange-rate adjustment 
Table 1.6 presents the results of our non-linearity tests. In all cases we reject the 
hypothesis of linear exchange rate adjustment at the 5 per cent level or better. which 
implies that the linear equations reported in Table 1.5 are mispeficied. 
1.6.4. Non-linear error correction models 
We estimate the QL-STECM following the same general-to-specific econometric 
approach used in section 1.6.1 above, reporting our parsimonious estimates in Table 1.7. 
Like their linear counterparts, the models in Table 1.7 include dummy variables defined 
for periods of exchange rate crisis and other important economic events. This ensures that 
our estimated models capture systematic non-linearity rather than the effect of isolated 
events. 
Table 1.7 provides strong evidence of non-linear exchange rate adjustment. In all 
countries we find the error correction term to be statistically insignificant in the inner 
regime, suggesting that for low values of the misalignment term nominal exchange rates 
follow a random-walk pattern. On the other hand, the error-correction term is always 
significant in the outer regime, which suggests that for larger misalignment values 
arbitrage forces ensure the reversion of the exchange rate toward its fundamentals-
determined equilibrium value. The speed of adjustment to equilibrium in the outer regime 
differs across countries, being faster in Indonesia and the Philippines and relatively 
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moderate in Malaysia and South Korea. For Indonesia and the Philippines. the width of 
the band defining the inner regime is wider, which suggests that in these countries 
exchange rate misalignment is more persistent, but then corrected in a way more abrupt. 
With regards to asymmetry, for three out of four countries. the absolute value of 
the estimated lower threshold is slightly higher than that of the upper. whereas in the 
remaining one (South Korea) the two thresholds are equal in absolute terms. These 
findings are consistent with the floating-rate exchange rate ~olicy followed by the 
countries we examine during the larger part of the post-Bretton Woods system. \vhich 
involved targets for the rate of depreciation against the US dollar. however the difference 
between the regime thresholds is statistically significant only in the case of Indonesia. 
which suggests that the evidence in favour of sign misalignment effects in exchange rate 
behaviour is not as strong as that in favour of size effects. The equations reported in 
Table 1.7 are well-specified and present higher explanatory power than the linear models 
in Table 1.5, as suggested by the lower regression standard error they produce. 
Figure 1.2 presents the estimated exchange rate misalignment term obtained by 
plotting the estimated residuals of equation (1.1) against the estimated thresholds of the 
inner regime. A number of interesting observations emerge. First, exchange rate 
misalignment is typically within the inner regime, although outer-regime values are not 
uncommon, particularly for Malaysia and South Korea. Second, we observe that 
incidences of discrete devaluations are typically preceded by pronounced exchange rate 
overvaluation that fall within the outer regime. In particular, Figure 1.2 suggests that in 
all countries the crisis of 1997-98 was preceded by substantial overvaluation against the 
US dollar. This overvaluation seems to have been particularly pronounced in the case of 
64 
Indonesia, where the overvaluation of the market rate relative to its equilibrium value 
seems to have been in the range of 20 percent. Overall. Figure 1.2 suggests that the 
devaluations which took place in the region in 1997/98 were justified by the movements 
of the underlying economic fundamentals. Our findings are contrary to the findings of 
Saxena (2002) who find that over the period of 1980-1998, none of three models used to 
estimate the equilibrium level of real exchange rate for Indonesia. namely co-integration 
approach, unobserved component model and structural vector autoregression (SV AR). 
suggest overvaluation of the Rupiah prior to the depreciation at the time of the Asian 
crisis in 1997. 
Finally, Figure 1.2 suggests that at the end of our sample periods the dollar 
exchange rate of the Indonesian Rupiah and the South Korean Won were overvalued 
quite significantly, whereas that of the Malaysian Ringgit was fundamentally 
undervalued. To restore equilibrium, Figure 1.2 suggests that the Rupiah and the Won 
would subsequently have to depreciate against the US dollar, while the Ringgit would 
have to appreciate. In 2004-2005 the Rupiah has indeed depreciated against the US 
dollar. whereas the recent re-floating of the Ringgit has also led to a slight appreciation of 
the Malaysian currency. By contrast, during 2004-2005 the South Korean Won has 
appreciated even further against the US dollar, suggesting that the Korean currency may 
be vulnerable to currency turbulence in the future. 
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1.7. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has modelled nominal exchange rate behaviour in four fast-growing 
emerging Asian countries, namely Indonesia. Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea 
for the period during which these countries implemented a policy of managed exchange 
rate floating against the US dollar. We modelled equilibrium nominal exchange rates 
using a general behavioural equation, consistent with a variety of theoretical approaches 
and found equilibrium nominal exchange rates to be a function of domestic and foreign 
price levels, relative permanent output shocks. nominal and real interest rate differentials 
as well as the level of and change in net foreign assets. We also found that individual 
countries present significant elements of idiosyncratic exchange rate behaviour. 
highlighting the risks of biases involved in modelling exchange rates using panel-data 
techniques. In relation to this, an interesting empirical finding of our analysis is that the 
relationship between nominal exchange rates on the one hand and real net foreign 
assets/current account on the other is in some cases non-monotonic. Finally, we obtained 
strong evidence of non-linear dynamics in the process of the adjustment of the nominal 
exchange rate to its extracted equilibrium level. More specifically, for all countries 
examined we found that the speed of reversion of the exchange rate to its equilibrium 
val ue is a function of the size and, at least in one case, the sign of the misalignment term. 
Our findings suggest that the currency devaluations that took place in 1997-98 were 
entirely justified by economic fundamentals. as prior to the financial crisis that hit the 
region the exchange rates of all four countries, especially the one of Indonesia. were 
significantly overvalued against the US dollar. 
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Our work can be extended in several ways. In the empirical le\el. \\e could use 
our empirical methodology to study the dynamics of nominal exchange rates in other Sl?ts 
of countries and determine whether the non-linear/asymmetric exchange rate d~ namics 
are a common future of exchange rate behaviour. In terms of theoretical \\ ork. \\ e can use 
the empirical findings of our study to motivate work on the non-monotonic link between 
the current account and the nominal exchange rate and. also. to build a model of non-
linear exchange rate behavior based on asymmetric policy preferences. 
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Table 1.1. De Jure Exchange Rate Regime (Official Classification by the IMF) 
Country Period Exchange rate regime classification 
From To Narrow Broad 
Indonesia Nov 78 Jul 97 Managed Floating Intermediate 
Aug 97 Dec 04 Free Floating (Managed Floating 
floating with no pre-
determined path for the 
exchange rate) 
Korea Aug 76 Jan 80 Peg to USD Fixed 
Feb 80 Nov 97 Managed Floating Intermediate 
Dec 97 Dec 04 Independently floating Floating 
Philippines Oct 81 June 82 Limited flexibility with Intermediate 
respect to USD 
Jul 82 Sept 84 Managed Floating 
Oct 84 Dec 04 Independently Floating Floating 
Malaysia Sep 75 Mar 93 Limited flexibility with Intermediate 
respect to USD 
Apr 93 Aug 98 Managed Floating 
Sep 98 Dec 04 Pegged to USD Fixed 
Sources: Frankel, et al. (2002) and IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange restriction (Dec 2004) 
Note: This classification of exchange rate regimes is based on a quarterly database from 
the IMF which encompasses a total often regime categories, based on officially reported 
exchange arrangements. 
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Table 1.2. De Facto Exchange Rate Regime (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
Country Period Exchange rate regime classification 
From To Narrow Broad 
Indonesia Dec70 Aug71 Peg to US dollar Fixed 
Aug 71 Oct 78 De facto crawling band to Intermediate 
US dollar 
Nov78 Jul97 De facto crawling peg to US 
dollar 
Aug97 Jan02 Freely floating/Free falling* Floating 
Apr99 DecOI Freely floating 
Korea May74 Feb80 Peg to US dollar Fixed 
Feb80 Nov94 Pre announced crawling Intermediate 
band 
Nov94 Nov97 De facto crawling peg to US 
dollar 
Dec97 Jun98 Freely falling* Floating 
Jul98 DecOI Freely floating 
Philippines Dec 72 Sep 83 De facto crawling band Intermediate 
around USD 
Oct83 Feb85 Managed floating 
Mar85 Apr92 De facto crawling peg to US 
dollar 
May92 Aug95 De facto band around US 
dollar 
Sep95 Jun97 De facto peg to US dollar Fixed 
Jul97 Dec97 Freely floating/Free falling* Floating 
Dec97 DecO I Managed floating Intermediate 
Malaysia Jun67 Aug75 Peg to pound sterling Fixed 
Sep75 Jul97 Limited flexibility with Intermediate 
respect to US dollar 
Aug97 Sep98 Freely floating/Free falling* Floating 
Sep98 DecO I Pegged arrangement Fixed 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff(2004). 
Note: *) Free falling is a new separate category for countries whose twelve - month rate 
of inflation is above 40%. 
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Table 1.3. Unit Root Tests 
Level Indonesia Korea Philippines Malaysia 
1978(3 )-2003( 4) 1980(1 )-2003(4) 1981(4)-2003(4) 1975(3 )-1998(3) 
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP 
s -0.637 -1.040 -1.217 -1.583 -1.931 -1.751 -0.932 -0.353 
P 0.355 -0.063 -0.263 -2.736* -2.515 -2.253 -0.306 -1.541 
P II.\'(/ 
-1.80 I -6.089*** -1.839 -4.793*** -2.011 -4.185*** -2.063 -5.118*** 
/' Y -YII.\'(/ f' -0.127 -0.570 -1.575 -1.740 -1.819 -1.885 -1.225 -1.279 
i- i ll.\'(/ 
-3.593*** -3.019** -1.985 -2.653* -3.797*** -3.997*** -1.960 -2.088 
r-r II.\'(/ 
-4.785*** -4.064*** -3.083** -3.854*** -3.482** -3.309** -2.614* -2.952** 
rn/a -1.709 -2.619*** -1.276 -0.916 -1.434 -1.250 -0.766 -0.551 
rnjl 
-1.466 -1.419 -0.903 -1.078 
LI rnla -4.473*** -11.253*** -4.294*** -8.110*** -5.204*** -8.541 *** -4.299*** -8.438*** 
LI rnfl -4.386*** -6.887*** -4.349*** -6.974*** 
1st Difference 
Indonesia Korea Philippines Malaysia 
1978(3)-2003( 4) 1980( 1 )-2003(4) 1981(4)-2003(4) 1975(3)-1998(3) 
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP 
s -4.621 *** -7.860*** -4.089*** -7.003*** -4.432*** -6.251 *** -4.528*** -6.239*** 
P -4.725*** -4.998*** -5.237*** -6.440*** -3.753*** -5.319*** -2.644* -8.209*** 
P II.\'(/ 
-2.984** -3.013*** -3.992*** -5.786*** -3.080** -5.694*** -1.607 -3.126** 
f' f' Y -Y,ml -5.932*** -14.824*** -4.471 *** -7.805*** -4.248*** - 10.08*** -4.941 *** -10.02*** 
i- i II.~CI 
-5.673*** -9.155*** -4.780*** -7.914*** -4.929*** -12.08*** -4.169*** -8.560*** 
r-r 11.\'(/ 
-7.126*** -6.613*** -5.334*** -7.394*** -4.826*** -5.751 *** -4.377*** -8.454*** 
rn/a -4.473* -11.254*** -4.294*** -8.110*** -5.204*** -8.541*** -4.299*** -8.437*** 
rnfl -4.386*** -8.637*** -4.349*** -6.974*** 
Llr~fa -8.081 *** -25.987*** -6.869*** -19.296*** -6.394*** -19.715*** -6.048*** -21.72*** 
Llr~ -8.634*** -23.369*** -6.848*** -15.96*** 
Notes: *1**1*** denote significance at the lWYoI5%1/% level respectively following MacKinnon critical 
valueJJ"/or rejection of hypothesis qf a unit root. 
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Table 1.4. Equilibrium nominal exchange rate models 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea 
Sample 1978(3)-2003(4) 1975(3)-1998(3) 1981(4)-2003(4) 1980( I )-2003( -t) 
Constant 2.080 (0.238) 0.966 (0.356) 1.014 (0.732) 6.295 (2.043) 
P 0.982 (0.153) 0.930 (0.228) 1.514 (0.181) 2.362 (0.556) 
Pli.\'O -0.343 (0.121) -0.951 (0.165) -1.345 (0.536) -4.125 ( 1.)57) 
I' I' Y -YIII(/ -0.827 (0.305) 0.504 (0.106) -0.194 (0.033) 0.740 (0.414) 
i- i llsa 0.451 (0.062) 0.244 (0.082) 
r-rllsa -0. 1 96 (0. I 12) -0.170 (0.062) 
-- ---
Rnfa -0.101 (0.030) 0.033 (0.013) 0.048 (0.024) 
Rnfl 0.084 (0.015) 0.074 (0.020) 
I1rnfa 0.346 (0.074) 0.029 (0.015) 
-_._-
I1rnfl -0.071 (0.019) 
--~~ R- 0.97 0.61 0.98 0.79 
ADF -3.540 -2.604 -3.255 -2.954 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; all variables are significant at 5% level or better; the lag 
structure of the reported ADF tests has been chosen using the Akaike information criterion. 
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Table 1.5. Linear error-correction models 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea 
Sample 1978(3)-2003(4) 1975(3)-1998(3) 1981(4)-2003(4) 1980( 1 )-2003( 4) 
constant 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.00 I ) 
tJ.S I_I 0.532 (0.063) 
tJ.s 1-2 0.100 (0.037) 
tJ.s I -3 0.198 (0.033) -0.231 (0.088) -0.134 (0.064) 
tJ.s 1-4 0.077 (0.018) 
tJ.s I -5 -0.145 (0.052) 
tJ.s 1-6 0.048 (0.024) 
&' 1-7 0.040 (0.021) 
Ils 1-8 -0.113 (0.032) 
tJ.S t _11 -0.051 (0.024) 0.196 (0.054) 
&'1-12 -0.102 (0.019) 0.139 (0.032) 
As 0.273 (0.034) 0.126(0.063) 0.198 (0.055) 
/)..5,_1 0.137(0.065) 0.271 (0.050) 
AS,_s -0.140 (0.042) 
ASH) 
AS,_7 -0.173 (0.034) 
AS'_8 0.134 (0.036) 
ASH I 0.370 (0.036) 
(s- s) I_I -0.003 (0.015) -0.062 (0.040) -0.117 (0.047) -0.042 (0.019) 
R.l 0.98 0.71 0.78 0.93 
Regression S.E. 0.00776 0.00929 0.01018 0.00665 
AR 1.41 [0.23] 0.99 [0.43] 1.26 [0.23] 0.48 [0.79] 
ARCH 0.79 [0.54] 0.29 [0.89] 1.15 [0.35] 0.76 [0.56] 
Normality 0.90[0.64] 3.67 [0.16] 0.66 [0.72] 1.97 [0.37] 
Hetero test 1.33 [0.21] 0.99 [0.47] 0.40 [0.98] 1.19 [0.31] 
RESET 0.45 [0.51] 0.56 [0.46] 1.99 [0.16] 2.65 [0.11] 
NOTES: Standard errors In parentheses. p-values In square brackets. All models have been estimated mcludmg dumm} 
variables tor periods of major currency turbulence. These are defined as follows: For Indonesia 1983(2). 1984( I). IlJ86(4). 
1987(2). 1997(4). 1998( I). 1998(4). and 200 1(3); for Malaysia: and 1975(3). 1997(3). 1997(4). 1998( I). 19lJ8(3); t()r Ihe Philippines 
1984(3). 1990(3). 1990(4). 1997(3). 1998( I) and 1998(3); and for South Korea 1997(4). 1998(1). 1998(2).2002(2). and 2002(4). AR 
is the Lagrange Multiplier F- test for residual serial correlation of up to fifth order. ARCH is an F-test for Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity and general mispecification. Normality is a Chi-square test for residuals' normality. Hetem 
is an F-test tor residuals heteroskedasticity. RESET is an F-test for functional form. 
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Table 1.6. Tests for non-linear exchange-rate adjustment 
~ 
k d F-test [p-value] 
i 
Indonesia I 2 7.515 [0.000] I I 
Malaysia I 4 2.326 [0.049] 
Philippines I 2 5.336 [0.000] 
South Korea 3 8 4.217 [0.000] 
NOTES: k is the order of the autoregressive component and d the order of the delay parameter in 
the artificial regression described by (1.3) 
73 
Table 1.7. Non-Linear Error Correction Models 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea 
Sample 1978(3)-2003(4) 1975(3)-1998(3 ) 1981(4)-2003(4) 1980( 1 )-2003( 4) ! 
MJ 
constant 0.0008 (0.0008) 0.0004 (0.00 I) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.0008) 
A~I_I 0.313(0.101) 0.586 (0.088) 
&1-2 0.185 (0.017) 
A~I-J 0.091 (0.017) 
&'1-4 0.047 (0.012) -0.155 (0.063) 
&'1-8 -0.086 (0.029) 
AS,_II 0.124 (0.058) 0.088 (0.031 ) 
A·\'1-12 0.124 (0.059) 
A\'1-14 0.123 (0.020) 
A~I-15 0.044 (0.012) 
As 1-5 -0.134 (0.021) 
As t-II 0.269 (0.023) 
--(s - S )\-1 0.001 (0.013) -0.091 (0.059) -0.083 (0.058) -0.005 (0.030) 
Mo 
constant -0.093 (0.008) -0.007 (0.003) 0.017 (0.006) -0.008 (0.001 ) 
A\'I_I 0.419 (0.028) 
A~I_6 0.152 (0.057) 
A·\·t-7 -1.298 (0.171 ) 
A'\·1-14 -4.129(1.186) 
As \-4 -0.294 (0.139) 
As 1-5 4.877 (0.406) -0.587 (0.149) 
(s-s )1-1 -0.478 (0.044) -0.130 (0.044) -0.387 (0.089) -0.156 (0.019) 
0- 4.572 (1.364) 10.082 (16.14) 2.132 ( 1.440) 50.928 (59.07) 
-r 
II 0.095 (0.003) 0.036 (0.003) 0.058 (0.0 I 0) 0.047 (0.001) 
-rl. 
-0.108 (0.003) -0.038 (0.003) -0.061 (0.002) -0.047 (0.001) 
Regression S.E. 0.00520 0.00822 0.00996 0.00579 
R- 0.994 0.794 0.782 0.953 
AR 1-5 0.975 [0.442] 0.859 [0.513] 1.964 [0.100] 1.317 [0.269] 
ARCH 1-4 0.535 [0.712] 0.895 0.472] 0.150 [0.962] 0.298 [0.878] 
Normality 0.008 [0.996] 3.332 0.189] 2.777 [0.250] 1.630 [0.443] 
hetero 0.428 [0.987] 0.416 0.989] 0.431 [0.985] 0.305 [0.999] 
F-test 
Hu: -rL +-rl' = 0 54.065 0.842 0.121 0.090 
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All models have been estimated including dummy variables tor periods of 
major currency crises. These are defined: For Indonesia 1983(4). 1986(3). 1986(4). 1981(2). 1991(3). 1991(4). 1998(1). 1998(4). 
2000(3).2002(4).2003(2); for Malaysia 1915(3). 1985(1). 1994(1). 1994(2), 1991(3). 1991(4). 1998(1) and 1998(3); tor the 
Philippines 1984(4). 1985( I). 1990(3). 1990(4). 1993(2). 1991(3) and 1998(3); and for South Korea 1986(2). 1988( I). 1991(4). 
I 998( I). 1998(4). 2001( I). 2002( 1).2002(4) AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F- test for residual serial correlation of up to tifth 
ord" .... ARCH is an F-test tor Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and general mispecitication. Normality is a 
Chi-square test tor residuals' nonnality. Hetero is an F-test tor residuals heteroskedasticity. RESET is an F-test ti.lr 
functional t(um. 
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CHAPTER II 
MODELLING REAL EXCHANGE RATES 
IN EMERGING ASIAN ECONOMIES: 
New insights using a behavioural, non-linear econometric approach 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Our focus in this chapter is on the real exchange rate. We are interested in 
l'.\amining the behaviour of real exchange rates because of the fact that o\er the past 
three decades. the real exchange rate of all four countries examined in our analysis. 
name" I ndonesia. ~ lalaysia. the Phi lippincs. and Korea. has been depreciating. Th is 
implil's that the benchmark real exchange rate model. Purchasing PmH:r Parity. \\hich 
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predicts a constant equilibrium real exchange rate, is not adequate to describe their 
movements.45 Considering movements in real exchange rate are vital for competitiveness 
and hence the stability of trade tlows,46 the first step of our empirical analysis is to 
identify the determinants of the equilibrium real exchange rate and the implied 
misalignments of the actual real exchange rate. 
We revisit a number of theoretical explanations offered for medium- and long-run 
shifts in real exchange rates. These include Balassa (1964)-Samuelson (1964) etlects 
caused by productivity gains, shifts in real and nominal interest rates, current account 
imbalances, net foreign asset accumulation, and a time trend. With the exception of the 
latter, all of these have been discussed in chapter I. A time trend is added to help capture 
the effects of missing fundamentals. Given the medium-run span covered by our sample 
periods, we model equilibrium real exchange rates using a general behavioural equation 
nesting all the theoretical arguments listed above. This approach enables us to identify the 
behavioural determinants of real exchange rates and extract a measure of fundamental 
misalignment at each point in time. We then contribute to the literature by considering 
and contrasting the results of determining the behaviour of real and nominal exchange 
rates in these emerging economies, as obtained in this and the previous chapter. 
We resume our analysis by modelling the process of adjustment of the real 
exchange rate to its equilibrium. Short-run real exchange rate tluctuations are known to 
-15 Frankel and Rose (1995) and Taylor (1995) argue that empirical models of exchange rate determination. 
econometrically, perform very poor in predicting or explaining future or past exchange rate movements. 
-1(, Kaminski et.al (1997) argue that an overvalued currency may lead to an unsustainable current account 
deficit, increasing external debt and the risk of possible speculative attacks, with unfavourable 
consequences for the economy. Adversely, Razin and Collins (1997) argue that there is also a general belief 
that an overvalued currency leads to lower economic growth, but that an undervalued currency has an 
unclear effect on growth. 
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be large and notoriously volatile47 and often very difficult to reconcile with mainstream 
theoretical models of exchange rate determination, even when the effects of price 
rigidities have been accounted for. In recent years, the excess volatility of the real 
exchange rate has been partially explained by the development of theoretical models of 
non-linear exchange rate dynamics.48 In these models. transaction costs. information 
costs, transportation costs, non-tariff barriers, susceptible or actual tariffs. or lack of 
labour mobility and other market imperfections imply that within a certain range around 
its equilibrium level, the real exchange rate does not respond to changes in its 
fundamental determinants. But when real exchange rate misalignment exceeds certain 
thresholds, arbitrage forces ensure its reversion to its equilibrium level. 
To test the nonlinearity of real exchange rates, we employ a new testing procedure 
suggested by Saikonnen and Luukkonen (1988), Luukkonen et al (1988), Granger and 
Terasvirta (1993) and Terasvirta (1994). They develop a new technique for the null 
hypothesis of linear adjustment of the market real exchange rate to its equilibrium level 
against an alternative of nonlinear smooth transition autoregressive process. Assuming 
real exchange rates follow nonlinear stationary processes, the alternative hypothesis of 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests based on the linear model will be 
mispecified. Thus, we follow Saikonnen and Luukkonen (1988), Luukkonen et al (1988). 
Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Terasvirta (1994) as we consider their tests are more 
powerful than the ADF tests. 
47 Rogoff (1996) finds that short run deviations from PPP are large and volatile. His findings are known as 
"PPP puzzle", which he describes as follows: "How is it possible to reconcile the extremely high short-term 
volatility of real exchange rates with the glacial rate (15 percent per year) at which deviations from PPP 
seem to die out?" (p. 664). 
48 See Benninga and Protopapadakis (1988). Dixit (1989), Dumas (1992), Uppal (1993). Sercu et al (1995). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). and O'Connell (1998). 
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As stated previously, various studies of mostly industrial economies present 
strong evidence to support the existence of non-linear exchange rate dynamics. The 
authors of these studies suggest that the speed of adjustment to equilibrium increases \\ ith 
the size of the misalignment term. Chen and Wu (2000), Baharumshah et at. (2003). 
Lestari et al (2003), and Liew et al (2003,2004) present similar evidence of non-linear 
real exchange rate adjustment in Asian economies, employing econometric models 
proposed by Tong (1990), namely the TAR, and Granger and Terarvista (1993). namely 
the EST AR. However, these models require a symmetric reaction of the real exchange 
rate to episodes of real overvaluation and undervaluation, a restriction which, in practice, 
may be invalid as argued in the introductory chapter. Insteac, we employ the QL-
STECM, which caters for the speed of adjustment to equilibrium as a function of both the 
size and the sign of misalignment term, allowing us to capture a wider range of features 
of process characterizing real exchange rate adjustment. 
We find a number of striking results. Firstly, in all countries examined. 
equilibrium real exchange rates are a function of the permanent component of relative 
output. In the case of Indonesia, we find that nominal interest rate differentials also playa 
key role. This is similar to when we model nominal exchange rate determination in the 
previous chapter. However, the behaviour of real exchange rate differs from that of 
nominal exchange rates in that the former takes into account the deterministic time trend 
in its long-run model. 
Meanwhile, in the case of Malaysia, we find that all variables determining the 
nominal exchange rate model discussed in the previous chapter also play similar roles. 
These include permanent relative output, real interest rate differentials, the level of and 
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changes in net foreign assets. The only distinction between the real exchange rate model 
and the nominal one is the former' positive sign for real net foreign assets. \\hile we find 
a negative sign when modelling nominal exchange rate behaviour. 
In the case of the Philippines, while we consider real interest rate differentials and 
the changes in net foreign assets in modelling nominal exchange rates, our real exchange 
rate model does not include these two variables because they are not empirically useful. 
Moreover, our real exchange rate model differs from the nominal exchange rate model in 
that it takes into consideration the time trend. However, there are no evidences to suggest 
that this time trend replaces missing fundamentals, in particular, real interest rate 
differentials and the changes in net foreign assets. 
Our results in the case of Korea are interesting as equilibrium exchange rates are a 
function of all the variables considered in this chapter; permanent relative output, 
nominal and real interest rate differentials, and the level of and changes in net foreign 
assets. The fact that all important fundamentals have been included in our real exchange 
rates model is probably the reason for our not obtaining a significant role for a time trend 
variable in this case. This is in contrast to our nominal exchange rates model in chapter I, 
in which we fail to take into account nominal and real interest rate differentials, and 
changes in net foreign assets. 
Secondly, despite these similarities, our above findings suggest that equilibrium 
real exchange rates in individual countries present elements of idiosyncratic behaviour. 
casting doubt on the use of fixed-parameter panel techniques applied by many empirical 
exchange rate studies. 
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Thirdly, in relation to the above, a new empirical finding, also observed in the 
case of nominal exchange rates, is that the relationship between real exchange rates on 
the one hand and real net foreign assets and/or current account balances on the other l1la~ 
be non-monotonic, depending upon the sign of net foreign assets and the current account 
balance. For instance, in the case of the Philippines, our robust model presents a positive 
sign for the changes in real net foreign liabilities, while in the case of Korea we tind a 
negative sign. 
Fourthly, for all countries we obtain strong evidence of non-linear exchange rate 
adjustment. Real exchange rates mayor may not react to changes in their determinants 
when close to their equilibrium, but revert to it at higher speed when the misalignment 
term becomes large (a size effect). In the case of Indonesia, the error correction 
coefficients in our non-linear real exchange rate adjustment present a somewhat slower 
reversion to equilibrium compared to that in modelling non-linear nominal exchange rate 
adjustment. On the other hand, in the case of Malaysia, the error correction coefficients in 
our non-linear real exchange rate adjustment present a mu~h faster reversion to 
equilibrium compared to that in modelling non-linear nominal exchange rate adjustment. 
Meanwhile, in the case of the Philippines, the speed of adjustment to equilibrium in our 
non-linear real exchange rate adjustment is slower than the one obtained when modelling 
non-linear nominal exchange rate adjustment. On the contrary, in the case of Korea, our 
non-linear real exchange rate adjustment presents a faster reversion to equilibrium 
compared to that in modelling non-linear nominal exchange rate adjustment. 
Fifthly, in Indonesia and Malaysia real exchange rate adjustment is asymmetric (a 
sign effect), with fundamental undervaluation corrected faster than overvaluation (a 
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finding consistent with the monetary policy implemented by these countries for the larger 
part of the post-Bretton Woods period). This is in contrast to the results obtained in the 
previous chapter when modelling nominal exchange rates, where we find asymmetric 
nominal exchange rate adjustment only in the case of Indonesia. This asymmetry is a new 
finding, which previous studies using symmetry-imposing non-linear models such as the 
TAR or the EST AR, are not in a position to capture. 
Finally, we find that the currency devaluations that took place in 1997-98 were 
fundamentally justified, as, prior to the crisis, all real exchange rates were signiticantly 
overvalued against the US dollar. This is similar to our findings in the previous chapter. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents the 
literature review. Section 2.3 describes our data. Section 2.4 introduces the methodology 
we employ. Section 2.5.1 estimates our behavioural model of the real exchange rate. 
Section 2.5.2 estimates linear models of real exchange rate adjustment. Section 2.5.3 tests 
for non-Iinearities in the adjustment process. Section 2.5.4 estimates non-linear real 
exchange rate adjustment models. Section 2.6 presents our conclusions. 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As some contemporary studies provide evidence that the equilibrium real 
exchange rate appears to change over time, in other words, it tends to be nonstationary. 
one would need to search for other variables cointegrated with it.49 Indeed. researchers 
4Q See Chinn ( 1997) 
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identify several possible reasons for these changes. all of which can be considered as the 
determinant of the real exchange rate. 
Balassa (1964 )-Samuelson (1964), followed by Chinn and Johnston (1996). and 
Canzoneri et al (1999) find that most long-run movements in real exchange rates are due 
to relative productivity shocks in the tradable and non-tradable sectors between a 
particular country and its main trading partners. By employing cointegration analysis. 
Bahamani-Oskooee (1992) and Dibooglu (1996) show that real exchange rates and the 
productivity differentials are cointegrated and thus do have a long-run relationship in the 
advanced countries against the USA, supporting the Balassa model. Evidence for this has 
also been found by Miyakoshi (2003) when re-examining three popular models of the 
real exchange rate developed by: (i) Edison and Pauls (1993), (ii) Kawai (1986). and (iii) 
Dibooglu (1996), using multivariate cointegration techniques and data from Indonesia 
and the Philippines against Japan. Furthermore, Bahamani-Oskooee and Rhee (1996) also 
find that the productivity-bias model does provide a valid explanation of the long-run real 
exchange rate between advanced countries and Korea. De Broeck and Slok (200 I), Sarno 
and Taylor (200 I), Egert (2002), and Egert and Lahreche-Revil (2003) also support the 
productivity-bias model. According to this model, a sustained decrease in the home 
country's productivity will lead to a permanent depreciation in the real exchange rate. 
Conversely, Balassa (1964) argues that when productivity differentials are greater in the 
production of traded goods between two countries, the real exchange rates appreciate. 
Furthermore, Rogoff (1996) argues that real exchange rates will also appreciate 
permanently following positive and permanent demand shocks relative to the home 
country' main trading partners. An increase in domestic economic activity gives rise to an 
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increase in the demand for domestic money. and the increased demand for domestic 
money leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency. However, in the Balance of 
Payments (BOP) flows model, a relative rise in domestic activity results in a depreciation 
of the domestic currency value. This is because an increase in domestic economic activit\ 
results in a deterioration of the domestic trade balance, which leads to a depreciation of 
the domestic currency. 
On the other hand, Alexius (2000) argues that supply shocks are the dominant 
cause of long-run variation in real exchange rates. The real exchange rate wi II depreciate. 
if there are economy-wide supply shocks. However. Sachs and Wyplosz (1984). Frenkel 
and Razin (1986), Clarida and Gali (1994), Taylor (1995), Rogoff (1996), Weber (1997). 
Chadha and Prasad (1997) suggest that such fluctuations in real exchange rates are driven 
by relative real demand factors in the short-run as well as in thp. long-run. with supply 
shocks having little impact on long-run real exchange rates. Interestingly, Weber (1997) 
concludes that these supply shocks account for only about a third of the long-run variance 
of bilateral real exchange rates. 
For Dornbush (1976), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), and Rogers (1999). 
meanwhile, the main sources of short-to medium-run movements in the real exchange 
rate. given that prices are sticky in the short-run, are monetary shocks. Dornbusch (1976) 
argues that, in the short run, a monetary expansion causes the exchange rate to depreciate 
and saving to fall due to terms of trade deterioration. He says that the exchange rate 
depreciation, in the short run. may be in excess of the long-run depreciation. Eichenbaum 
and Evans (1995) find evidence that a contractionary shock to U.S. monetary policy leads 
to persistent. significant appreciations in U.S. nominal and real exchange rates. Rogers 
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( 1999) provides evidence that monetary shocks (both to the monetary base and the money 
multiplier) are empirically important in explaining variation in the real pound-dollar 
exchange rate. 
In contrast with earlier studies,5o Chortareas and Driver (200 I) find evidence 
supporting a long-run relationship between real exchange rates and real interest rate 
differentials. They use new non-stationary panel estimation techniques for II OEeD 
(Non G_7)51 economies using the United States as a numeraire for the post-Bretton 
Woods era. Kanas (2005) employs a bivariate Markov switching vector auto regression 
model to find strong empirical link between the US/UK real exchange rate and real 
interest differential for the period 1959-2002. His results suggest that the real interest 
differential is an important variable in building better models aiming at explaining the 
behaviour of the US/UK real exchange rate. Their findings also provide a reconciliation 
between Campbell and Clarida (1987), Meese and Rogoff (1988) and Clarida and Gali 
(1994), who failed to uncover a relation between the two variables during the recent 
period of floating exchange rates, and theories of real exchange rate which predict a link 
between the two variables. Bleany and Laxton (1999) also find a significant positive 
correlation between the real interest rate differential and the real exchange rate. Shafer 
and Loopesko (1983) and Boughton (1987) argue that when the real interest differential 
is positive, the real exchange rate appreciates. Miyakoshi (2003) also suggests that the 
real interest rate-bias model does provide a valid explanation of the long-run real 
~u See Meese and Rogoff ( 1988) and Edison and Pauls (1993). 
SI They are Australia. Austria. Belgium, Ireland. Lu~embourg. Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway. 
Portugal. Spain. and Switzerland. whereas the G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan. the 
USA, and the UK. 
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exchange rate between Japan and the East-Asian countries, namely Indonesia. Korea. the 
Philippines, and Malaysia. 
In addition, Frankel (1979)'s real interest rate differential model implies that a 
sudden unexpected expansion in domestic money supply growth may exert downward 
pressure on a domestic currency's value if it (I) acts to push real interest rates 
temporarily lower, which, in turn, invites capital to flow overseas and (2) signals to the 
market that monetary growth will proceed at a new faster pace in the future. Another 
important point to be gleaned from the real interest rate differential model is that the 
response of the exchange rate to a change in interest rates is only transitory. A rise in the 
real exchange rate induced by a widening of the real interest rate differential can only be 
temporary if there is, at the same time, an expectation that the real exchange rate must 
eventually decline back to its long-run equilibrium level. Even though the magnitude of 
the response of the exchange rate to a change in relative interest rates may be large, and 
real interest rate differentials may be expected to persist, the actual rise or fall in the 
exchange rate is expected to be instantaneous, after which the initial rise or fall in the real 
exchange rate is expected to be gradually unwound as the real exchange rate returns to its 
long-run equilibrium level. This adjustment path is similar to the overshooting path 
described in the Dornbusch sticky-price monetary model. 
In the last model, Gagnon (1996) finds a significant and robust relationship 
between real exchange rates and net foreign assets when exploiting the information in a 
panel data set for Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States from 
1973 through 1995. His estimates reveal that the half-life of real exchange rate 
disequilibria is about one-half and two years. A falling of net foreign assets means 
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permanent real exchange rate depreciation. Conversely. a raising of net foreign assets 
.... 
implies a permanent real exchange rate appreciation. In addition, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004) use cross-country data on real exchange rates and a newly constructed data set on 
countries' net external positions to find that countries with net external liabilities have 
more depreciated real exchange rates. 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1980), Hooper and Morton (1982). Gavin (1991). 
Faruqee (1995), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) present theoretical treatments of the 
relationship between net foreign assets and the real exchange rate. Hooper and Morton 
(1982) develop a model in which exogenous shocks to trade flows create a long-run 
positive correlation between net foreign assets and the real exchange rate. In a more 
complete theoretical model, Gavin (1991) shows that exogenous shocks to wealth create 
a positive correlation between net foreign assets and the exchange rate when the 
Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied. Faruqee (1995), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) 
also present empirical results confirming a positive correlation between net foreign assets 
and the real exchange rate. 
The papers cited above focus on exogenous shocks that affect net foreign assets 
directly. The transmission to the exchange rate is based on the fact that in equilibrium, a 
country with negative net foreign assets must have a trade surplus to finance the stream 
of interest and dividend payments. The mechanism to generate this trade surplus is 
exchange rate depreciation. Similarly, countries with positive net foreign assets must 
have trade deficits in equilibrium. Thus, a shock to net foreign assets has a long-run 
effect on the exchange rate as long as goods produced in different countries are not 
perfect substitutes. In addition. it is also important to recognize that exchange rate 
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dynamics may be the mechanism by which shocks to desired net foreign assets are 
equilibrated. Thus, an increase in desired net foreign assets may cause an immediate 
depreciation of the exchange rate in order to generate a trade surplus, followed by a long-
run real appreciation of the exchange rate above its asset stock that is achieved. Hov.ever, 
in a more general framework, both net foreign assets and the real exchange rate should be 
viewed as endogenous variables that influence each other and are determined 
simultaneously. 
We apply this model to four Asian countries, namely Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia and the Philippines since they have displayed rapid structural changes in the 
supply side in the early 1980s and experienced turbulence in 1990s, characterized by 
frequent changes in the real exchange rate and speculative attacks. The surge in structural 
changes can generate considerable changes in the relative price s(ructure between traded 
goods and non-traded goods in individual countries and eventually the equilibrium real 
exchange rate will adjust in response to these structural changes. Meanwhile, during the 
financial crisis of 1997/98, the real exchange rate has depreciated and appears to be non-
stationary. This evidence can not be explained by the benchmark model of real exchange 
rate determination, PPP, which predicts a constant real exchange rate. 
In a recent paper, Arghyrou et al (2004) have argued that the task of extracting the 
underlying equilibrium real exchange rate is made even more difficult by possible non-
linearity in the process of the short-run exchange rate adjustment, cause by market 
frictions. Market frictions, such as transactions costs, in international trade introduce a 
neutral range, an "inner regime", or band of inaction, within which deviations from pa:-ity 
are left uncorrected, as they are not large enough to cover transactions costs. Only 
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deviations outside the neutral range are arbitraged away by market forces. In this 
dynamic equilibrium framework, Benninga and Protopapadakis (1988), Dixit (1989). 
Dumas (1992), Uppal (1993), Sercu et al (1995), Coleman (1995), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), and O'Connell (1998), show that deviations from equilibrium exchange rate 
follow a nonlinear stochastic process that is mean-reverting. In particular, the strength of 
mean reversion increases with the deviation from equilibrium (in the "outer regime'"), as 
the profits from goods arbitrage, which is generally thought to be the ultimate force 
behind maintaining PPP, do not make up for the costs involved in the necessary 
transactions for small deviations from the presumed equilibrium real exchange rate. This 
has recently led to an outburst of empirical studies using nonlinear time series models to 
model such effects.52 Sarno (2000b) for instance, found empirical evidence that 
deviations of PPP revert to a constant equilibrium level in a nonlinear fashion, in the 
context of the real exchange rate behaviour in Middle Eastern countries. Obstfeld and 
Taylor (1997), Michael et al (1997), Taylor and Peel (2000), Taylor et al (2001), and 
Baum et al (2001) have found evidence of nonlinear adjustment in the real exchange rates 
of the G7 countries. In a study on the exchange rates of transition economies, Sarno and 
Taylor (200 I) arrive at a similar conclusion. Chen and Wu (2000), Baharumshah et al 
(2002), Liew et al (2003, 2004) also report nonlinear adjustment of Asian nominal 
exchange rate deviation towards PPP. Their models reveal a typical behaviour of 
adjustment process for PPP deviations. 
S~ See Michael et al (1997). Obstfeld and Taylor (1997). Sarantis (1999), Baum et al (200 I). Lo and Zivot 
(2001). Taylor et al (200 I). and O'Connell and Wei (2002). It should be noted that many of these papers 
consider the relative price of individual goods and therefore actually test the Law of One Price (Micheal et 
al.. 1997; Sarantis. 1999; Baum et aI .• 2001). An exception is the study of Enders and Falk (1998) who. 
working within a non-linear unit tests framework. find limited evidence in support ofPPP. 
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However, their findings are based on the assumption that the adjustment of 
exchange rates to over- and under-valuations of the same magnitude is symmetric. This 
assumption may not be true. Van Dijk and Franses (2002) draw on the existing model of 
the threshold autoregressive (TAR) (Tong, 1990). the smooth transition auto regression 
(STAR) (Chan and Tong 1986, Luukkonen et al 1988, Terasvirta 1994). and the 
exponential smooth transition autoregressive (EST AR) (Granger and Terasvirta. 1993) to 
develop a nonlinear model of the Quadratic Logistic Smooth Transition Error Correction 
Model (QL-STECM). This model examines whether the behaviour of exchange rates in 
adjusting to the fundamental value is nonlinear with respect to the size and sign of 
deviations. Their model extends the existing models in that it allows the response of 
exchange rates to depend not only on the size of the deviation from fundamentals but also 
on the sign of the deviation from fundamentals. 
2.3. Methodology 
2.3.1. Modelling equilibrium real exchange rates 
We model equilibrium real exchange rates using a general behavioural 
specification, nesting all the theoretical arguments listed in the literature review above. 
This is given by equation (2.1) below: 
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(2.1 ) 
In (2.1), q denotes the actual (observed) real exchange rate of the domestic 
currency against the US dollar, calculated using CPI indexes~ y the level of permanent 
output; i and r nominal and real interest rates respectively; rnfa real net foreign assets. 
t1rnfa the change in real net foreign assets, which serves as a proxy for current account: I 
a time trend, a catch-all variable capturing the effects of all variables unaccounted for: 
and Ut a white noise error term. All variables in (2.1). except from nominal and real 
interest rates are expressed in logs, with the subscript USA denoting variables referring to 
the USA. Given that negative numbers' logarithms are not defined, when a country's net 
foreign asset position is recorded by IFS to be negative, an extra variable. real net foreign 
liabilities (rnff) , is added in (2.1). In such cases, real net foreign liabilities (assets) are 
defined as the maximum of the log of the absolute value of the net liabilities (assets) and 
zero. In this case, in estimating (2.1) we would expect rnfa and rnfl. to have identical 
signs and parameters. 
Equation (2.1) can be seen as an equilibrium model of the real exchange rate, a 
simple version of which is discussed by Taylor (1995, pp. 24-26). Equilibrium real 
exchange rate models consider two countries under full price flexibility, with y and ,V"'SA 
representing full-employment output levels. In such models, an increase in domestic 
productivity, captured by an increase in (y -Y(l,'iA)" has two analytically separate effects. 
The first. defined by Taylor as a relative price effect, results in a reduction in the relative 
price of domestic output, thus leading to a real depreciation. The second, defined by 
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Taylor as a money demand effect, results in an increase in demand for money. reducing 
- .... 
equilibrium prices and ultimately leading to real exchange rak appreciation. The net 
effect of an increase in domestic productivity on the real exchange rate is determined by 
the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, with real appreciation 
(depreciation) being more likely the higher (lower) the degree of substitutability. 
Typically, a real appreciation of the domestic currency is expected if domestic 
productivity exceeds that of foreign economy. This is mainly due to higher domestic 
inflation as a result of faster productivity growth. This transmission is conventionally 
associated with the Balassa-Samuelson effects (1964). Such effects say that if the 
productivity growth in the domestic tradable sector (manufacturing) is relatively higher 
than in the non-tradable sector (services), wages in the tradable sector tend to increase. 
The assumption of perfect labour mobility equalizes wages in the two sectors and 
increases the prices of non-tradable goods, thus increasing the overall price level in the 
domestic economy with respect to the foreign economy. This transmission leads to real 
exchange rate appreciation. 
Equation (2.1) includes another four possible determinants for the real exchange 
rate. First, the nominal interest rate differential (i-it:SA)/' which aims to capture the effects 
of shifting medium-term inflation expectations, reflecting in turn demand conditions. In 
monetary models of the exchange rate (see e.g. Frankel, 1979), an increase in the nominal 
interest rate differential results in nominal depreciation and, in the presence of short-run 
price rigidities, real depreciation too. 
Second. the real interest rate differential (r-rUSA), is included to capture the efft:cts 
of capital inflows following changes in short-term interest rates, as predicted by 
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Dornbuch's (1976) sticky price overshooting modeL53 Adding this variable is also in line 
with the Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) approach. Given that this 
approach is developed from the underlying Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP). a negati\"e 
interest rate differential (the domestic currency has relatively lower interest rate compare 
to the foreign one) leads domestic currency to depreciate in order to match the yields in 
domestic and foreign currencies, hence any possible arbitrage opportunity can be 
abolished. Correspondingly, a positive interest rate differential generates portfolio 
reallocation and a higher demand for domestic currency, implying a contemporaneous 
appreciation of the domestic currency. 
Third, real net foreign assets (rnfa)( are included to capture the wealth effects of 
accumulated current account imbalances. Portfolio balance models of the exchange rate, 
such as Branson (1983), suggest that a country's debt resulting from current account 
deficits has to be financed by internationally diversifying investors. Traditionally, given 
interest rates, these investors want a higher yield in order to adjust their portfolios in the 
desired way, which can be achieved through an expected appreciation of the debtor 
country's currency. This may require contemporaneous depreciation of the currency. 
Similarly, increasing the stock of foreign assets held by domestic agents results in 
expectations of future capital inflows, leading to a real appreciation of the domestic 
currency. 
However, this negative relationship may be reversed within the context of the 
balance-of-payments model. Assuming that current account deficits accumulate net 
foreign liabilities. an improvement in the trade balance is needed to pay dividends and 
rental payments associated with the accumulated liabilities. This requires the currency to 
SJ See also Hallwood and MacDonald (2000. pp. 175-209). 
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depreciate, thus increasing the international price competitiveness of the country's 
exports. Faruqee (1995) find a similar adjustment of the real exchange rate \\hen 
employing stock-flow models. These models predict that the relationship between (rnfa), 
and the real exchange rate may be positive rather than negative in the medium-run. 
because the higher growth prospects of emerging economies cannot be financed by 
domestic savings only, but also through increased foreign borrowing leading to an 
increase in foreign liabilities. Nevertheless, in the long-run, payments on the existing 
stock of foreign liabilities would restore the negative relationship: the higher the stock of 
foreign liabilities (i.e. the lower (rnfa)t is), the higher the need for real exchange rate 
depreciation to service the debt through an improved current account. 
Fourth, the change in the stock of real net foreign assets, (!l.rnfa), serves as a 
proxy for the movements of the current account. The effects of the latter on the real 
exchange rate remain unclear and subject to debate. Rogoff (1996, p. 663) has described 
the literature's agnostic state by stating that, "from a theoretical perspective, virtually any 
correlation between the current account and the real exchange rate can be easily 
rationalise. Ultimately, the correlation between the current account and the real exchange 
rate is an empirical matter, one that remains the subject of debate". Finally, equation (2.1) 
includes a linear trend, which serves as a proxy for any other variable that may be 
relevant to the process of real exchange rate determination and not captured by the rest of 
the terms included in equation (2.1). 
Summarizing our discussion, in estimating (2.1), all betas (PI, /h., /33, P4, f3s and 
A) can take either positive or negative signs. The fitted values of (2.1), denoted by q •. 
provide an estimate for the behavioural equilibrium level of the real exchange rate. in 
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which case the estimated residuals of (2.1), UI , is the deviation of the observed real 
exchange rate from its equilibrium level (the misalignment term). 
2.3.2. Linear real exchange rate adjustment models 
We model the adjustment of the real exchange rate towards its behavioural 
equilibrium level described by (2.1) using the linear model given by (2.2) below: 
(2.2) 
In (2.2), q is the log of the estimated equilibrium real exchange rate obtained 
from (2.1), P(L) and y(L) are lag-polynomials of order L, &" is a white noise error term and 
L\ is the first difference operator. The error correction term (q - q *) measures the 
deviation of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium level, with the coefficient 
is measuring the speed of adjustment of the former to the latter. If there is cointegration. 
the Granger representation theorem suggests that we should expect t5 to be in all cases 
statistically significant with a negative sign. 
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2.3.3. Testing for non-linear real exchange rate adjustment 
We next consider the possibility of non-linear real exchange rate dynamics. To 
that end, we first test for non-linear dynamics in the process of exchange rate adjustment. 
We do so using the testing approach suggested by Saikonnen and Luukkonen (1988). 
Luukkonen et al (1988), Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Terasvirta (1994). This 
involves estimating the auxiliary regression described by (2.3) below: 
rp 
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In (2.3), (q - q *) is the deviation of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium 
level, measured by the estimated residual term obtained from (2. I), and d is the delay 
parameter. The null hypothesis of linear adjustment to equilibrium is described by Ho: ['Ylj 
= 'Y~i = 'Y3j = 'Y4 = 'Y5 = 0] for all j E (1 ,2 ... ,k), where the autoregressive parameter k is 
determined through inspection of the partial autocorrelation function of (q - q *); VI is a 
white-noise error term.54 Testing the null of linearity involves estimating (2.3) for all 
plausible values of the delay parameter d, followed by testing the zero restrictions 
implied by the null using an LM test. If the null is rejected for more than one values of d. 
then d is chosen to be the one that which yields the largest value of the test statistic. 
S4 Granger and Terlsvirta (1993) and Terlsvirta (1994) advise against choosing k using an information 
criteria such as the Akaike since this may induce a downward bias. 
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2.3.4. Non-linear real exchange rate adjustment models 
We model non-linear real exchange rate adjustment using the Quadratic Logistic 
Smooth Transition Error Correction Model (QL-STECM, see van Dijk et al.. 2002). This 
model, previously used to model non-linear exchange rate dynamics by Arghyrou et al 
(2005), is described by equations (2.4) to (2.7) below: 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
MOl = Po (L) ~ ql-l + yo (L) ~ q *+ ~ (q- q *)/-1 + &Ot (2.6) 
(2.7) 
Equation (2.4) models exchange rate changes as a weighted average of the linear 
adjustment models MI and Mo, where MI represents the inner regime, in which 
misalignment is small, and Mo the outer regime, where misalignment is larger. Equation 
(2.7) uses the quadratic logistic function to model e, the probability that the transition 
variable (q - q *)/-d takes values in the inner regime, with 0 affecting the speed of 
transition between the two regimes. The inner regime is defined by two threshold values. 
(' and I. respectively denoting the upper and lower limit of the inner regime, so that 1 < 
o and I' > O. The adjustment of the real exchange rate to its equilibrium is non-linear. 
subject to size misalignment effects if o,~oo. In particular. if 0,=0 and 00 < O. the 
exchange rate follows a random walk in the inner regime. adjusting to equilibrium only in 
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the outer regime. Sign misalignment (asymmetric adjustment) effects exist if (- + / "* O. 
In particular, if -I + ,{ > 0, negative misalignment values are corrected faster than 
positive ones, which implies that outer-regime undervaluation is more likely than 
overvaluation. By contrast, if -I + f! < 0, fundamental undervaluation is corrected faster 
than overvaluation. If -I + -II = 0, exchange rate adjustment is symmetric. in which case 
the QL-STECM reduces to an ESTAR type-model. 
2.4. DATA 
Our data source is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), provided by Datastream. We work with quarterly 
data. To avoid mixing periods of fixed and floating exchange rates, we define our 
samples to cover periods during which the countries examined did not operate a policy of 
pegging their currencies against the dollar. These are 1978(3)-2003(4) for Indone:;ia; 
1975(3)-1998(3) for Malaysia, 1981(4)-2003(4) for the Philippines; and 1980(1)-2003(4) 
for South Korea. During these periods all countries followed a managed-floating 
exchange rate policy against the US dollar, which makes our previous discussion on 
possible asymmetries in exchange rate adjustment even more relevant. 
We define real exchange rates as the product of the nominal exchange rate and the 
ratio of foreign (USA) to domestic prices. With this definition, an increase (reduction) in 
real exchange rates denotes a real depreciation (appreciation) of the domestic currency. 
Real exchange rates are calculated using CPI indexes. To characterize the behaviour of 
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domestic currencies against US dollar, Figure 2.1 presents four important episodes of 
their movements over our sample periods. 
In the case of Indonesia, the first episode is from 1978Q3 to 1979Q I. the second 
episode is from 1979Q 1 to 1983Q 1, the third episode is from 1983Q 1 to 1998Q I. and the 
fourth episode is from 1998Q 1 to 2003Q4. During these four episodes. the Indonesian 
rupiah experienced a dramatic up and down rollercoaster ride. From 1978Q3 to 1979Q I. 
the real exchange rate increased from Rp860/USD to Rp 1 ,258/USD, a depreciation of 
46%. Then, from 1979Q 1 to 1983Q 1, the real exchange rate decreased from 
Rp 1 ,258/USD to Rp 1, 184/USD, an appreciation of 60/0. The rupiah experience another 
depreciation from 1983Q 1 to 1998Q 1 where the real exchange rate increased from 
Rp 1, 184/USD to Rp7,024/USD, a huge depreciation of 493%. Finally, the rupiah real 
exchange rate appreciated from 1998Q 1 to 2003Q4. In this fourth period the rupiah 
decreased from Rp7,024/USD to Rp3,336/USD, an appreciation of 53%. 
In the case of Korea, as shown in figure 2.1, we also notice four important 
episodes. The first episode is from 1980Q 1 to 1985Q4, the second episode is from 
1985Q4 to 1989Q3, the third episode is from 1989Q3 to 1998Q I, and the fourth episode 
is from 1998Q 1 to 2003Q4. During these four episodes, the Korean won also experienced 
a dramatic up and down rollercoaster ride. From 1980Q 1 to 1 985Q4, the real exchange 
rate increased from W810/USD to WI,] 10/USD, a depreciation of 37%. Then, from 
1985Q4 to 1989Q3, the real exchange rate decreased from W],] ] O/USD to W796/USD. 
an appreciation of 28%. The won experienced another depreciation from 1989Q3 to 
I 998Q I where the real exchange rate increased from W796/USD to W 1.452/USD. a 
depreciation of 82%. Finally, the won real exchange rate appreciated from I 998Q 1 to 
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2003Q4. In this fourth episode the won decreased from WI A52/USD to W I.055/USD. an 
appreciation of270/0. 
Meanwhile, in the case of the Philippines, we find three interesting episodes. as 
shown in figure 2.1. The first episode is from 1981 Q4 to 1987Q4, the second episode is 
from 1987Q4 to 1997Q2, and the third episode is from 1997Q2 to 2003Q4. During these 
three episodes, as occurred in the other first two countries above, the Philippines peso 
also experienced volatility. From 1981 Q4 to 1987Q4, the peso real exchange rate 
increased from P23.09/USD to P35.04/USD, a depreciation of 520/0. Then. from 1987Q4 
to 1 997Q2, the peso real exchange rate decreased from P35.04/USD to P24.26/USD. an 
appreciation of 310/0. The peso experienced another depreciation from 1 997Q2 to 2003Q4 
where the real exchange rate increased from P24.26/USD to P41.70/USD. a depreciation 
of 720/0. 
In the case of Malaysia, we find three important episodes during our sample 
episodes, as occurred in the case of the Philippines previously. As shown in Figure 2.1. 
the first episode is accounted from 1975Q3 to 1991 Q3, the second episode is from 
1991 Q 1 to 1997Q I. and the third episode is from 1997Q 1 to 1998Q3. During these three 
episodes, the Malaysian Ringgit was volatile. From 1975Q3 to 1991 Q3. the real 
exchange rate increased from RM 1.82/USD to RM2.89/USD, a depreciation of 59%. 
Then, from 1991 Q3 to 1997Q I, the real exchange rate decreased from RM2.89/USD to 
RM2.47/USD, an appreciation of 15%. The ringgit experienced another depreciation 
from 1 997Q I to 1998Q3 where the real exchange rate increased from Rp2.47/USD to 
Rp3.61/USD. a depreciation of 57%. 
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To summarize, In all countries we observe the existence of alternating. some 
upward and downward movements; however for all countr ies a clear long-term 
depreciation trend emerges. This is confirmed by the results of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) unit root tests applied to these series, as shown in Table 2.1. all of \\ hich 
turn out to be I(]). 
As discussed above, our modelling approach models equilibrium real exchange 
rates using a behavioural specification. This includes relative equilibrium output levels. 
real and nominal interest rate differentials, current account imbalances and real net 
foreign assets. GDP data for the countries examined is not available on a quarterly basis. 
therefore we approximate output using industrial or manufacturing volume indexes.55 
Given the high importance of manufacturing production for these countries. this 
approximation, also widely used to approximate full-employment output in other 
applications such as empirical models of monetary policy.56 can be considered 
reasonable. To smooth out the effects of demand shocks and thus obtain a measure of the 
permanent output component, we follow many existing studies by de-trending our output-
proxy series. We do so by fitting into the industrial production series a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).57 The extracted series, suggest that relative permanent 
output against the USA presents a declining trend for Indonesia and an increasing one for 
~~ An industrial or manufacturing production series was not available for Indonesia for the whole of the 
sample period covered by our analysis. Given the high importance of oil production for this country, we 
approximate output using the crude petroleum production index provided by IFS. 
Sb See for example Clarida et al (1998). 
S7 To obtain the Hodrick-Prescott trend, we set the value of a smoothing parameter at the recommended 
value for quarterly data of 1600. 
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Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea. 58 The ADF tests applied to all relative 
permanent output series reject the stationarity hypothesis. 
Nominal interest rates are typically included in exchange rate modelling to 
capture the effects of inflation expectations and, by implication, cyclical demand 
conditions. For this purpose, our preferred variable is long-term government bond yields. 
however this series was not always possible. As the best available proxy. we use the 
long-term lending rate (working-capital loans' rate) for Indonesia; the one-year money 
market rate for Malaysia, the one-year lending rate for the Philippines; the IO-year 
government bond yield for South Korea; and the IO-year government bond yield for the 
USA. 
Real interest rates are calculated using the Fischer equation, rt = it - l{t where r. i 
and 1re respectively denote real interest rate, nominal interest rate and expected inflation. 
Real interest rates are used in real exchange rate modelling to capture the Dornbuch 
(1976) type-effects, based on price rigidities and resulting from expected short-term 
capital gains created by increases in short-term interest rates. As a result, for all countries 
real interest rates are calculated using a short-term nominal interest rate, namely the 
domestic money-market overnight rate (the federal funds rate for the USA). We define 1r 
to be CPI inflation over a period of a calendar year, with expected inflation 1r" 
approximated using actual CPI inflation rates after four quarters (i.e. 1r," = 1r,+~). The 
SIC The medium size of our sample periods implies that in addition to permanent relative supply shocks. 
ultimately transitory yet relatively persistent demand shocks may also have an effect on the fitted output 
series. This implies that our relative permanent output series may capture both permanent supply and 
demand shocks dying out at a slow rate. As a highly persistent positive demand shock would result in real 
appreciation for the domestic country, this increases the possibility of obtaining a negative coefficient for 
PI in equation (2.1 ). 
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applied AOF tests suggest that with two exceptions (nominal interest rate differential in 
Korea and Malaysia), all interest rate differential series (nominal and real) are stationary. 
Finally, regarding real net foreign assets and current account imbalances. as in the 
previous chapter, we would have liked to include these series into the analysis as 
percentages in GOP. However, due to the lack of availability of GOP on a quarterly basis. 
that was not possible. We have therefore used the level of real net foreign assets. 
calculated by deflating the nominal net foreign assets series provided by IFS using the 
CPI index. We use the change in the stock of real net foreign assets as a proxy for a 
country's current account position. All real net foreign series were found to be I( I). with 
their changes being stationary. Non-stationarity for real exchange rates. relative output 
and real net foreign assets implies that any econometric analysis aiming to model the real 
exchange rate using these variables has to be undertaken within a cointegration 
framework. 
2.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.5.1. Model/ing equilibrium real exchange rates 
The sample periods on which our analysis is based covers a period of 
approximately twenty-five years. For the purpose of modelling real exchange rates, such 
a data span can be classified as medium rather than long-run, in which case the effects of 
ultimately transitory yet long lasting changes, such as shifts in relative demand and real 
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interest rate differentials, can affect the level of the real exchange rate. as can changes of 
a more permanent nature, such as productivity gains. 
We follow a general-to-specific approach, which involves estimating (2.1) and 
gradually reducing it to the point where only statistically significant variables are 
included in the model. The results of our long-run equations appear in Table 2.2 showing 
in all countries examined, equilibrium real exchange rates are a function of permanent 
relative output and one or more variables from nominal and real interest rate ditTerentials. 
the level of and changes in net foreign assets, and a time trend. 
Relative permanent output is statistically significant for all four countries. but its' 
effect on real exchange rates is not uniform: in Indonesia and the Philippines (5~ - .vI S./ ) 
has a negative sign, which suggests that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is stronger than the 
relative price effect. By contrast, in Korea and Malaysia, (y - Y/lSA) has a positive sign, 
suggesting the relative price effect dominates.59 This is similar to when we model 
nominal exchange rate determination in the previous chapter. 
With one exception (Malaysia) nominal interest rate differentials are in all 
countries statistically significant, displaying the theoretically-expected positive sign. This 
is dissimilar to when we model nominal exchange rate determination in the previous 
chapter in that only in Indonesia and the Philippines cases we find that this variable is 
statistically significant with the theoretically-expected positive sign. 
Real interest rate differentials are significant for Korea and Malaysia, also 
entering (2.1) with the theoretically-expected negative sign. Our results differ from that 
5'1 As a robustness check. we estimated the models reported in Table 2.2 changing the value of the 
smoothing parameter by 10. 20. 30. 40 and 50 per cent upwards and downwards. The results obtained 
remain unaltered. 
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of nominal exchange rates model discussed in the previous chapter in that the latter 
provide evidence that real interest rate differentials are statistically significant \\ ith the 
theoretically-expected negative sign in the case of Malaysia and of the Philippines. 
Real net foreign assets are significant with a positive sign for Korea. the 
Philippines, and Malaysia. This is consistent with the predictions of the stock-tlow 
approach to real exchange rate determination, given the high-growth. emerging nature of 
the countries considered by our analysis and the medium- rather than long-run character 
of our samples. However, in the case of Malaysia, we find a distinction between the real 
exchange rate model and the nominal one as discussed in the previous chapter in that in 
the latter model the sign for real net foreign assets is negative. 
In South Korea and Malaysia, our proxy for the current account, the change in 
real net foreign assets, is statistically significant with a positive sign. This is dissimilar to 
when we model nominal exchange rate determination in the previous chapter in that the 
change in real net foreign assets is statistically significant, displaying a positive sign, in 
the case of Malaysia and the Philippines. In the case of the change in real net foreign 
liabilities, we find in the Philippines, these variables enter equation (2.1) with a negative 
sign, while in the case of South Korea it is positive. Our result for modelling the real 
exchange rate differ from that of the nominal one as discussed in the previous chapter in 
that only in the Philippines the change in real net foreign liabilities is statistically 
significant. 
In relation to this, it is interesting to note that in the case of Malaysia, the real 
exchange rate appears to respond in a statistically significant way only to changes in real 
net foreign assets but not to changes in real net foreign liabilities, while the opposite 
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holds true for the Philippines. All of this suggests that the ambiguity of the role of the 
current account in real exchange rate determination, discussed above in the context of 
Rogoffs statement, may be even more complex, with the nature of the relationship 
between the two variables (positive or negative) varying not only across countries. but 
also within the same country, depending on whether the current account is in deficit or 
surplus. Finding a theoretical explanation for the existence of such a non-monotonic 
relationship exceeds the scope of an empirical study such as the present one, however, 
our findings may provide an incentive for future theoretical work. 
The trend term is statistically significant for only two countries (Indonesia and the 
Philippines), and even for these the trend coefficient is very low. This suggests that our 
equations are unlikely to be subject to the influence of omitted variables, a conclusion 
also supported by the high explanatory power of all models. 
Finally, the reported ADF tests suggest that all equations are clearly cointegrated, 
which excludes the possibility of spurious correlation among the \ariables. 
2.5.2. Linear real exchange rate adjustment models 
We estimate (2.2) using a general-to-specific approach, starting by including 
sixteen lags for /lq, and /lq., and reducing the equation to a parsimonious specification. 
The results are reported in Table 2.3. All equations have been estimated including 
intercept dummies for incidences of particular exchange rate turbulence. These are 
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defined at the bottom of Table 2.3. Excluding these dummies does not change the nature 
of the findings, but results in problems of residual non-normality. In line with our 
expectations, all error correction coefficients are statistically significant with a negati\e 
sign. The speed of adjustment differs across countries, with adjustment to equilibrium in 
Malaysia and the Philippines being faster than in Indonesia and Korea. This is similar to 
when we model nominal exchange rate determination in the previous chapter. However. 
all adjustment to equilibrium of real exchange rate are faster than that of nominal 
exchange rates. The reported equations are generally well-specified, with their 
explanatory power being rather mixed. Nonetheless, the nominal exchange rate model fits 
the data better than that of the real exchange rate one in that the former' coefficient of 
determinations, with the exception in the case of Indonesia, show relatively higher 
values. In the case of Indonesia, we find that the R-squares in real and nominal exchange 
rate models are similar (0.98), indicating that we have accounted for almost all of the 
variability with the variables specified in these models. 
2.5.3. Testing for non-linear real exchange rate adjustment 
Table 2.4 presents the results of our non-linearity tests. In all countries we obtain 
evidence of non-linear adjustment, which we proceed to model formally in the following 
section. 
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2.5.4. Non-linear real exchange rate adjustment models 
Table 2.5 presents the estimates of our non-linear estimations. The reported 
equations are parsimonious specifications obtained using a general-to-specific search 
modelling approach and include statistically significant turbulence dummies similar to 
those included in their linear counterparts. These dummies ensure that our non-linear 
findings reflect systematic non-linearity in real exchange rate adjustment and do not 
simply reflect the influence of isolated, one-off events. For all countries. we obtain strong 
evidence of size-misalignment. The error correction coefficients are insignificant in the 
inner regime, suggesting a random walk behaviour when the real exchange rate closes to 
its equilibrium. On the other hand, for all countries the error correction term is highly 
significant in the outer regime, suggesting fast reversion to equilibrium when the 
misalignment term becomes large. 
In the case of Indonesia, the error correction coefficients in our non-linear real 
exchange rate adjustment present a somewhat slower reversion to equilibrium (-0.412) 
compared to that in modelling non-linear nominal exchange rate adjustment (-0.478). On 
the other hand, in the case of Malaysia, the error correction coefficients in our non-linear 
real exchange rate adjustment present a much faster reversion to equilibrium (-0.359) 
compared to that in modelling non-linear nominal exchange rate adjustment (-0.130). 
Meanwhile, in the case of the Philippines, the speed of adjustment to equilibrium in our 
non-linear real exchange rate adjustment (-0.218) is slower than the one obtained when 
modelling non-linear nominal exchange rate adjustment (-0.387). On the contrary. in the 
case of Korea, our non-linear real exchange rate adjustment presents a faster reversion to 
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equilibrium (-0.238) compared to that In modelling non-linear nominal exchange rate 
adjustment (-0.156). 
For two countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, we also obtain evidence of sign 
misalignment effects, with the absolute value of the lower threshold of the inner regime 
being in all cases higher than that of the upp~r. This is consistent with the 1Iualing-rat~ 
exchange rate policy followed by these countries during the larger part of the post-
Bretton Woods system, which involved targets for the rate of depreciation against the US 
dollar. Compare this with the results obtained in the previous chapter when modelling 
nominal exchange rates, where we find asymmetric nominal exchange rate adjustment 
only in the case of Indonesia. This asymmetry is a new finding, which previous studies 
using symmetry-imposing non-linear models such as the TAR or the ESTAR. are not in 
position to capture. The econometric properties of the models reported in Table 2.5 are 
generally superior to their linear counterparts in Table 2.3, as they all pass the 
misspecification tests at the 5 per cent level and produce lower regression standard 
errors.60 
Figure 2.2 presents the estimated real exchange rate misalignment term against 
the estimated thresholds of the inner regime for each of the countries examined. Some 
interesting observations emerge. First, deviations of the real exchange rates from their 
equilibrium values have predominantly been taking values within the inner regime. This 
is similar to the results in previous chapter in that nominal exchange rate misalignment 
hU Note that the estimate of the 0' parameter. giving the speed of transition between the inner and outer 
regime. is high for Korea. moderate for Indonesia and the Philippines and low for Malaysia. With the 
exception of Korea. these results indicate that using the TAR or MTAR (Momentum Threshold 
Autoregressive) models (which postulate abrupt change between the two regimes) to model non-linear 
exchange rate dynamics may result to biased results. Note also that in all cases the 0' coefficient is 
imprecisely estimated. however. this is not surprising as the likelihood function is very insensitive to this 
parameter (see the detailed discussion on this point in van Dijk et 81 .• 2002). 
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typically also takes place within the inner regime. However, as found in the case of 
modelling nominal exchange rates behaviour in the previous chapter, deviations of the 
real exchange rates from their equilibrium values have also been taking values within the 
outer regime, particularly for the Philippines and South Korea. 
Second, episodes of discrete devaluations were preceded by substantial 
overvaluation of the currencies involved, with the rate of misalignment taking values in 
the outer regime. In particular, Figure 2.2 suggests that the crisis of 1997-98 was justitied 
by economic fundamentals. This evidence is also found when modelling nominal 
exchange rates in the previous chapter. It would appear that the restrictive monetary 
policy followed by all countries prior to 1997 led to very substantial real exchange rate 
overvaluation (particularly in the case of the Indonesian Rupiah), creating pressures for a 
substantial real exchange rate correction, which came in the form of a violent 
devaluation. 
Finally, Figure 2.2 suggests that at the end of our sample periods the real 
exchange rate of the Indonesian Rupiah and the South Korean Won were significantly 
overvalued, whereas that of the Malaysian Ringgit was fundamentally undervalued. 
These results are also discovered in the previous chapter when modelling nominal 
exchange rates behaviour. To restore equilibrium, Figure 2.2 suggests that the Rupiah and 
the Won would subsequently depreciate against the US dollar, while the Ringgit would 
appreciate. In 2004-2005 the Rupiah has indeed depreciated against the US dollar. 
whereas the recent re-floating of the Ringgit has also led to a slight appreciation of the 
Malaysian currency. By contrast, during 2004-2005 the Won has appreciated further 
against the US dollar. suggesting that the Korean currency may be vulnerable to currency 
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turbulence in the future. These results are remarkably consistent with our forecast \\ hen 
modelling nominal exchange rates behaviour in the previous chapter. 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has examined real exchange rate behaviour in four fast-growing 
emerging Asian countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Korea. 
Over the past three decades, the currencies of all four countries have experienced a 
prolonged real depreciation against the US dollar. This renders the benchmark model of 
real exchange behaviour, Purchasing Power Parity, which predicts a constant real 
exchange rate, inadequate to explain real exchange rate behaviour in this set of countries. 
We modelled equilibrium real exchange rates using a general behavioural 
equation, consistent with a variety of theoretical approaches to real exchange rate 
determination. We found equilibrium real exchange rates to be a function of relative 
permanent output shocks and one or more variables from nominal and real interest rate 
differentials as well as the level of and change in net foreign assets. However, the 
behaviour of real exchange rate differs from that of nominal exchange rates in that the 
former takes into account the deterministic time trend in its long-run model but excludes 
domestic and foreign prices. We also found that individual countries present significant 
elements of idiosyncratic behaviour, casting doubt on empirical models using panel-data 
techniques. 
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Furthermore, we obtained strong evidence of non-linear dynamics in the process 
of the adjustment of the real exchange rate to its extracted equilibrium level. More 
specifically, for all countries examined we found that the speed of reversion to 
equilibrium is a function of the size and, in two cases, the sign of the misalignment term. 
Compare this with the results obtained in the previous chapter when modelling nominal 
exchange rates, where we find asymmetric nominal exchange rate adjustment only in the 
case of Indonesia. 
Finally, similar to the findings when modelling the behaviour of nominal 
exchange rates, our results in this chapter also suggest that the currency devaluations that 
took place in 1997-98 were entirely justified by economic fundamentals. as prior to the 
crisis the real exchange rates of all four countries were significantly overvalued against 
the US dollar. 
Similar to the suggestions we made when modelling the behaviour of nominal 
exchange rates, our work can be extended in several ways. In the empirical level. we 
could use our empirical methodology to study the dynamics of real exchange rates in 
other sets of countries and determine whether the asymmetric, non-linear dynamics 
identified in the Asian economies examined by our analysis are a common future of 
exchange rate behaviour. In the theoretical level, we can use the empirical findings of our 
study first to motivate a theoretical model of non-linear exchange rate behavior based on 
asymmetric policy preferences and, second, to establish a formal non-monotonic link 
between the current account and the real exchange rate. 
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Table 2.1. Unit Root Test 
Level Indonesia Korea Philippines Malaysia 
1978(3 )-2003( 4) 1980(\ )-2003( 4) 1981(4)-2003(4) 1975(3)-1998(3) 
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP 
q -1.546 -2.084 -1.824 -1.879 -1.955 -1.869 -1.051 
-0.510 
" Y -Y'N' " -0.127 -0.570 -1.575 -1.740 -1.819 -1.885 -1.225 -1.279 
i- i ""tJ -3.593*** -3.019** -1.985 -2.653* -3.797*** -3.997*** -1.960 -2.088 
r-r ""tJ -4.785*** -4.064*** -3.083** -3.854*** -3.482** -3.309** -2.614* -2.952** 
rnfa -1.709 -2.619*** -1.276 -0.916 -1.434 -1.250 -0.766 -0.551 
rnfl -1.466 -1.419 -0.903 -1.078 
Llrnfa -4.473*** 11.253*** -4.294*** -8.110*** -5.204*** -8.541*** -4.299*** -8.438*** 
Llrnfl -4.386*** -6.887*** -4.349*** -6.974*** 
I sf Difference 
Indonesia Korea Philippines Malaysia 
1978(3)-2003(4) 1980( I )-2003( 4) 1981 (4)-2003( 4) 1975(3)-1998(3) 
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP 
q -4.946*** -8.192*** -3.834*** -7.002*** -5.020*** -7.754*** -4.834*** -6.469*** 
Y"-Y""tJ " -5.932*** 14.824*** 
-4.471*** 
-7.805*** -4.248*** -10.08*** -4.941*** -10.02*** 
i- i ""tJ -5.673*** -9.155*** -4.780*** -7.914*** -4.929*** -12.08*** -4.169*** -8.560*** 
1'-1'".1'(/ -7.126*** -6.613*** -5.334*** -7.394*** -4.826*** -5.751 *** -4.377*** -8.454*** 
rnfa -4.473* 11.254*** -4.294*** -8.110*** -5.204*** -8.541 *** -4.299*** -8.437*** 
rnfl -4.386*** -8.637*** -4.349*** -6.974*** 
Llrn/a -8.081*** 25.987*** -6.869*** 19.296*** -6.394*** -19.715**~ -6.048*** -21.72*** 
Llrnfl -8.634*** 23.369*** -6.848*** -15.96*** 
Notes: */**/*** denote sign(ficance at the IO'Y0I5%//% level respectively following MacKinnon critical 
valuesfor rejection of hypothesis q( a unit root. 
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Table 2.2. Real exchange rate models 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea 
Sample 1978(3) -2003( 4) 1975(3)-1998(3) 1981 (4) - 2003( 4) 1980( I) - 2003(~) 
constant 3.178 (0.032) 0.931 (0.119) 1.093 (0.027) 2.572 (0.099) 
(Y - YI',\/) -0.815 (0.178) 0.506 (0.040) -0.087 (0.027) 0.286 (0.090) 
(i - iI/SA) 0.414 (0.061 ) 0.374 (0.079) 0.248 (0.143) 
(r - rl/s/a -0.206 (0.099) -0.548 (0.157) 
mlu 0.102 (0.026) 0.056 (0.012) 0.090 (0.022) 
mil 0.109 (0.013) 0.138 (0.020) 
I1rnfu 0.348 (0.072) 0.239 (0.046) 
I1mfl -0.102 (0.015) 0.187 (0.045) 
I 0.003 (0.00 I) 0.004 (0.0003) 
Rl 0.895 0.850 0.786 0.740 
ADF -3.723 -3.025 -4.384 -2.998 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; all variables are significant at 5% level or better; the lag 
structure of the reported ADF tests has been chosen using the Akaike inFormation criterion. 
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Table 2.3. Linear Error Correction Models 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines S. Korea 
Sample I 978(3)-2003( 4) 1975(3)-1998(3) 1981 (4)-2003(4) 1980( I )-2003(4) 
constant -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 
-0.000 (0.001) 
!J.q ,_I -0.061 (0.023) 0.261 (0.102) 0.408 (0.076) 
!J.q ,-4 0.046 (0.021 ) 
!J.q ,-9 0.083 (0.022) 
!J.q ,-10 0.057 (0.022) 
!J.q ,-II 0.169 (0.077) 
!J.q ,-13 0.090 (0.025) 
!J.q ,-14 0.153 (0.032) 
!J.q ,-15 0.060 (0.020) 
!J.q* 0.205 (0.044) 0.192 (0.061 ) 0.320 (0.059) 
!J.q* (-5 -0.202 (0.056) 
!J.q * ,-7 -0.144 (0.042) 
!J.q * ,-II 0.131 (0.049) 
(q-q*)'-I -0.051 (0.018) -0.201 (0.044) -0.219 (0.052) -0.098 (0.030) 
Regression S.E. 0.00815 0.01 103 0.01482 0.00847 
R.l 0.98 0.57 0.44 0.85 
AR 1.15 [0.34] 
-
2.21 [0.06] 1.71 [0.14] 1.58 [0.17] 
ARCH 0.48 [0.75] 0.11 [0.98] 1.51 [0.21] 2.60 [0.04] 
Normality 4.63[0.10] 0.39 [0.82] 1.81 [0.40] 3.80 [0.15] 
Hetero 0.90[0.61 ] 1.79 [0.08] 1.65 [0.13] 0.53 [0.81] 
RESET 0.08 [0.78] 0.74 [0.39] 2.19[0.14] 3.45 [0.07] 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. p-values in square brackets. All models have been estimated including dummy 
variables tor periods of major currency turbulence. These are defined: for Indonesia 1983(2), 1986(4). 1997(4). 
1998(1),1998(4).2001(3): for South Korea: 1997(4).1998(1).1998(2): for Malaysia: 1997(4), 1998(1) and 1998(3). 
AR is the Lagrange MUltiplier F- test for residual serial correlation of up to fifth order. ARCH is an F-test tor 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and general mispecitication. Normality is a Chi-square test for residuals' 
normality. Hetero is an F-test for residuals heteroskedasticity. RESET is an F-test for functional form. 
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Table 2.4. Tests for non-linear adjustment 
((J d F -test [p-val ue] 
Indonesia 1 2 7.903 [O'()()] 
Malaysia 1 4 2.26-t [0.05] 
South Korea 1 4 3.317 [0.00] 
Philippines 1 2 4.305 [0.00] 
NOTES: rp is the order of the autoregressive component and d the order of the delay parameter 
in the artiticial regression described by (2.3) 
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Table 2 5 Non-Linear Error Correction Models · . 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea 
Sample 1978(3)-2003(4) 1975(3)-1998(3) 1981(4)-2003(4) I 980( 1)-2003(4) 
MJ 
Constant 0.0009 (0.001) 0.026 (0.009) 0.0012 (0.002) 
-0.001 (0.001) 
Ilqt_1 -0.074 (0.023) 0.366 (0.087) 
Ilqt-4 0.318 (0.096) 
Ilqt-II 0.1929 (0.081) 
Ilqt-n 0.077 (0.021) 
Ilqt-14 0.141 (0.028) 
Ilqt-I 0.130 (0.064) 
Ilqt-~ 0.113 (0.048) 
Ilqt-5 -0.099 (0.049) 
Ilqt-7 -0.170 (0.042) 
(q-q*)t-I -0.0 I 0 (0.018) -0.035 (0.044) 
-0.0515 (0.067) 
-0.046 (0.048) 
Mo 
Constant 0.0439 (0.008) -0.021 (0.012) -0.0002 (0.003) 
-0.002 (0.002) 
Ilqt-I 0.737(0.167) 
Ilqt-2 0.362 (0.146) 
Ilqt-4 -2.788 (0.214) 
Aql_') -1.566 (0.657) 
Al/,-11 2.242 (0.979) 
~- . 
.1'1,_1 -0.253 (0.077) 
Ill/,-~ 1.709 (0.071) 
Ilq,_J 0.9806 (0.499) 0.405 (0.126) 
(q-q*)I-1 -0.412 (0.041) -0.3591 (0.114) -0.218 (0.070) -0.238 (0.044) 
cr 15.93 (19.71) 2.25 (0.977) 27.81 (84.31) 68.68 (319.8) 
i 
II 0.089 (0.00 I) 0.032 (0.006) 0.023 (0.002) 0.034 (0.00 I) 
i l -0.104 (0.0004) -0.058 (0.005) -0.043 (0.002) -0.041 (0.00 I) 
Standard error 0.00788 0.00903 0.01324 0.00827916 
R- 0.98 0.75 0.60 0.87 
AR 0.39 [0.8531] 0.95 [0.45] 1.01 [0.42] 0.57 [0.72] 
ARCH 0.47 0.7563] 0.26 [0.90] 0.51 [0.73] 0.97 [0.43] 
Normality 2.73 0.2555] 2.68 [0.26] 2.37 [0.31] 1.19 [0.55] 
Hetero 1.12 0.3804] 0.28 [0.99] 0.31 [0.99] 0.62 [0.90] 
F-test 
Ho: t L +tU = 0 133.69 11.34 3.17 0.35 
NOTES: Standard errors In parentheses. p-values In square brackets. All models have been estimated mcludmg 
dummy variables for periods of major currency crises. These are defined: For Indonesia 1983(2). 1986(4). 1993( I). 
2000(2). 2001(3): for Malaysia: 1975(3). 1976(3). 1983(1). 1985( I). 1986(2). 1997(3). 1997(4). 1998(1): thr South 
Korea 1997(4). 1998(1).2001(1): for the Philippines: 1984(1). 1985(1). 1997(3). AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F- test 
tor residual serial correlation of up to fifth order. ARCH is an F-test for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and 
general mispecitication. Normality is a Chi-square test for residuals' nonnality. Hetero is an F-test for residuals 
heteroskedasticity. RESET is an F-test for functional form. The 95 p.c. critical value for the F-test testing Ho: t l +tl 
= 0 is 3.84. 
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CHAPTER III 
Modelling Monetary Policy Reaction Function: 
New Evidence from East Asia 
3 .1. Introduction 
It has become standard practice to explain the conduct of monetary polic) uSing 
n:action functions that associate the interest rate \\ ith inflation alld output. This reaction 
function. the Taylor rule that was first proposed by Taylor (1993). suggests that interest 
raIL's are changed according to de\iations of inflation from a target and to the output gap. 
IlmH.'\l'L the Ta) lor rule has been criticized for being too simple for a smaller and more 
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open economy. Some researchers, such as Svensson (2000), have proposed an augmented 
Taylor rule with the exchange rate included, in a rule designed for small open economies. 
Other economists, such as Clarida et al (1998), consider the foreign interest rate to be 
another variable that should be included in a typical central bank reaction function for 
these economies. 
There are several reasons for including the exchange rate in the central bank 
reaction function in emerging economies. For example, a high degree of pass-through of 
the exchange rate into inflation, in which the exchange rate affects the domestic currency 
prices of imported final goods and, consequently, CPt inflation. As a secondary etfect of 
the exchange rate on inflation, changes in CPt inflation will induce wage setting and 
eventually affect nominal wages. The impact on both CPt inflation and nominal wages 
will change the cost of producing domestic goods and eventually lead to inflation in the 
prices of domestically produced goods (domestic inflation). 
Another reason for including the exchange rate in the augmented Taylor rule is 
the possible effect on aggregate demand. Changes in the exchange rate will alter the 
relative prices of tradable and non-tradable goods, leading to adjustment in trade 
balances. For instance, following a depreciation of domestic currency, imported goods 
become more expensive. If pass-through is high, imports will decline as consumer 
spending shifts to domestically produced goods and away from imported goods. Indeed, 
foreign demand for domestic goods will rise if the relative price between domestic and 
foreign goods becomes larger and may eventually lead to expenditure switching between 
imports and exports. The shift in domestic and foreign demand for domestically produced 
goods will ultimately affect aggregate demand in an economy. 
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For these reasons, it is sensible to presume that an augmented Taylor rule 
including the exchange rate could lead to an improved macroeconomic performance in 
terms of stabilizing inflation and output in a small open economy. Accordingly. the 
inclusion of the exchange rate variable is consistent with all these four Asian Central 
Banks' objectives of maintaining price and financial stability, as a substantial 
depreciation of their currency would cause domestic price and wage inflation. eventuall) 
hampering its competitiveness. If the domestic currency depreciates beyond a certain 
point the Central Bank responds by raising the interest rate. 
There are also several reasons for including the foreign interest rate in the 
monetary reaction function of emerging economies. One is interest rate differential 
parity. Since the advent of financial globalization, any movements in foreign interest 
rates vis-a-vis domestic rates can no longer be totally ignored in monetary policy 
implementation. If the foreign interest rate exceeds the domestic interest rate, there is a 
capital outflow. Therefore, in response to increasing foreign interest rates, the central 
bank may be forced to raise interest rates. On the other hand, there is a potentially huge 
capital inflow if domestic interest rate exceeds the interest rate abroad. Hence, the central 
bank will consider lowering domestic interest rates in response to a decreasing foreign 
interest rate. 
In this chapter, we investigate the monetary policy reaction function of four Asian 
Central Banks. We attempt to assess whether central banks in these four emerging 
economies are primarily concerned with fluctuations in inflation and output, or whether 
they are also concerned with fluctuations in the exchange rate or foreign interest rates. To 
do this we use a simple model of the augmented Taylor Rule including exchange rates 
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and foreign interest rates. We consider both backward-looking and forward-looking 
specifications. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research exploring this type of 
augmented Taylor rule for these four emerging economies. 
The evidence in this chapter suggests that all central banks in these emerging 
market economies pursue the objectives of price and output stability. In all four countries 
other objectives also play a role, monetary authorities adjusting interest rates 
systematically in response to foreign interest rates and exchange rates. The response to 
the foreign interest rate is typically strong in all countries in the sample. Additionally, in 
Indonesia and the Philippines, the response is found to be even more marked than that to 
changes in the inflation rate or the output gap. This emphasizes the importance of foreign 
interest rate fluctuations. Our empirical evidence also suggests that the interest rate is a 
useful instrument to counter movements in the exchange rate. The augmented Taylor rule 
including the exchange rate and the foreign interest rate is a better empirical model 
because it captures how a small open economy attempts to stabilize the exchange rate and 
the financial market. Finally, we also find evidence that monetary policy reaction 
functions in Indonesia and Korea were a combination of forward and backward-looking, 
while in the Philippines were a combination of forward-looking and contemporaneous 
and in Malaysia were essentially forward-looking. Surprisingly, we do not find any 
central bank considering purely backward-looking or contemporaneous specifications. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the literature review. 
Section 3.3 presents the methodology we employ and some notes on the estimation of 
monetary policy reaction functions. Section 3.4 introduces the data used and discusses 
some preliminary observations. Section 3.5 proceeds with the estimation of the baseline 
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specification and its extensions and then an analysis of the implied monetar) policy 
behaviour over the period studied. Finally, Section 3.6 offers concluding remarks. 
3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Original Taylor Rule vs. Augmented Taylor Rule 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1998) conclude that the Taylor rule framework is 
useful in summarizing major variables in US monetary policy. Gerlach and Schnabel 
(2000) conclude that monetary policy in the EMU (European Monetary Union) area has 
largely been consistent with the Taylor rule. Using quarterly data from 1990 to 1997. 
with the exception of the period of exchange market turbulence in 1992-93, they show 
that a Taylor rule accurately portrays the behaviour of interest rates in the EMU area. 
Implementing such a rule as a policy guideline provides evidence of positive correlations 
between interest rate and the average of inflation as well as the output gap. Adopting such 
a rule recognized by the public may ease uncertainty about the future pattern of monetary 
policy and thus help prevent unnecessary macroeconomic instability. Levin et al (1999). 
Leitemo and Soderstrom (200 I), and Nyberg (2002) give further support for the 
robustness of the Taylor rule. 
On the other hand, Svensson (2000, 2002) argues that from a theoretical point of 
View, the importance of the Taylor rule for conducting monetary policy should be 
questioned. If there are essential variables other than inflation and the output gap, then 
the original Taylor rule is highly unlikely to explain the monetary authority's action. He 
126 
suggests that for a small and open economy, other important state variables such as real 
exchange rate and the foreign interest rate should be included in the rule. His conclusion 
echoes those of Ball (1999) and Batini et al (2000) who found evidence that such an 
augmented rule is superior to the original Taylor rule for small open economies. reducing 
the standard deviation of CPI inflation. Other researchers such as Hsing (2004) also 
support the use of exchange rates in a Taylor-type rule, in which he shows that between 
1975 and 2003 the Bank of Canada raised the call rate in response to a depreciation of the 
Canadian dollar. 
Clarida et al (1998), meanwhile, are among those to have proposed the relevance 
of a foreign interest rate variable in an augmented Taylor-type rule. According to their 
results for the period 1979 to 1994, central banks in the E3 countries (U.K .. France. and 
Italy) reacted to the German interest rate and kept interest rates higher than the domestic 
economic conditions required. They also find central banks in the G3 countries (Japan, 
U.S., and Germany) pursuing inflation targeting implicitly, reacting to expected inflation 
instead of past inflation figures, and so were forward-looking. 
3.2.2. Backward-Looking vs. Forward Looking Augmented Taylor Rule 
The forward-looking version of the Taylor rule, according to Huang et al (200 I) 
performs better than a contemporaneous variable specification. This effect, although the 
differences are minor, is found when studying the Reserves Bank of New Zealand's 
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reaction function. Similarly. other economists such as Ball (1999), Svensson (1999, 
2002), Batini et al (2000), Orphan ides (2001). and Woodford (2001) support a forward-
looking version of the Taylor rule. Orphanides (2001) estimates the Taylor rule for the 
U.S. during 1987-1992 using ex post and real time data. He finds evidence that fonvard-
looking versions of the Taylor rule can describe policy better than contemporane~us 
specifications. He also finds that, the Taylor rule seems to give a much more accurate 
description of policy when ex post data are used than when real time data are used. 
Eusepi (2005), meanwhile, provides evidence of the superiority of Taylor rules based on 
current and past information rather than forecasts. 
3.2.3. The Monetary Policy Reaction Function in Emerging Economies 
During the last decade, the number of empirical studies of the monetary policy 
reaction function from the perspective of developing countries has increased 
substantially, suggesting the relevance of Taylor rule as a tool for the analysis of the 
behaviour of monetary policy. A review of interest rate setting behaviour in emerging 
market economies gives interesting results. Affandi (2004), when estimating Indonesia's 
monetary policy reaction function, finds that reaction of the interest rate to expected 
inflation is positive. in that an increase in expected inflation is responded to by raising 
nominal rates. He also finds that the central bank is more sensitive with respect to 
domestic inflation. in the sense that the interest rate response to non-traded goods 
inflation is greater than that to CPI inflation. This policy response has ensured inflation 
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stability, as the central bank does not allow expected inflation to rise. He suggests that 
this empirical evidence shows the monetary authority was implicitly employing inflation 
targeting as a new framework for monetary policy in Indonesia.61 
In the case of Korea, Hsing and Lee (2004) find that the call rate reacts positively 
to the lagged call rate, the inflation gap (the deviation of inflation from its target). the 
output gap (the difference between actual and potential GOP). the exchange rate gap (the 
deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value), and the stock price gap (the 
deviation of stock prices from its trend), but not to foreign interest rates. They find that 
the Bank of Korea focuses more on the inflation gap and the exchange rate gap in the 
short run, whereas the output gap and the stock market gap are more important in the 
long run. 
Salas (2004) finds that the Philippine central bank (BSP) has been stabilizing 
inflation through its choice of its key policy rate. However, it appears to be 
accommodative with respect to the output gap, in that changes in the output gap do not 
provoke a response. Filosa (200 I) finds that most central banks of maturing emerging 
market economies react strongly to the exchange rate, although frequent changes in the 
monetary policy regime make it difficult to assess the relative importance placed on 
inflation control and external equilibrium. 
C>I Indonesia officially adopts inflation targeting framework in Juli 2005 following the amendment of its Act 
No. 23 of 1999. 
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3.3. The Evolution of Monetary Policy in These Economies 
Over the decade before the mid 1980s, the Central Banks of Indonesia. Korea. 
Malaysia and the Philippines generally conducted monetary policy using an intermediate 
targeting system, such as a broad monetary aggregate, in order to attain price stability.62 
Additionally, in this period, these four central banks conducted monetary policy through 
a mixture of financial-market operations and direct controls on markets and financial 
institutions. These incorporated controls on commercial bank interest rates. reserve 
requirements and various other balance-sheet restrictions. This system of policy 
management was gradually found to be ineffective. Markets in fact developed ways of 
avoiding regulation through dealing with unregulated parts of the financial sector. 
As in any other countries, the rapid financial innovation and liberalization of the 
late 1980s blurred the distinction between monetary aggregates and destabilized the 
relationship between the real sector and monetary aggregates. These developments 
greatly reduced the effectiveness of existing methods of conducting monetary policy. 
These countries began demonstrating considerable instability in the demand for money, 
implying that monetary growth targets had failed because of large-scale shocks to money 
demand functions. 
In the aftermath of the 1997/98 financial crises, the maintenance of exchange rate 
at a certain level as the anchor for their monetary policy was abandoned. In the face of 
growing capital flows and the imperfections of financial markets, monetary authorities 
b:! Price stability contributes to economic efficiency by reducing the uncertainties. which are likely to slow 
investment down. It also allows resources to be directed toward productive economic activities that might 
otherwise be redirected to alleviating the financial effects of inflation. 
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shifted their fixed-exchange rate system to a floating exchange rate system.63 
Consequently, they needed a new anchor and turned their attentions to controlling 
. fl' 64 S' h h In atton. mce ten, t ese central banks, with the exception of Malaysia. have 
exercised the potential of inflation targeting as a new framework for the operation of 
monetary policy. 
According to Bernanke et al (1999), inflation targeting is a monetary policy 
framework that exhibits five conditions. Firstly, the bank specifies and officiallv 
announces its inflation rate target. Secondly, the bank unambiguously recognizes that the 
ultimate goal of its monetary policy is stable inflation, while allowing economic growth 
and employment stability as subordinate goals. Thirdly, the bank takes all economic 
indicators concerning price stability into account in its forward-looking monetary policy 
management. Fourthly, the bank transparently explains to the public and market players 
reasoning behind the contents of monetary policy decisions and the grounds on which the 
decisions are based. Fifthly, the focus of its monetary policy is placed on achieving 
inflation targeting objectives in an accountable manner. With the introduction of inflation 
targeting system, the previous multiple objectives of monetary policy - high economic 
growth, a low level of unemployment, a tolerable inflation rate, and a sustainable balance 
of payments position - were abolished and replaced by the single objective of price 
stability. Additionally, employing the inflation targeting system strengthened the central 
bank's independence and neutrality. 
(l~ For example, South Korea. hard hit by the currency and financial crisis in November 1997, abolished its 
exchange rate band and shifted to a complete floating exchange rate system in December of the same year. 
<l4 Countries that have been successful in maintaining low inflation have typically enjoyed better economic 
performance than those that were unable to do so (see Haldane, 1995: Bernanke et al. 1999: Cecchetti and 
Ehrmann 1999: Allen 2000). 
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Korea was the first of these countries to introduce inflation targeting. in 1998. 
About four years later, inflation targeting was introduced in the Philippines as a ne\\ 
method of operating monetary policy. Indonesia followed. introducing inflation targeting 
implicitly in 1999 and explicitly in 2005. However, Malaysia has not yet introduced this 
system as its monetary policy. 
Because of the short time SInce these countries adopted inflation targeting 
framework their performance cannot be reviewed thoroughly at the present time. The 
experience of these countries, though, generally shows that the effectiveness of monetary 
policy has improved since the introduction of the system. 
3.3.1. The Monetary Policy Framework in Indonesia 
Over the past four decades, Indonesia's monetary policy framework has changed 
steadily. In the late 1970s, Bank Indonesia (81) shifted its monetary management from 
direct controls (i.e. credit and interest rate ceilings) to indirect control (open market 
operations). Monetary policy was conducted mainly by using base money as the 
operational instrument for controlling other monetary aggregates such as broad money.65 
However, although the use of base money as the operational instrument for monetary 
policy seemed to have been effective in the 1980s and early I 990s, this approach came 
under severe pressure thereafter. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98. Bank 
tiS McLeod (1997a) argued that during this period. the monetary policy anchor was clearly the nominal 
exchange rate. which was controlled intensely within a relatively narrow band. This allows the exchange 
rate to depreciate at a fairly steady rate. However. with this type of exchange rate system. the conduct of 
monetary management was effectively constrained. 
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Indonesia had to act as lender of last resort in order to prevent bank runs and a collapse of 
the banking system, backing failing banks with huge liquidity support. Unfortunately. 
this action cost the authority its monetary control, as base money grew by I 150/0 and 
broad money by 68% between November 1997 and July 1998.66 This expanding money 
supply, along with an erosion of public confidence in the Rupiah, a weakening currency 
cycle, and mounting prices, plunged the country into hyperinflation. In brief, monetary 
policy using quantity targets became ineffective.67 
As a result, the bank considered shifting from quantity targeting to inflation 
targeting. As a first step the bank united money, interest rate and exchange rate targeting. 
In the massive financial integration and globalization of the 1990s, the bank found this 
pragmatic approach loosing ground.68 The policy of maintaining the exchange rate within 
a narrow band was challenged by sizeable and volatile capital flows. Beginning in 1992, 
the bank gradually broadened its intervention band. Alamsyah et al (200 I) noted that by 
July 1997, the band was about 12% from the central parity following mounting 
b6 See Alamsyah et al (200 I). 
67 Boediono (1998) in Alamsyah et al (2001) argues that there are at least two reasons why base money 
growth became less effective. The first is a relatively thin and fragmented market for the bank's open 
market operation (OMO) instruments, namely central bank bills (SBI, Sertifikat Bank Indonesia) and 
money market securities (SBPU, Surat Berharga Pasar Uang). The OMO procedure allowed leading banks, 
mostly state banks to hold most outstanding S81. Consequently, most private banks were exposed to 
unexpected shocks since they were extremely dependent on the interbank market to cope with their liquid 
reserves. In such circumstances, the central bank may be forced to push up the interest rate to control 
liquidity. In September 1984, for instance, the interbank overnight rate soared to 90% per annum after 
contraction policy. Under the same policy in mid 1987, with the aim of fighting speculative transactions in 
foreign markets, Bank Indonesia made the state banks buy back SPBU and the state-owned enterprises 
purchase SBI with their deposits at the state banks. Secondly, base money is endogenous with respect to 
output in particular times. During an economic upswing for instance, escalating aggregate demand is 
followed by inflated foreign loans and the selling of SBI back to BI. Given the quasi-fixed exchange rate 
policy and an unwillingness to increase S81 rates, base money rises. Therefore, managing base money (and 
through it, aggregate demand) is a complicated task in which hugely high interest rates should occasionally 
be considered otherwise non-market instruments such as reserve requirements, moral suasion and tighter 
~udential regulations for the banks might be put in place. 
Conflicts between multiple objectives were discussed by Mcleod (1997c), although in a slightly 
different context. In particular, he argued that Indonesia's efforts to limit the current account deficit to 2% 
ofGDP conflicted with its 5% annual inflation target. 
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speculative transactions in the money and foreign exchange markets. In August 1997. the 
bank shifted its managed exchange rate system to a flexible exchange rate system and 
delayed the implementation of inflation targeting framework. Consequently. the bank 
continued to employ the quantity targeting as its nominal anchor following IMF advice. 
IIjas (1999) found that in the aftermath of the crisis, the monetary base target \\-as only 
utilized as a transitory measure to absorb excess liquidity from its emergency action as 
lender of last resort during the financial crisis. 
A major change in the conduct of monetary policy took place in May 1999 w:,en 
parliament passed a new central banking law69 that allowed BI to independently 
formulate and operate monetary policy. Under the new law, multiple objectives such as a 
low level of unemployment, high economic growth, a sustainable balance of payments 
position and a tolerable rate of inflation were abolished. The only objective of the new 
monetary policy is to pursue and maintain the stability of the value of the rupiah. A stable 
rupiah value has two meanings. Firstly, it refers to its value in terms of another currency 
unit (e.g. US dollar, the Japanese yen or the Euro). Since the rupiah exchange rate is 
completely determined by supply and demand forces in the market, all the Bl can do is to 
attempt to limit fluctuation in the exchange rate. Secondly, it refers to maintaining 
domestic price stability with regard to the purchasing power of the Rupiah to acquire 
goods and services. Under the new law, there is reasonable room for 81 to achieve price 
stability since it is granted full independence70 to formulate inflation target (goal 
hI) The Law No. 23 of 1999 on Bank Indonesia (BI). 
7(l Unlike in the past, the law stipulates that as an independent institution, BI is free from government or 
other outside intervention. Article 9 of the Law No. 23 of 1999 on Bank Indonesia prescribes that other 
parties are prohibited to get involved in any form in implementing BI tasks, and BI is obliged to refuse 
and/or to disregard any form of involvement by any parties in implementing its tasks. 
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independence) and operate monetary instruments (instrument independence).71 In 
addition, article 10 stresses that BI is authorized to implement monetary policy b\ 
determining monetary target in consideration of inflation rate target. Typically. price and 
exchange rate stability are strongly interconnected since exchange rate stabilit~ will 
affect low inflation. 
While Bank Indonesia is supposed to have implemented an inflation targeting 
framework in 1999 following the adoption of a new central banking law. the Lm\ No. 23 
of 1999 on Bank Indonesia (BI), it is in July 2005, Bank Indonesia finally launched this 
framework following the amendment of its Act No. 23 of 1999.72 This framework has 
four basic elements. Firstly, it uses the BI rate as a reference rate in monetary control in 
replacement of the base money operational target. Secondly, it considers a forward 
looking monetary policymaking process. Thirdly, the bank commits to be more 
transparent in its communications strategy. Finally, the bank will strengthen its policy 
coordination and cooperation with the Government. The reason for this is because the 
bank assumes that inflation cannot be controlled only over monetary policy, but also over 
other macroeconomic policy such as fiscal policy. These four basic elements are meant to 
improve the effectiveness in conducting monetary policy in order to achieve the ultimate 
goal of price stability in support of sustainable economic growth.73 
71 There is a conceptual difference betwt!en a quantitative definition of price stability and an inflation t&rget 
in that the latter does not automatically define "price stability", but reckons the objective in connection with 
price changes that monetary policy intend to pursue. Traditionally, there have been many occasions when 
inflation targets were set at levels considerably away from "price stability", often in cases where countries 
experiencing high levels of inflation, eventually set a path of inflation targets in order to bring inflation 
down to lower levels. A relationship presents only when such inflation targets are aimed explicitly at 
achieving "price stability". (Duisenberg, 2001) 
7:! The Act No. 23 of 1999 concerning Bank Indonesia is amended by Act No.3 of2004. 
7J By adopting the inflation targeting framework. it does not mean that the bank pays attention only to 
inflation and excludes economic growth from its monetary policy. The bank sees that the ITF is not a rigid 
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Under the amendment of the law concerning Bank Indonesia, the intlation target 
is set by the Government after considering Bank Indonesia's proposal. The Government 
set the inflation target for 2005, 2006, and 2007 at 6% ± I %, 5.5%± I %. and 5.0%± I 0/0 
respectively. The setting of these intermediate targets considers the trade-off \\ ith 
economic growth in the effort to improve the living standards of the popUlation and 
consistent with the desire to achieve a medium-long term inflation rate of 30/0. 
3.3.2. The Monetary Policy Framework in Korea 
Korea has used various monetary policy frameworks since 1957. In managing its 
monetary policy, from 1976, the Bank of Korea used the rate of increase in the monetary 
aggregate as an intermediate targee4 before shifting to a floating exchange rate system 
and adopting an inflation target in 1998. The Bank of Korea Act of 1997 that came into 
effect on 1 April 1998 replaced the previous dual objectives of maintaining monetary 
stability and strengthening the soundness of the banking system with the primary goal of 
price stability. The law is concerned to establish the neutrality and autonomy of monetary 
policy. It specifies that the central bank should formulate the annual inflation target in 
consultation with the government, make that target public and attempt to achieve it. For 
rule, but a comprehensive framework for formulating and implementing monetary policy. Thus. the focus 
on inflation does not mean guiding the economy towards a condition of zero inflation. 
74 Initially the bank used M I before net domestic assets. Since then. reserve money has been used before 
tum to domestic credit of financial institutions, net domestic credit, respectively. Again MI. M2. M2 plus 
certificates of deposit and balances held by investment trust companies. and finally M3 implemented by the 
bank accordingly. 
136 
instance, according to the agreement between the bank and the government the bank set 
the 1998 inflation target at a rate of 9%±1 %, based on the Consumer Price Index. In 
addition to that and as a part of conditions impose on IMF credits, the bank also consults 
the IMF concerning the method of monetary operation in particular in determining and 
maintaining the appropriate level of M3 growth, serving as a monitoring variable. This 
twin target system, M3 target and inflation target, is believed to resemble that of the 
European Central Bank. 
Bank of Korea gave three reasons 75 for adopting the twin target system. Firstly. 
there would be chaos in financial markets if the monetary target that had been used in the 
last 30 years were to be abandoned suddenly. Secondly, given that inflationary 
expectations are influenced by monetary indicators, the bank considered it was right and 
proper to guide them through the announcement of an appropriate growth rate of M3. 
Finally, the bank intended to employ both systems only during the period of transition 
unti I the inflation targeting approach took root in 200 I. 
The inflation target formulated by the Bank initially referred to average annual 
consumer price inflation. However, starting in 2000, the bank adopted the core inflation 
rate as its inflation target, set at 2.5%±1 %,76 since most of the time, consumer price 
inflation is considered more volatile in particular it is sensitive to certain items, such as 
non-grain agricultural products whose prices are greatly affected by weather conditions, 
harvests and so forth, and petroleum products whose prices are likely to fluctuate 
depending on changes in international oil prices. This decision was taken by the bank 
because it could not control supply side external shocks. 
75 See Monetary Policy in Korea by the Bank of Korea 
76 In anticipation of various uncertainties surrounding the economy, the bank allows a one-percent point 
band around the mid-point of the target range. 
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Even though the fundamental task is clearly to ensure price stability. the bank still 
considers other policy goals. For instance, in a situation when future prices are expected 
to be high but within the target range, the central bank will not necessarily rush to 
increase interest rates. Conversely, the bank may base its decision on the state of the 
financial markets or the real economy. These circumstances led the National Assembly in 
its annual report to argue that the Bank of Korea actually employs flexible inflation 
targeting,77 in the sense that the bank moderates the speed of call rate adjustment in 
response to the percentage deviations of actual from target inflation with respect to the 
condition of the real economy. 
3.3.3. The Monetary Policy Framework in the Philippines 
The Central Bank of the Philippines was established in June 1948 and began 
operation on 3 January 1949. In conducting monetary policy, the bank formulated and 
operated a variety of intermediate targets to achieve its final objectives. It traditionally 
conducted monetary policy by targeting monetary aggregates in line with its mandated 
duty of maintaining price stability that was conducive to the economic growth of the 
country and was a fundamental component of the Philippine government's loan program 
with the International Monetary Fund (lMF). 
77 Flexible inflation targeting occurs if the central bank puts some weight on inflation-stabilization. output-
stabilization. interest-rate smoothing. or some other goals. This is opposed to strict inflation targeting when 
the only concern of the central bank is to stabilize inflation. 
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On 3 July 1993, The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) took over from the 
Central Bank of the Philippines as the country's central monetary authority follo\ving the 
implementation of the New Central Bank Act of 1993. Starting in the second semester of 
1995, the bank adopted a so-called modified framework combining monetary aggregate 
targeting with inflation targeting. Facing difficulties in meeting the intermediate 
monetary targets, the bank chose to focus its interest on price stability. This new 
framework allowed base money growth to exceed target as long as inflation targets were 
met, with mopping up operations done if and when inflation eventually overshot the 
target (Guinigundo, 2000). 
The monetary pol icy framework was changed again on 24 January 2000 when the 
Monetary Board (MB), the BSP's policy-making body, informally adopted an inflation-
targeting framework. However, the bank only formally adopted this framework two years 
later. Like other banks adopting inflation targeting, the bank annually announces its 
explicit inflation target, and sets the monetary policy instrument to attain the target based 
on inflation forecasts and other relevant information. 
Nonetheless, the bank differentiates inflation target from inflation forecast. An 
inflation target, representing policymakers' desired level of the inflation rate, is basically 
a contract between the government (represented by the central bank) and the public, 
while an inflation forecast is a tool or indicator used in performing that contract. Because 
of their institutional nature, inflation targets are more unlikely to be changed -albeit 
countries with a history of high inflation are likely to adjust their inflation targets across a 
period of several years. On the other hand, inflation forecasts, because of important new 
information is incorporated in the assessment of future inflation, normally tend to change 
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over time. Inflation forecast also represents their expectation or prediction of the level of 
inflation in the future. 
The government of the Philippines defines the inflation target in terms of the 
year-on-year change in the consumer price index (CPI) and expressing it in terms of a 
range of one percentage point. For example, the target for 2004 was set between 4 and 5 
percent. This band is considered to give operational flexibility to the bank in achieving 
the target. However, the bank has to show a high degree of transparency and 
accountability, such as explaining its actions and the motivations of its policies publicly. 
If the BSP fails to meet the inflation target, the BSP Governor is obliged to write an open 
letter to the President to explain why the target was not achieved along with measures to 
be adopted to turn inflation towards the target level. The bank has issued Open Letters to 
the President on 16 January 2004, 18 January 2005, 25 January 2006 and 19 January 
2007. 
3.3.4. The Monetary Policy Framework in Malaysia 
Prior to the mid-1990s, the central Bank of Malaysia, namely the Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM) conducted monetary policy by using a monetary target to achieve the 
ultimate objective of price stability. This was an internal strategy and was never officially 
published. The bank controlled the day-to-day volume of liquidity in the money market to 
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guarantee that liquidity was adequate to meet demands and to meet the monetary growth 
target. 
The globalization of financial markets and global economic integration in recent 
decades undermined monetary targeting. After 1990, in particular, the globalization of 
financial markets78 changed the money demand function. The connection betw~en 
monetary aggregates and output and prices became less stable. For instance. massive 
capital inflows in 1992-93 and equally massive outflows in the following year 
contributed to the instability of monetary aggregates. During periods of large capital 
flows, the annual money supply growth (M3) was highly volatile. Consequently. the 
value of M3 as an intermediate target was diminished. This lead to deviations of 
monetary velocities and ratios of nominal GDP to various monetary aggregates from their 
historical patterns from the early 1990s as discussed by Cheong (2004). 
For the above reasons, in the mid-1990s, BNM altered its policy from monetary 
targeting to interest rate targeting.79 According to Cheong (2004), four factors lead the 
Bank to change its intermediate target from monetary aggregates to interest rates. First. 
since the liberalization of interest rates in 1978, the formulation of the interest rate has 
been considerably more market-oriented. Second, since financial deregulation and 
liberalization measures undertaken during the 1970s, the role of interest rates in the 
monetary transmission mechanism has become stronger. Third, since the mid-1980s and 
following structural changes in the economy that shifted emphasis from the interest-
78 Monetary authority became powerless in formulating its monetary policy since the financial globalization 
took place. This is so, because the bank now should concern about external considerations when 
formulating its monetary policy. 
7Q It is interesting to notice that in implementing the new interest rate targeting. the bank still observes 
thoroughly the monetary aggregates, credit growth and other economic and monetary indicators including 
price developments (i.e. asset prices). consumption and investment indicators. 
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inelastic market for government securities to the more interest sensitive market for bank 
credit, there had been a marked change in the financing pattern of the economy. Fourth. 
as a matter of policy, the bank had retained a positive real rate of return on deposits. 
Interest rate stability is necessary to encourage a stable financial system, \\hich \\as a 
factor in a more effective monetary transmission mechanism. These factors, along with 
increasing numbers of interest-sensitive investors, provided sufficient ground for interest 
rate targeting to replace monetary targeting as an intermediate target. 
During the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, the Bank's ability to control 
interest rates was challenged by insecure short-term capital flows and by the tremendous 
fluctuation of the Ringgit. The Bank had no option other than maintaining high interest 
rates to discourage large capital outflows. This strategy was aimed at defending the value 
of the Ringgit against further speculative transactions in the financial market. However, 
this strategy was unable to dampen volatility in the financial market due to growing 
uncertainty during the crisis. On the first September 1998, the bank introduced selective 
exchange rate controls in which the domestic currency was predetermined at the 
established market rate on the following day. This action reduced exchange rate volatility 
and accordingly protected foreign reserves from further declinp- in the volume of the 
currency. It also granted the bank a higher degree of monetary autonomy in controlling 
interest rates to champion economic recovery. The BNM policy surprised the world, 
especially when most economists were worried about Malaysia's decision to reject IMF 
assistance during the Asian Financial crisis. The BNM proved that it was unnecessary to 
maintain high interest rates to support the currency, to bring back confidence, and to 
attract capital inflows. 
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3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1. Simple Taylor Rule 
The original Taylor (1993) paper argues that u.s monetary policy during the 
period of 1987-1992 can be explained by movements in the federal funds rate in reaction 
to deviations of inflation from target and real GDP from capacity levels. According to 
Taylor, the relationship between the Federal Funds rate, the current output gap and the 
current rate of inflation can be presented in a number of different formulae. Below. we 
present two simple versions of the Taylor rule for the United States, which are equivalent 
to each other: 
i; = 4 + 1.5(ll', - 2) + 0.5(y, - y;) 
rIO = 2 + 0.5(ll', - 2) + 0.5(y, - y;) 
(3.1 ) 
(3.2) 
where i; is the targeted nominal Fed Funds rate in percent per year, r,. is the targeted 
real Fed Funds rate in percent per year,80 1t is the rate of inflation over the past four 
quarters, y is the log of real GDP and y* is the log of potential GOP, thus (y-y*) is the 
output gap, i.e. the percentage deviation of output from steady state or trend output. 
80 Defined as ; = r + 1r. 
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Taylor assumes both the equilibrium real interest rate in the economy and the 
desired rate of inflation to be 2%. If everything else in equilibrium the Fed will set the 
nominal Fed Funds rate at 4% a year. However, if either inflation is above 20/0 or the 
output gap becomes positive then the Fed will raise the funds rate i.e. for every I percent 
increase in the output gap the nominal Fed funds rate is raised by half percent. Similarly. 
a decrease in either inflation or the output gap will lead to lowering of the Fed Funds rate 
i.e. for every 1 percent decrease in the inflation the nominal Fed funds rate is reduced by 
1.5 percent. 
In general, a simple version of the Taylor rule can be expressed by the following 
formula: 
i; = J + YIl'(1(, -1(*) + Yy(Y, - y*) + 8, (3.3) 
where i; is the targeted nominal interest rate, J is the equilibrium nominal interest rate, 1ft 
is the current inflation rate, 1( * is the targeted inflation rate, y and y* are the natural logs 
of output and potential output respectively, 8, is a white noise error term, Yft and Yy are 
parameters that measure the magnitude of the response of the monetary policy instrument 
to deviations of inflation from its target and to the output gap, respectively. 
Defining r* = (i*-1C). the desired or equilibrium nominal interest rate J is equal to 
the sum of the equilibrium real interest rate rand the targeted inflation rate1(*. 
Subtracting current inflation from both sides, we can write the Taylor rule in term of 
targeted real interest rate as follows: 
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(3.4) 
Theoretically, Y7t should be greater than 1 (Y7t > 1) to capture the idea that the 
central bank should raise or decrease the nominal interest rate by more than the 
movement in inflation. Defining fJ = (r If - 1) and Y=YY' we can write our Taylor rule as 
follow: 
(3.5) 
This equation gives a central bank advice on how to set interest rates whenever 
economic conditions change, in order to achieve both its short-run goal of stabilizing the 
economy and its long-run goal of stabilizing inflation. It also portrays the preferences of 
the central bank as reflected by fJ and y. In a situation where inflation is above its target 
and p>O, the central bank may pursue a tight monetary policy by raising nominal interest 
rates (i*J sufficiently to increase the real interest rate (r*J. This behaviour enables the 
bank to keep inflation on target by shrinking aggregate demand. If fJ <0, the rule 
recommends an easing of monetary policy by lowering the interest rate. The central bank 
is less sensitive to the ongoing inflationary pressure, which may result in a higher actual 
inflation. Assuming expected inflation is constant, if y >0 monetary authorities take 
measures to stabilize output around its steady state level. If y = 0 output stabilization is 
not a matter of concern for the central bank. 
145 
If both parameters f3 and yare greater than zero, then monetary policy is 
stabilizing. The stabilizing properties of monetary policy imply that monetary policy not 
only operates as a nominal anchor, but also encourages a stable macroeconomic 
background in which output growth is mainly shaped by technology and other supply-
side components (potential output). 
Levin et al (1999) suggest that the optimal response for a central bank may be to 
make slow and smooth, rather than sudden, adjustments of interest rates toward the 
favoured level. This gradual tendency helps to reduce the disturbance of capital markets 
and to protect its credibility. In addition, empirical work by Clarida et al (1998, 2000), 
Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) and Domenech et al (2002) detects such interest rate 
smoothing. We follow Clarida et ai's assumption that the actual interest rate r, is a 
weighted average of its lagged value and its target level in formulating the following 
equation: 
r,=(1- p) r*,+ p r,_1 + V, (3.6) 
where p (OSp<I) depicts the partial adjustment (i.e. degree of interest rate smoothing) and 
V, is a white noise random policy shock term (an exogenous interest rate shock with zero 
mean). The coefficient p determines the speed at which the central bank adjusts the real 
interest rate (rJ gradually towards its target real interest rate (r* J. In general, the 
estimated equation has been highly significant, which has been interpreted as evidence 
for the hypothesis that central banks adjust the interest rate gradually towards its target 
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rate. The coefficient p is often fairly high, which implies a slow adjustment process 
(Osterholm, 2003). By defining a = r - /37[: and replacing (3.5) and (3.6), we obtain: 
rl = P rt-I + (1-p) a +(1- p) /3 1it + (1- p) Y (y-Y*)t + '7t (3.7) 
where '71 is a random term, which combines the errors of inflation and output and the 
random policy shock term VI. Defining c=(J-p)a, equation (3.7) can be economically 
estimated using baseline monetary policy rule as shown in equation (3.8). 
(3.8) 
where UI is a white noise term. 
3.4.2. Allowing for external influences on monetary policy 
3.4.2.1. A Contemporaneous Model 
The base-line specifications described by equations (3.3) to (3.8) can be extended 
to account for the other variables, which may playa role in the determination of monetary 
policy. Many variants of this base-line rule have been employed in both theoretical and 
empirical work. For such an extension, Clarida et al (1998) modify equation (3.8): 
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(3.9) 
In equation (3.9) z, is a generic variable representing additional variable(s) that could pla~ 
a role when setting monetary policy. We draw on others' work on the transmission 
mechanism for an open economy when choosing these additional variables. 
Clarida et al (1998) develop a model of monetary policy in countries with 
exchange rate targets. They employ equation (3.9) to model the pre-I 993 interest rates of 
France, Italy, and the UK, defining z, to be the short-term interest rate of Germany. to 
which the monetary authorities of these three countries were anchoring their monetary 
policy before the end of the ERM. The outcomes they get using equation (3.9) were 
superior to those obtained by the estimation of the simple Taylor Rule in (3.8). 
Adam et al (2005) find something similar when estimating monetary policy 
reaction functions for the UK over three periods - 1985-90, 1992-97 and 1997-2003 - in 
order to unravel two effects: the switch from an emphasis on exchange rate stabilization 
to inflation targeting, and the introduction of instrument-independence in 1997. However. 
they differ their analysis from Clarida et al (1998) by using not only German interest 
rates but also the US one. 
As barriers to the free movement of capital have gradually been lifted as a result 
of global ization and financial integration, funds can be easi ly transferred from one 
country to another in pursuit of the highest rate of return. For this reason, we estimate 
(3.9) defining z, to include the exchange rate and foreign interest rates. The exchange rate 
is particularly important for emerging economies for several reasons discussed 
previously. However. it is not clear which measure of exchange rate should be 
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considered. Consequently, we develop different versions of equation (3.9) to include the 
nominal exchange rate, real exchange rate, the deviation of actual nominal exchange rate 
from its trend (we then call this as the nominal exchange rate gap), and the deviation of 
actual real exchange rate from its trend (we then call this as the real exchange rate gap). 
in equation (3.10) to (3.13) respectively. 
where r is the real interest rate, 7r is the rate of inflation over the past four quarters, (y-y*) 
is the deviation of actual from potential output, f is the nominal foreign interest rate, s is 
the nominal exchange rate, q is the real exchange rate (in log term q=s+p*-p, where p* is 
foreign national price level and p is domestic price level), (s-s*) is the deviation of actual 
nominal exchange rate from its trend, and (q-q*) is the deviation of actual real exchange 
rate from its trend. With respect to (s-s*) and (q-q*). an increase means a depreciation 
and vice versa. 
Equations (3.10) through (3.13) describe a situation in which the pass-through of 
exchange rate changes to consumer prices is quick, so in a situation where the exchange 
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rate has depreciated and, in anticipation of increasing inflation, the central bank may raise 
interest rates to stimulate an appreciation in the exchange rate and so fall in the price of 
tradable goods. The central bank may subsequently lower the interest rate and allO\\ the 
exchange rate to depreciate again after dissolving the inflationary pressure. However. \\e 
should be aware that reducing inflation fluctuations might raise exchange rate volatility 
and also note that manipulating the exchange rate has proved to be very difficult to 
achieve in practice as the previous sections discuss in the case of these four countries. 
Commonly, the monetary authority tends to intervene in the foreign exchange market 
through sterilization policy in order to reduce the volatility of exchange rate. 
As we stated previously, it is not clear which measure of the exchange rate should 
be considered. In the same way as with the exchange rate measure discussion above, then 
again, it is not clear which foreign interest rate the central bank is more sensitive to. For 
this reason, we extend the Taylor-type rule in equation (3.9), in addition to all equations 
(3.10) through (3.13), to examine whether the central bank is sensitive to the real foreign 
interest rate as follow: 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
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where all variables are similar to equation (3.] 0) to (3.] 3) with the exception of real 
foreign interest rates 1/ replaces nominal foreign interest rate of f I Real foreign interest 
rates are calculated using the Fischer equation, ! ( = f ( - .,; (, where ,f" l I and ;I, 
respectively denote foreign real interest rate, foreign nominal interest rate and foreign 
inflation rate. 
The theoretical signs of the parameters in equation (3.] 0) through (3.17) for p. f3. 
1. ¢ and A are positive (p, f3, 1. ¢ and A >0). According to the Taylor rule. the interest rate 
is expected to react positively to changes in the inflation gap and the output gap. If the 
main objective of monetary policy is to keep the inflation rate low or close to its target 
level, the real interest rate should be raised when inflation becomes positive. In other 
words, the central bank should raise nominal interest rates by more than the increase in 
inflation in order to bring up real interest rates. In a standard transmission mechanism 
from aggregate demand to price dynamics, it is through an increase in the real interest 
rate that observed inflation is brought back to its target level when the former exceeds the 
latter. Thus, in the above model, the value of f3 should be positive. 
Similarly, the value ofy should be positive. If output is above its steady state level 
(i.e. the output gap is greater than zero) and y > 0, the rule recommends that the central 
bank may raise nominal (;*J and real (r*J interest rates in order to shrink aggregate 
demand, encourage output to converge to its steady state level and prevent pressures on 
future inflation. In these circumstances, monetary policy is said to be an automatic 
stabilizer of output around its trend level. This policy is consistent with inflation 
targeting, in view of the fact that it abolishes sources of persistent pressure on inflation. 
On the other hand, if y < 0 and the central bank reduces nominal (i* J and real (r* J 
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interest rates, this will enhance aggregate demand and boost output up its trend le\el. 
which ultimately will cause inflation to rise. 
Our model follows and differs from Taylor's to the extent that we assume that 
central banks may respond to changes in the foreign interest rate and exchange rate. \\,ith 
near perfect capital mobility, there is a vast capital outflow if the total return on foreign 
lending exceeds the total return on domestic lending. The central bank will raise interest 
rates in response to increasing foreign interest rates. Conversely, there is a capital intlo\v 
if the return on domestic lending exceeds the return on lending abroad. The central bank 
lowers interest rates in response to decreasing foreign interest rates. The total returns on 
temporarily lending in foreign currency is the interest rate paid on assets in that currency 
plus any capital gain (or minus any capital loss) arising from depreciation (appreciation) 
of the domestic currency during the period.8 ) Accordingly, the central bank will raise 
interest rates in response to currency depreciations and vice versa. 
3.4.2.2. Backward-looking Policy Rules 
The basic Taylor rule assumes that interest rates react contemporaneously to 
movements in inflation and the output gap. Some researchers, such as McCallum 
(I 999a), argue that this may not be an accurate assumption since GDP data is only 
available with a lag. In other cases, the data is revised at the end of the year resulting in a 
different value for GDP than in the quarter released. Hence, the proper policy rule may 
HI The interest parity condition stated that return on domestic loan = return on foreign loan = [foreign 
interest rate] + [domestic currency depreciation while funds abroad] 
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have lagged macroeconomic variables rather than contemporaneous variables. For that 
reason, we consider a backward looking equation in which policy responds to a lagged 
inflation rate, output gap, exchange rate and foreign interest rate: 
where all variables and parameters in equation (3.18) are the same as those in equations (3.10) 
through (3.17) with the exception of F and G where F is the (nominal s, or real q, or nominal gap 
(,',-s*), or real gap (q-q*) exchange rate and dis the nominal i' or the real I foreign interest rate, 
and), k, /, and m are lags with the values of 1,2, ... ,8. 
3.4.2.3. Forward- looking Policy Rules 
As discussed previously, some researchers, such as Ball (1999), Svensson (1997a, 
1999, 2002), Clarida et al (1999), Batini et al (2000), Huang et al (2001), Orphanides 
(2001), and Woodford (2001) use a forward-looking version of the Taylor-rule because it 
attempts to capture the explicit forward looking behaviour of some central banks. They 
suggested that forward-looking versions of the Taylor rule describe policy better than 
contemporaneous specifications. One among other reasons is that current inflation is 
essentially predetermined by previous decisions and contracts, which means that central 
banks can only affect future inflation. In this section, we analyze alternative 
specifications in which we extend a simple augmented Taylor-type rule to use forecasts 
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of the variables in the reaction function. The interest rate is now set in accordance \\ ith 
the following forward-looking reaction function: 
Equation (3.19) differs from equations (3.10) to (3.18) in which real interest rates are 
assumed to react to the expected inflation, output gap, exchange rate and foreign interest 
rates, rather than to the past or present values of these variables. All variables and 
parameters are the same as those in equations (3.10) to (3.18) with the exception of j. k. I. and 
m where they are leads with the value of 1,2, ... ,8. 
3.4.2.4. Composite model 
There is a debate in the area whether central bank should stick to specific rule or 
may be flexible. We exercise a discretionary Taylor-type rule to analyze the 
instrumentation of monetary policy through constructing various composite Taylor-type 
rules. In this section, we focus on policies that respond to a combination of 
contemporaneous, backward and forward-looking specifications to determine the real 
interest rate. Building on our previous analysis that allows for foreign interest rates and 
exchange rates to influence monetary policy in Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines. and 
Malaysia. we suggested the following models: 
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r, = c+p r'_1 + (1- p) {PI 7i I±j + r (Y-Y*)t±k+ ¢ FI±I + A d,±/1I} + u, (3.20) 
where all variables and parameters in equation (3.20) are the same as those in equations (3.10) 
through (3.19) with the exception of}, k, t, and m where they are lags or leads with the value of 
0,1, ... ,8 (i.e.j E(-8, ... ,-I, 0, +1, ... , +8». 
3.5. Data and preliminary observations 
We use quarterly data for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines for 
different time periods, based on their availability. The sample for the estimation of the 
Korea model runs from 1984( 1) to 2005(2). The estimation sample runs from 1988( I ) to 
2005(2) for both the Philippines and Malaysia, and from 1993( I) to 2005(2) for 
Indonesia. 
However, we face a dilemma in choosing our variables. Even though the literature 
agrees that inflation and the output gap must be taken into account in the policy rule. it is 
not obvious what measure of inflation should be used, whether for example, CPt core 
CPl. or the GDP deflator. For instance, in the early stage of inflation targeting in Korea. 
i.e. during 1998 and 1999, the rate of increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was 
used. while from 2000 onwards. the core inflation was adopted as the target indicator. On 
the other hand. the government of the Philippines defines inflation target in terms of the 
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average year-on-year change in the consumer price index (CPI) over the calendar ~ ear. 
With respect to output, it is not instantly obvious how to measure potential output. As 
suggested by earlier papers, such as Clarida et al. (2000) and Nelson (2000). potential 
output can be computed using a linear trend, a quadratic trend, a split linear trend as \\ell 
as a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter. 
Thus, during the period of our observations, we use all available data related to all 
variables involved in our equations, as stated in section (3.4), in order to uncover the 
parsimonious model from each country in our analysis. All the data used in this analysis 
were obtained from the International Financial Statistics published by the International 
Monetary Fund provided by Datastream. We define r l as the discount rate.82 deposit 
rate,83 and money market rate/federal funds/call money rate84 for Indonesia;85 the 
discount rate, deposit rate, and money market rate/federal funds/call money rate for 
Korea86; the discount rate, deposit rate, and treasury bill87 rate for the Philippines;88 the 
82 Discount rate or Bank rate is the rate at which the central banks lend or discount eligible paper for 
deposit money banks, typically shown on an end-of-period basis (International Financial Statistics, 2002). 
83 Deposit rate usually refers to rates offered to resident customers for demand, time, or savings deposits. 
Frequently, rates for time and savings deposits are classified according to maturity and amounts deposited; 
in addition, deposit money banks and similar deposit-taking institutions may offer short- and medium-term 
instruments at specified rates for specific amounts and maturities; these are frequently termed "certificates 
of deposit.' (International Financial Statistics, 2002) 
84 Money market rate is the rate on short-term lending between financial institutions (International 
Financial Statistics, 2002). 
as Bank Indonesia conducts Open Market Operation (OMO) through offering Bank Indonesia Certificates 
(SBI) to influence the liquidity of the Rupiah in the money market, which in turn will influence interest 
rate. This conducted through auction so that discount rate achieved truly reflects the liquidity condition of 
the money market. However, since SBI rate is not available during our period of observations, thus, we 
suggest to use either money market rates or discount rates as our interest rates. We also take into account 
the deposit rate for comparison. 
116 Since Korea has only recently approved the call rate as a policy instrument (Overnight call rate began to 
be suggested as a target from May 1999 onwards), term structure information is not available for empirical 
analysis. As an alternative. we use typical interest rates in the present Korean market which is the money 
market rate/federal funds. 
117 Treasury bill rate is the rate at which short-term securities are issued or traded in the market 
(International Financial Statistics. 2002) 
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real deposit rate, real money market rate, and real treasury bill rate for Malaysia. Intlation 
1C is defined as the percentage increase of the price level relative to its value in the same 
quarter of the previous year. We calculate 1C using the consumer price index (CPI).!N Real 
interest rates are calculated using r= i-7i, where r, i, and 7i respectively denote real interest 
rate, nominal interest rate and inflation. 
The output gap (y-y*) is a measure of the difference between actual output (1') and 
the potential output (y*).90 We estimate potential output and hence the output gap since it 
cannot be observed. Theoretically, productivity growth, labour force developments and 
other conditions affecting productive capacity in the economy may change (raise) the 
potential output. In this study, we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter since it is the most 
commonly accepted way of measuring potential output. We fit Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter into y using the suggested smoothing parameter for quarterly data in order to obtain 
an estimate of potential output (v*). We then measure the output gap as the difference 
between y, and y*,. The output gap in these four countries represents the overall 
assessment of resource utilization in their economy. The basis for the assessment is as 
follow. First, we collect data of variable GOP Volume Index (1995=100)91 for Indonesia; 
GOP Volume Index (2000= 1 00) and calculated real GOP (= GOP current/GOP deflator) 
For Korea;92 GOP Volume Index and GOP Volume Index (1995=100) for the 
Philippines; and GOP Volume Index (2000=100) for Malaysia, to measure actual output 
88 The current Bank Ng Pilipinas's primary monetary policy instruments are its overnight reverse 
repurchase (borrowing) rate and overnight repurchase (lending) rate. However, during this period of 
observation, unfortunately, this data set is not available. 
89 Therefore. the rate of inflation P, = PrP,-.J, where P is the log of the consumer price index. 
90 Potential output is a level of output that over time is consistent with stable inflation. 
91 GOP volume indices that are presented on a standard 1995 reference year and are derived from the GOP 
volume series reported by national compilers (International Financial Statistics. 2002) 
92 We find that the value of GOP Volume Index (2000=100) and calculated real GOP (= GOP current/GOP 
deflator) are different. 
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y, and to ensure our findings are robust. Next, we choose a parameter to measure the 
degree of variability in trend output, i.e. how smooth the trend should be. In this case. we 
specify the smoothing parameter to be 1600. 
The nominal exchange rate s is expressed as units of the domestic currency per 
U.S. dollar. The real exchange rate q is defined as nominal exchange rates adjusted for 
differences in national price p levels or defined in log terms as q=s+p*-p. where p* i~ 
foreign national price level and p is domestic price level. The HP filtering process is used 
to estimate trend values for the nominal and real exchange rates. The nominal exchange 
rate gap (s-s*) is determined as the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its trend 
value. Similarly, the real exchange rate gap (q-q*) is then determined as the deviation of 
the real exchange rate from its trend value. The nominal foreign interest rate (I) is the 
U.S Treasury bill rate. The real foreign interest rate (,tj is calculated using the Fischer 
equation, I = f - 11:*, where I. f and 11:* respectively denote real interest rate, nominal 
interest rate and CPI inflation in the US. 
1.5.1. Statistical Description 
As a first step, it is useful to review the data. Tables 3.1 through 3.5 summary the 
main statistical properties of the four countries' short-term nominal interest rates (i). real 
interest rates (r), inflation rates (11:). output gap (y-y*). nominal (s) and real exchange rates 
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(q), nominal (,""-8*) and real exchange rate gaps (q-q*), as well as nominal (/) and real 
foreign interest rates (I). 
According to the Taylor rule, the relationship between short-term real interest 
rates and inflation is expected to be positive, an increase in inflation being followed by an 
increase in the short-term real interest rate (a decrease being followed by a decrease in 
the short-term real interest rate). We begin our data analysis by looking at the correlation 
coefficient defining a measure of linear association between two variables. In particular. 
we would like to see how strong the relationship between the dependent variable of real 
interest rates and each of the independent variables under discussi0n is. 
As shown in Table 3.1, in the case of Indonesia, there is a positive relationship 
between the real money market rate and inflation, albeit a weak one (0.09).93 However, 
the degree of association between the real discount rate and inflation, and between the 
real deposit rate and inflation are stronger but negative. 
Similarly, in Korea (Table 3.2), only the correlation between the real money 
market rate and inflation fits the Taylor rule. However, while the correlation coefficient 
in Indonesia is nearly zero, that in Korea is larger. 
In the case of the Philippines (Table 3.3), none of the correlation coefficients 
between the three short-term real interest rates of real discount rate, real deposit rate and 
real treasury bill rate, and inflation are found to be positive, while, in Malaysia (Table 
3.4), all three short-term interest rates of real deposit rate, real money market rate, and 
real treasury bill rate show a positive correlation to the inflation rate. 
93 Although zero correlation does not necessarily imply independence. we may suspect that the real money 
market rate and inflation are statistically independent. In this research, we are not primarily interested in 
such a measure. Instead. we try to estimate or predict the average value of short-term interest rates on the 
basis of the fixed values of inflation or other variables in our augmented Taylor rule. 
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As with inflation the Taylor rule suggests a positive relationship bet\\ een short-
term real interest rates and the output gap, an increase in output gap being followed by an 
increase in the short-term real interest rate (a decrease being followed by a decrease in 
the short-term real interest rate). 
In general, the relationship between the real interest rate and the output gap in all 
four countries can be represented by the correlation coefficient ranging from -0.11 to 
+0.52. As shown in Table 3.1, in Indonesia, the degree of association between, tirstly. the 
discount rate and secondly, the money market rate and the output gap is positive and 
moderate to strong, giving the impression of non-accommodative monetary policy. The 
degree of association between deposit rate and output gap is also positive but relatively 
weaker. 
As shown in Table 3.2, in the case of Korea, there is a positive relationship 
between the real discount rate and firstly, the output gap based on the GOP Volume Index 
(2000= I 00), and secondly, the output gap based on the real GOP (=GOP current/GOP 
deflator), albeit a weak one (0.1 ]). However, the degree of association between the real 
deposit rate and both these measures of the output gap is negative and weak, implying 
that movements in these output gaps tend to be in the opposite direction to movements in 
the real deposit rate. With respect to the correlation between the real money market rate 
and these measures of the output gap, we may suspect that they are statistically 
independent as the correlation coefficient between these variables is nearly zero.94 
Q4 If two variables are (statistically) independent, their covariance is zero. Therefore, the correlation 
coefficient will be zero. The converse, however, is not true. That is, if the correlation coefficient between 
two variables is zero, it does not mean that the two variables are independent. This is because the 
correlation coefficient is a measure of linear association or linear relationship between two variables. For 
example. if y=.r. the correlation between the two variables may be zero, but by no means are the two 
variables independent. Here Y is nonlinear function of X(Gujarati, 2006, pp 61) 
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In the case of the Philippines (Table 3.3), there is a positive relationship between 
the real deposit rate and firstly, the output gap based on the GOP Volume Index. and 
secondly, the output gap based on the GOP Volume Index (1995=100). Similarly. there is 
a positive relationship between the real treasury bill rate and these measures of the output 
gap. However, we may suspect that the real discount rate is statistically independent of 
these measures. 
In the case of Malaysia, we find the relationship between all real short-term 
interest rates and the output gap is positive. As shown in Table 3.4, the relationship 
between all three short-term interest rates of real deposit rate, real money market rate. and 
real treasury bill rate and the output gap based on the GOP volume index is reflected in a 
correlation coefficient of 0.35. 
With respect to the relationship between the real interest rate and the exchange 
rate, the relationship between them is expected to be positive, a depreciation of domestic 
currency being followed by an increase in the short-term real interest rate (an 
appreciation being followed by a decrease in the short-term real interest rate). 
Tables 3.1 through 3.4 show interesting results. The correlation coefficients range 
from -0.68 to 0.43. In the case of Indonesia, as shown in Table 3.1, our augmented Taylor 
rule works when we define the real interest rate as the discount rate and the money 
market rate, and the exchange rate as real exchange rate, nominal or real exchange rate 
differential. However, it does not work when we consider the real deposit rate, which 
shows a negative and moderate to strong correlation with all exchange rate measures. 
The table also shows that all three real interest rates are negatively correlated with 
the nominal exchange rate, implying, contrary to our rule that a currency depreciation is 
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associated with a decrease in the real interest rate and vice versa. Additionalh. \\e rna\' 
. . 
suspect that the relationship between the real discount rate and nominal exchange rate 
differential is statistically insignificant. 
In the case of Korea (Table 3.2), on the other hand, the real deposit rate is 
positively, albeit weakly, correlated with all exchange rate measures, with the exception 
of nominal exchange rate. We may suspect that the real deposit rate and nominal 
exchange rate are (statistically) independent. We may also suspect that the real discount 
rates and real exchange rates are independent as the correlation coefficient between these 
variables is zero. 
Similar to the case in Indonesia, in the Philippines, as shown in Table 3.3, all real 
interest rates have a negative correlation with the nominal exchange rate, implying. a 
currency depreciation is associated with a decrease in the real interest rate and vice versa. 
Table 3.3 also shows that the real discount rate is negatively correlated with all measures 
of exchange rate under observation, with the exception of real exchange rate differential, 
where the correlation coefficient is +0.09. 
In the case of Malaysia (Table 3.4), all correlation coefficients, surprisingly, are 
negative, implying that an appreciation of the Ringgit leads to a tightening of monetary 
policy. In terms of magnitude, table 3.4 shows that the degree of association between the 
real treasury bill rate and the nominal exchange rate as well as that between the bill rate 
and the real exchange rate is moderately high with a coefficient correlation of about 54%. 
Our augmented Taylor rule suggests that the relationship between short-term real 
interest rates and foreign interest rates will be positive, an increase in foreign interest 
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rates being followed by an increase in the short-term real interest rate (a decrease being 
followed by a decrease in the short-term real interest rate). 
Tables 3.1 through 3.4 show that the conduct of monetary policy in all countries 
under research relied on the conduct of monetary policy at the Federal Reserve. In the 
case of Indonesia (Table 3.1), the strongest relationship between the real interest rate and 
the foreign interest rate is found using the real money market rate and the real U.S 
Treasury bill rate where the coefficient of correlation is +0.53. 
In the case of Korea (Table 3.2), the relationship between the real interest rate and 
the foreign interest rate is moderate to strong, the strongest relationship being between 
the real deposit rate and the real U.S Treasury bill rate with a correlation coefficient of 
+0.74. This is also the highest coefficient of correlation among four economies. As with 
Indonesia, there is a moderate relationship between the real money market rate and the 
real U.S Treasury bill rate, with the coefficient of correlation at +0.56 (the second highest 
coefficient among the four economies). 
As shown in Table 3.3, in the case of the Philippines, the strongest relationship 
between the real interest rate and the foreign interest rate is found using the real treasury 
bill rate and the nominal U.S Treasury bill rate where the coefficient of correlation is 
+0.52. However, Table 3.3 also shows that the Philippines has the weakest relationship 
among these four economies, between any measure of the real interest rate and the 
foreign interest rate. This is found when we use the real discount rate and nominal U.S 
Treasury bill rate. where the coefficient of correlation is almost zero. 
In the case of Malaysia (Table 3.4), monetary policy management in Bank Negara 
Malaysia was less closely related to the movement of U.S Treasury bill rates as shown by 
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a relatively weak degree of association between these variables. The strongest 
relationship between Malaysian real interest rates and the foreign interest rate is found 
using the real treasury bill rate and the nominal U.S Treasury bill rate with the coefficient 
of correlation of only +0.38. 
It is also important to look at the volatility indicators. This is represented by the 
standard deviation of variables as shown in Table 3.5. Real interest rates are more volatile 
in countries that have witnessed more volatility in inflation rates and real exchange rates 
than those with relatively stable financial environments. In particular, mirroring frequent 
devaluations and high inflation, short-term real interest rates in Indonesia are more 
volatile than those in the Philippines and Korea. What is also striking in the case of 
Indonesia is that the output gap is relatively more stable than other domestic variables. 
We also find that the nominal rupiah-dollar exchange rate is highly volatile. 
In the case of Korea, we find that both inflation and real discount rates are 
relatively more stable than other domestic variables. On the contrary, the nominal 
exchange rate is found to be the most volatile variable in Korea. Similar to the case of 
Indonesia, as shown in table 3.5, in the Philippines, the output gap is relatively more 
stable than other domestic variables. The table also shows that the nominal exchange rate 
is the most volatile variable in this country. 
An interesting result appears in the case of Malaysia. Table 3.5 shows that both 
real interest rates and inflation are relatively more stable than other domestic variables. 
These variables provide the least volatile among all variables under research. The 
standard deviation of output gap is also relatively low. 
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Although the standard deviation of inflation in the case of Indonesia is higher than 
in the other three countries, as shown in Figure 3.1, the inflation rate in Indonesia \vas 
relatively stable from the beginning of 1994 until the beginning of 1996. Indonesia 
enjoyed low inflation from 1996(2) to 1997( I), with a low of 10/0 reached in the first 
quarter of 1997, before increasing during the Asian financial crisis from 1997(2) to 
1998( 4), where inflation reached a high of 58% in the last quarter of 1998. Indonesia' s 
post-crisis inflation performance has been relatively poor in comparison to the other three 
economies under discussion. However, since the beginning of 1999 inflation has fallen. 
and Indonesia experienced deflation in the first quarter of 2000. Since then there has been 
a relatively stable inflation of 7%. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show that before the financial crisis unfolded in 1997. 
Indonesia enjoyed the highest economic growth rate in Southeast Asia.95 However. the 
financial crisis had a highly destabilizing impact on the economy. Real growth shrank 
from 13% in 1997(1) to -21% in 1999(1),96 as a result of widespread banking sector 
collapse and widespread business failures. The real output gaps, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
show large negative values from the last semester of 1998 until the first semester of 2000. 
Since the last semester of 2000, real output has been relatively close to potential output 
and in some periods have significantly positive values following the turnaround of 
competitiveness, probably caused by factors such as the depreciation that followed the 
implementation of a free-floating exchange rate regime in 1997, a more credible central 
bank, and fiscal reform in the economy that increased international confidence. 
9' Based on GOP Current measure, growth is 13% in 1 997( I). 
% Based on GOP volume index ( 1995= 1 00). 
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In terms of interest rates, soon after floating the currency in August 1997. the 
government adopted an extremely tight monetary policy, raising interest rates sharply 
(Figure 3.5) and forcing state enterprises to withdraw funds from the banking system and 
purchase central bank bills (SBI=Sertifikat Bank Indonesia). Bank Indonesia also 
suspended the use of several monetary instruments that had an expansionary impact. such 
as auctions of money market securities (SBPU=Surat Berharga Pasar Uang). the Discount 
Facility 197 and repurchases of central bank bills (SBI=Sertifikat Bank Indonesia). Figure 
3.6 shows that the real discount rate reached a high of 18% in the second quarter of 1998. 
before suddenly plunging to a low of -19% two-quarters later. The real money market 
rate touched 38% in the beginning of the crisis in 1997(3) and reached a low of -5% in 
1998(4). 
In Korea, as shown in Figure 3.7, the inflation rate rose during the 1980s and 
reached a high of 11 % at the beginning of 1991. After that CPI inflation declined 
continuously and reached 0.60/0 in the second quarter of 1999. However, during the 
turbulent times of the Asian financial crisis, the CPI inflation rate almost doubled within 
two quarters, from 50/0 in 1997(4) to 90/0 in 1998(1}. The Korean won plunged by 93.1% 
as the exchange rate depreciated from a high of 870.98 won per U.S. dollar in 1 997( I} to 
a low of 1,605.72 in 1998(1} (Figure 3.8). Real GDP declined from 1,426 billions won in 
1997(4} to 1,127 billions won in 1998( I} (Figure 3.9 shows in log term). During this 
period the monetary authority in Korea frequently changed the call rate (money market 
rate) but maintained the discount rate at 5%. As shown by Figure 3.10, the call rate 
changed dramatically from a low of 11.9% in 1 997( 1) to a high of23.9% in 1 998( 1). The 
97 Bank Indonesia's Discount Facility I is designed to allow banks to cover any shortfall in their required 
minimum reserves. The maximum maturity of this facility is one month, but borrowings can be extended 
by a month each time they fall due. 
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latter figures show that Bank of Korea was more aggressive in bringing inflation down 
and consequently strengthening the currency although at the price of economic recessioll. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, inflation started falling before showing another 
upturn. Conversely, the output gap in Figure 3.11 shows a major jump after the peak of 
the financial crisis in 1998( 1). 
Figure 3.12 shows that the interest and inflation rates in the Philippines decreased 
after 1990. Inflation reached its highest rate of 17.9% in 1991(3), and gradually decreased 
to an average of 7.5% in 1995. During this period, as opposed to the downward pattern of 
Inflation and interest rates, the output gap tended to increase as sh0wn in Figure 3.13. 
In the second quarter of 1995, the bank adopted a so-called modified framework 
that endeavoured to balance monetary aggregate targeting with some form of inflation 
targeting. This novel framework permitted base money growth to surpass target as long 
as inflation targets were met, with a contraction whenever inflation rose above target. As 
shown in Figure 3.13, the framework appeared to work as the inflation rate reached a low 
of 5% just a quarter before the Asian crisis unfolded. The output gap, on the contrary, 
presents an obvious upward trend, with an exception during the financial crisis. During 
the crisis, a major increase in inflation and interest rates was accompanied by a major 
decline in the output gap. 
In Malaysia. as shown in Figure 3.14, the inflation rate declined steadily from 
1992 to the first quarter of 2004, with the exception of during the Asian crisis in 1998.98 
Government spending cuts along with a tighter monetary policy from mid-1997 
98 As a small open economy, the rise of inflation at this time was practically obvious when the Ringgit 
came under attack. However, such contractionary macroeconomic policy responses were only a little help 
to bring back the Ringgit to its desired value or stimulate a rapid deflation. 
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intensified disinflationary pressure. Accordingly, economic growth declined dramatically 
from a high of 8% in mid-1997 to a low of -II % in mid-1998. 
In contrast with the other three countries, the Malaysian authorities did not ask for 
IMF assistance. Instead, in September 1998 Malaysia introduced currency and capital 
controls. This controversial policy was unexpectedly successful in minimizing 
speculation in the Ringgit, although the policy was implemented too late to stop capital 
flight, which had already contributed to an 80% collapse in the stock market index since 
the onset of the financial crisis. While the Republic of Korea and the Philippines began 
their economic recovery in the first quarter of 1999, Malaysia's unconventional strategies 
were likely responsible for the delay in its recovery. The bank amended the policy in 
February 1999 before finally abandoning it in September 1999. Malaysia then embarked 
on positive growth in the third quarter of 1999. As shown in Figure 3.16, the Malaysian 
regime claimed that its strategy was efficient in that it brought about stronger recovery 
than had been achieved by Indonesia and the Philippines, though not the Republic of 
Korea at the end of 1999.99 
3.5.2. Unit root test 
Given that the time series properties of the data will play an important role in the 
discussion below, it is worth noting that all series display unit root characteristics. 
I)Q As Korea's Government did, the Government of Malaysia improved the fiscal policy, performed more 
rapid bank re-capitalization and corporate restructuring. The pre-Y2K demand for electronics, large budget 
deficits and enormous government spending to offset the private investments loss, benefited Malaysia more 
than the others. Malaysia also benefited from soaring petroleum and palm oil prices, whereas the intensity 
of the 1998 recession in Southeast Asia was partly due to EI Nino weather effects on agricultural output, 
and not just the currency and financial crises. 
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Figures 3.) through 3.) 5 suggest that some variables such as real interest rates and 
inflation are not stationary within the period covered by our sample. However. to test this 
more formally we use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Said and Dickey. 1984) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test has been shO\vn to 
have good size and power properties in a number of studies and is therefore preferred to 
other tests with a unit root as the null hypothesis. loo To complement the ADF test. we 
formally employ the Phillips-Perron (PP) test to determine whether each of the time 
series have a unit root. The process to estimate orders of integration is essentially an 
important part to seek more robust results. 
The results of the unit root tests for all countries are shown in Table 3.6. The real 
discount rate (raJ for Indonesia and the Philippines is stationary, whereas in the case of 
Korea the results are ambiguous. Using ADF tests, the results suggest that the rate is 
non-stationary. On the other hand, the PP tests suggest it is stationary. 
The real deposit rate (rb) is found to be stationary in the case of Indonesia and the 
Philippines, but non-stationary in the case of Korea and Malaysia. The table also shows 
that both money market rates (re) and treasury bill rates (rdJ in the countries where data is 
available are non stationary. Looking at the first difference ADF and PP tests, the results 
obviously show that the order of integration of the real money market rate and Treasury 
bill rate is 1 (I( 1 ». 
Our evidences contribute to the debate on the order of integration of interest rates. 
While most economists believe that the order of integration of interest rates is 1(0). 
authors such as Nelson and Plosser (1982) and Perron (1989) find that interest rates are 
I( I). Tkacz (2001), using the wavelet OLS estimator of Jensen (1999), finds that all short-
100 See for instance Schwert (1989) and I)antula (1991) 
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term interest rates for the United States from 1948 to 1991 are long-run mean-reverting. 
whereas longer-term rates are more likely to follow unit root processes. These differences 
occurred probably because of the additional risk captured in the term premia of long-term 
bonds. In addition, he also finds that Canadian bonds show larger order of integration 
than their American counterparts for the reason that the former ones are usually riskier 
than the latter based on political uncertainty and exchange rate movements 
considerations. 
As shown in Table 3.6, the unit root hypothesis for inflation is not rejected in all 
countries, with the exception of Korea where the tests give ambiguous results. Using 
ADF tests, we do not reject the existence of a unit root in Korea, while using PP test we 
do. 
The ADF and PP tests show that the nominal exchange rate gap, real exchange 
rate gap, and all measures of the output gap are stationary variables. An exception is the 
nominal exchange rate gap in Indonesia, where, according to the ADF test, it is clearly 
non-stationary. However, the PP test shows it to be stationary at the 900/0 confidence 
level. 
With respect to the level of the nominal and real exchange rate as well as foreign 
interest rates, either nom inal or real, we found they are non-stationary with an order of 
integration of one (J( I ». An exception is the real exchange rate in Malaysia, where. 
according to the ADF test, it is clearly stationary, while the PP test shows it to be non-
stationary. 
In view of these results, there is a risk of running a spurious regression In 
estimating the Taylor rule on these data. Clarida et al (2000) encounter the same problem 
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of non-stationary variables but argue that unit root tests have low power. Taylor (1999b) 
gives no further details apart from parameter estimates, t-values of the estimated 
coefficients and the multiple coefficient of determination (R:!). Hetzel (2000) states 
something very similar but with additional information regarding the standard error of 
regression and the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
We follow the same approach. We assume here that all variables such as the 
inflation and real interest rate series are stationary. The rationale for this assumption is 
that this is just a sample rather than population property. In this research. we consider 
have only small to medium sample (from 53 (Malaysia) to 89 (Korea) observations). In 
addition, the ambiguity related to the integration order of these variables is a well-debated 
subject in the theoretical literature. However, the predominant opinion holds that 
inflation, real and nominal interest rates are stationary. For further discussion on this 
point see Martin and Milas (2004) and the references therein. 
3.6. Empirical analysis 
3.6.1. The Baseline Model 
The empirical analysis begins with the estimation of the baseline specification. 
Subsequently, we investigate other variables that may enter the reaction function. As 
discussed earlier we include the movements in foreign interest rates, either in nominal or 
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real terms, and exchange rates in terms of nominal and real exchange rate level and also 
in their difference from their trend value (nominal and real exchange rate gap). 
We estimate a variety of baseline and augmented Taylor-type models usmg 
quarterly data, different measures of variables and over several different sample periods 
for these countries. To accommodate lags and expectation in the operation of monetary 
policy, we explored different lags and leads for all variables. We investigated the 
robustness of these findings in several ways and, for efficiency reasons, only the several 
best results for each country and model of these lengthy experiments are reported here. 
Firstly, we used alternative measures of real interest rates. We estimated equation 
(3.8) where real interest rate was the discount rate, deposit rate, money market 
rate/federal funds, or Treasury bill rate. We defined output gap as GOP volume index, 
GOP Volume Index (1995=100), GOP Volume Index (2000=100), or Real GOP (=GOP 
current/GOP deflator) either in contemporaneous, backward-looking, forward-looking or 
a combination of these three specifications. 
Our best findings on estimation of the baseline specification using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) are reported in Table 3.7. The table shows that the optimal results are 
achieved when we define r, as the three-month-money market rate for both Indonesia and 
Malaysia, the discount rate for Korea, and the treasury bill rate for the Philippines. The 
output gap contributes to a most robust model when we use the GOP volume index 
(1995= 1 00) for Indonesia, the GDP volume index for the Philippines, and the GDP 
volume index (2000= I 00) for Korea and Malaysia. 
In the case of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia the model suggests a 
relatively moderate degree of interest rate smoothing, as the coefficients on the lagged 
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interest rate are 0.57, 0.49 and 0.58 respectively. On the other hand, in the case of Korea. 
the model suggests a relatively high degree of interest rates smoothing as the coefficients 
on the lagged interest rate is 0.83. 
Table 3.7 shows that, the real interest rate responds positively and significantly to 
inflation. This evidence meets our theoretical expectation and suggests a non-
accommodating inflationary pressure. In the case of Indonesia, the movement in inflation 
leads the monetary authority to respond positively by a factor of 49% of the intlation rate. 
In Korea, the monetary authority responds to increasing intlation by increasing the real 
interest rate by 85%. In the case of the Philippines, the coefficient on intlation is 0.73. 
The result for Malaysia shows that the weight on the inflation is 0.45. 
Table 3.7 also shows statistically significant and positive coefficients of output 
gaps. These results meet our theoretical expectation suggesting a non-accommodating 
economic growth in each central bank's monetary policy. In the case of Indonesia, the 
central bank is very sensitive to movement in the output gap as the coefficient of the 
output gap is about + 1.97. In the case of Malaysia, the coefficient is much lower (+0.20), 
implying a monetary authority only slightly sensitive to the output gap. On the other 
hand, Bank ng Pilipinas appears to be moderately to highly sensitive to the output gap as 
the coefficient of the output gap is +0.56. This moderate response to the output gap is 
also found in the case of Korea in which the coefficient of the output gap is about +0.44. 
In general, as shown in Table 3.7, the best model of monetary policy response in 
Indonesia is backward looking, in Korea is a combination of backward- and forward-
looking, and in the Philippines and Malaysia is a combination of forward-looking and 
contemporaneous. In the case of Indonesia, the model is best when we use a one-year lag 
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of inflation and a three-quarter lag of output gaps. This implies that monetary policy in 
Indonesia responds to a fourth-quarter behind of inflation and a three-quarter behind of 
output gaps. In the case of Korea, the best model is obtained when we consider a one-
year lag of inflation and a quarter ahead of output gaps. This implies that monetary policy 
in Korea responds, not only to a first-quarter lag of real money market rates, but also a 
fourth-quarter behind of inflation and a quarter expectation of output gaps. In the case of 
the Philippines and Malaysia, the best model is obtained when we combine a one-year 
expectation of inflation with a contemporaneous value of the output gap. 
3.6.2. The augmented Taylor-rule 
We resume the analysis by estimating the augmented Taylor rule during 1984-
2005 using OLS in equations (3.10) through (3.20), where we also consider, as an 
alternative specification, a backward and forward-looking verJion of the augmented 
Taylor-type rule. We use the current, lag (from the first to the eight) and lead (from the 
first to the eight) of inflation 11:, output gap (y-y*), all exchange rate and foreign interest 
rate measures. The optimal interest rate rule for all these countries can be seen in Table 
3.8. The optimal results are achieved when we use the same definition of real interest 
rates rl as in our baseline model. 
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A quick glance at Table 3.8 reveals that the inflation, output gap. foreign interest 
rate, and the exchange rate have a significant effect on the domestic real interest rate. 
However, the timing of the impact differs considerably. 
Monetary policy in Indonesia responds to a first-quarter lag of real money market 
rates, a fourth-quarter lag of inflation, a third-quarter lag of output gap. and the expected 
real exchange rate gap and nominal foreign interest rate two quarters ahead. The 
monetary policy reaction functions in Korea responds to a first-quarter lag of real 
discount rates, a fourth-quarter lag of inflation, a quarter ahead of output gap. a fourth-
quarter lag of real exchange rate and the expected real foreign interest rates one quarter 
ahead. 
In the case of the Philippines, the best results are obtained using the current value 
of output gap, real exchange rate gap and nominal foreign interest rates as well as an 
expected first-quarter ahead of inflation. Table 3.8 also shows that the central bank of 
Malaysia reacts to an expected inflation, output gap, real exchange rate gap and nominal 
foreign interest rates one year ahead. We find consistency between Table 3.7 and 3.8, in 
particular in Indonesia and Korea, with respect to inflation and output gap, either in the 
sign of parameters or the timing of the impact. 
A more careful examination of the results as shown in this table reveals that the 
degree of interest rate smoothing is relatively high in all these countries. with the 
exception of Indonesia, between 53% and 74%. The degree of interest rate smoothing. 
among these three countries, is particularly high in Korea and the Philippines but smaller 
in Malaysia. On the other hand, in the case of Indonesia we find that the degree of 
interest rate smoothing is only 25%. The coefficient on the lagged interest rate of all 
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countries, with the exception of lndonesia, is on average 66%, implying that the initial 
adjustment in interest rates is on average only 34%. This is considered low if \\e compare 
to the one with Indonesia where the initial adjustment in its interest rates is as high as 
75%. 
The elasticity of the interest rate with respect to inflation is highly significant at 
the 5% level or better. The estimated coefficient of the inflation rate varies between +0.23 
(Indonesia) and + 1.21 (Philippines). The results show that the inflation coefficients have 
the expected positive signs in all countries. An interesting finding can be seen in the 
Philippines, where the estimated long-run inflation coefficient is high and statistically 
significant with a magnitude of higher than one. The low coefficient in Indonesia 
suggests that the inflation has not been the main focus of monetary policy in this country. 
As shown in Table 3.8, the conduct of monetary policy is significantly affected by 
the state of the business cycle. The response of monetary policy to the output gap is 
statistically significant for all countries and ranges between +0.28 (Malaysia) and + 1.27 
(Indonesia). The results also show that the monetary policy response to output is stronger 
in Indonesia than in Korea, the Philippines and Malaysia. In the case of Indonesia, our 
results suggest that the central bank has indeed been sensitive to the movement of the 
output gap. 
It is also found that the monetary authority of Indonesia put more weight on 
output rather than inflation. This quantitative evidence runs counter to the view that the 
central bank's main task is to achieve price stability. On the other hand, the evidence on 
output in the remaining three countries, Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia, clearly 
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shows that the monetary authority puts more weight on inflation, as shown by the greater 
coefficient of inflation than that of output in the estimated reaction function. 
With respect to the exchange rate, the coefficient is statistically significant and 
varies between +0.] ] (Malaysia) and +0.26 (the Philippines). As shown in Table 3.8. the 
coefficient of exchange rates in all countries is lower than the one of inflation rates. The 
sign of the coefficients of exchange rate adjustment in all countries is comparable to most 
previous work done on this subject (see Bharucha and Kent (] 997), Ball (] 999). Svesson 
(2000), and Leitemo and Soderstrom (2001)). 
With respect to the foreign interest rate, we find that, with the exception of 
Malaysia and Korea, it appears to have had a very significant effect on monetary policy. 
more so than domestic inflation. This suggests that the foreign interest rate is the pre-
dominant factor influencing Asian monetary policy, with an estimated coefficient for the 
foreign interest rate consistently higher than unity in Indonesia and the Philippines. and 
almost unity in Korea. Moreover, in Indonesia and the Philippines, the long-run response 
of the target interest rate to changes in the foreign interest rate is more than or almost 
double in size than that to changes in inflation. 
These results are consistent with the monetary policy in these countries before the 
crisis. Following the implementation of fixed exchange rate regimes, the initial spread 
between the domestic and the foreign interest rate -adjusted for the expected rate of 
devaluation- rose sharply, providing substantial encouragement for capital inflows and 
credit expansion. Our results show that any increase in foreign interest rates will lead to 
arise in the domestic rate giving a significant spread between domestic and foreign 
interest rates. 
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Theoretically, however, this increase in the spread could also be due to fiscal 
policy. Our results also support this as shown by a positive and statistically significant 
output reaction coefficient. Our findings explain implicitly that in all four countries under 
discussion, a combination of large capital inflows, an expenditure boom, and a sharp real 
appreciation occurred before the crisis. A sudden reversal of capital tlows sensibly leads 
to a major crisis. 
The other evidence that we find is that the introduction of foreign nominal or real 
interest rates along with exchange rate gaps or exchange rate levels improves the model's 
fit, as it results in a lower regression standard error in all four countries. Table 3.8 also 
shows that adding foreign interest rates results in substantially higher estimated 
coefficients for intlation, especially so in the case of Korea, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines. These findings confirm a positive correlation between intlation and any 
measure of foreign interest rate, as shown in Tables 3.1 through 3.4. 
Putting the R2 and the Durbin-Watson (OW) statistics side by side, we find 
another interesting piece of evidence in which the OW in all cases is larger than the R2, 
implying that the sign of the spurious regressions never took place. This statistics ease 
our previous concern over running a spurious regression in estimating the Taylor rule on 
these data, given several variables are integrated with the order of one (1(1)) or nearly 
integrated. 
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3.7. Conclusions 
This study examines monetary policy reaction function in four Asian countries. 
namely Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines, based on an open econom) 
augmented Taylor rule including the real exchange rate (level or difference from its 
trend) and the foreign interest rate (nominal or real). Using more recent quarterly data. we 
reach major findings as follows. 
Firstly, the real interest rate reacts positively and significantly to inflation. the 
output gap, the exchange rate, and the foreign interest rate. Secondly. we find that the 
timing of the impact sometimes differs considerably. According to our findings. 
monetary policy conducted by central banks of Indonesia and Korea is essentially a 
combination of forward and backward-looking, while policy of central bank of the 
Philippines is composite looking between forward and contemporaneous looking. In the 
case of Malaysia, monetary policy is essentially forward-looking. Surprisingly, we do not 
find any central bank considering purely backward-looking or contemporaneous 
specifications. 
Thirdly, we find the initial adjustment in interest rates varies between 260/0 and 
75%. Fourthly, we find that it is an aggressive response of mon~tary policy, which has 
played a more important role in Asia since the financial crises of 1997-98 rather than, as 
claimed in the literature, the fiscal policy. 
Fifthly, we find that, only in Indonesia, does the central bank appear to be less 
sensitive to inflation, though it has indeed been stabilizing the output gap by and large 
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through its key policy rate. This quantitative evidence supports the fact that the central 
bank's main task is not to achieve price stability during period of observations. 
Sixthly, with the exception of Korea and Malaysia, the foreign interest rate IS 
more influential in explaining the variance of the interest rate than other endogenous 
variables, suggesting that the major focus of the monetary policy in these countries is to 
consider foreign interest rates. 
This research can be expanded in numerous approaches. As the results shO\\ that 
the inflation did not justify as much variation in the real interest rate as we had expected. 
it may be possible to restructure this variable differently. Otherwise. it would also be 
interesting to take into account other monetary policy variables such as the stock prices 
and monetary base in empirical work. 
Furthermore, it is also more challenging to develop an empirical study of the 
potential asymmetrical behaviour of central banks' preferences, with respect to inflation 
and output targets, based on the common assumption that central bank loss function is 
quadratic. In addition, following the development in the non-linear rules, it would be 
more useful, to develop an empirical work toward a formal model of non-linear monetary 
reaction function, which would provide a clearer theoretical grounding for empirical 
work in this area. We will discuss these in the next chapter. 
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Table 3.1. Variable Correlations: Indonesia 
fa fb fc n (y-y*) s (S-S*) q (q-q*) i r 
fa 1.00 0.44 0.66 -0.34 0.48 -0.06 0.04 0.16 0.23 0.33 0.27 
fb 0.44 1.00 0.30 -0.71 0.22 -0.49 -0.68 -0.45 -0.53 0.35 0.23 
fc 0.66 0.30 1.00 0.09 0.52 -0.06 0.21 0.30 0.43 0.42 0.53 
TT -0.34 -0.71 0.09 1.00 -0.24 0.27 0.66 0.45 0.52 0.13 0.34 
I (y-y*) 0.48 0.22 0.52 -0.24 1.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.15 0.26 0.15 0.09 
s -0.06 -0.49 -0.06 0.27 -0.05 1.00 0.57 0.88 0.50 -0.47 -0.40 
[(s-s*) 0.04 -0.68 0.21 0.66 -0.01 0.57 1.00 0.80 0.95 0.05 0.18 
q 0.16 -0.45 0.30 0.45 0.15 0.88 0.80 1.00 0.80 -0.12 -0.02 I (q-q*) 0.23 -0.53 0.43 0.52 0.26 0.50 0.95 0.80 1.00 0.09 0.21 
if 0.33 0.35 0.42 0.13 0.15 -0.47 0.05 -0.12 0.09 1.00 0.93 
ff 0.27 0.23 0.53 0.34 0.09 -0.40 0.18 -0.02 0.21 0.93 1.00 
Notes: r", rh, and r" denote real discount rates, real deposit rates and real money market rales respeclive~\": 
1C denotes the inflation; (y-y*) denotes the output gap based on the GDP (at 2{){){) prices conslanl) 
seasonally adjusted; s, (s-s*), q, and (q-q*) denote nominal exchange rates, real exchange rales, Ihe 
nominal exchange rate gap and the real exchange rale gap respectively; l and I denole foreign nominal 
and real interest rates respectively. 
Table 3.2. Variable Correlations: Korea 
fa fb fc TT (y-y*) 1 (y-y*) 2 S (S-S*) q (q-q*) i f 
fa 1.00 0.70 0.24 -0.59 0.10 0.11 -0.30 -0.18 0.00 -0.13 0.39 0.48 
fb 0.70 1.00 0.55 -0.42 -0.11 -0.11 0.00 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.48 0.74 
fc 0.24 0.55 1.00 0.32 -0.03 -0.03 -0.46 0.18 -0.35 0.17 0.48 0.56 
TT -0.59 -0.42 0.32 1.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.45 0.12 -0.46 0.09 0.26 0.00 
(y-y*) 1 0.10 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 1.00 1.00 -0.20 -0.46 -0.28 -0.44 0.01 -0.08 
(y-y*) 2 0.11 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 1.00 1.00 -0.21 -0.49 -0.30 -0.46 0.01 -0.08 
s -0.30 0.00 -0.46 -0.45 -0.20 -0.21 1.00 0.46 0.86 0.46 -0.58 -0.30 
I (s-s*J -0.18 0.23 0.18 0.12 -0.46 -0.49 0.46 1.00 0.65 0.99 -0.17 0.05 
Iq 0.00 0.26 -0.35 -0.46 -0.28 -0.30 0.86 0.65 1.00 0.67 -0.28 -0.01 
I (q-q*) -0.13 0.25 0.17 0.09 -0.44 -0.46 0.46 0.99 0.67 1.00 -0.15 0.05 
If I 0.39 0.48 0.48 0.26 0.01 0.01 -0.58 -0.17 -0.28 -0.15 1.00 0.86 
rf 0.48 0.74 0.56 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 -0.30 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.86 1.00 
Notes: ruo rho and r,. denote real discount rates, real deposit rates and real money market rales respectively; 
1C denotes the il1flation; (y-y.) and (Y-Y·h denote the output gap based on the GDP Volume Index 
(2000=/00) and the real GDP (= GDP currentlGDP deflator) respectively; s, (s-s·). q. and (q-q.) denote 
nominal exchange rates. real exchange rates, the nominal exchange rate gap and the real exchange rate 
gap respectively; I and I denote foreign nominal and real interest rates respectively. 
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Table 3.3. Variable Correlations: the Philippines 
fa fb fd TT (y-y*) 1 (y-y*) 2 S (S-S*) q (q-q*) iT f 
fa 1.00 0.68 0.61 -0.51 -0.01 -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 -0.11 0.09 0.09 0.13 
fb 0.68 1.00 0.94 -0.21 0.23 0.23 -0.28 0.17 0.03 0.33 0.34 0.14 
fd 0.61 0.94 1.00 -0.03 0.32 0.32 -0.46 0.15 -0.13 0.31 0.52 0.32 
TT -0.51 -0.21 -0.03 1.00 0.05 0.05 -0.52 0.26 -0.35 0.13 0.47 0.36 
(y-y*) 1 -0.01 0.23 0.32 0.05 1.00 1.00 -0.16 -0.34 -0.12 -0.25 0.36 0.27 
(y-y*) 2 -0.02 0.23 0.32 0.05 1.00 1.00 -0.16 -0.34 -0.09 -0.25 0.38 0.27 
S -0.10 -0.28 -0.46 -0.52 -0.16 -0.16 1.00 0.26 0.84 0.25 -0.69 -0.56 
1 (s-s*) -0.05 0.17 0.15 0.26 -0.34 -0.34 0.26 1.00 0.49 0.96 -0.10 -0.10 
Iq -0.11 0.03 -0.13 -0.35 -0.12 -0.09 0.84 0.49 1.00 0.52 -0.52 -0.60 
1 (q-q*) 0.09 0.33 0.31 0.13 -0.25 -0.25 0.25 0.96 0.52 1.00 -0.07 -0.12 
if 0.09 0.34 0.52 0.47 0.36 0.38 -0.69 -0.10 -0.52 -0.07 1.00 0.87 
ff 0.13 0.14 0.32 0.36 0.27 0.27 -0.56 -0.10 -0.60 -0.12 0.87 1.00 
Notes: 1'", 1'", and I'd denote real discount rates, real deposit rates and real treasUlY bill rates respectively; 1C 
denotes the inflation; (y-y*) , and (y-y*JJ denote the output gap based on the GDP Voilime Index and the 
GDP Volume Index (/995=/00) respectively; s, (s-s*), q, and (q-q*) denote nominal exchange rates, real 
exchange rates, the nominal exchange rate gap and the real exchange rate gap respectively; land'; denote 
foreign nominal and real interest rates respectively. 
Table 3.4. Variable Correlations: Malaysia 
fb fc fd TT (y-y*) S (s-s*) q (q-q*) ;r I f 
fb 1.00 0.95 0.83 0.30 0.38 -0.39 -0.08 -0.40 -0.03 0.20 0.27 
rc 0.95 1.00 0.89 0.36 0.36 -0.48 -0.13 -0.48 -0.08 0.26 0.27 
rd 0.83 0.89 1.00 0.24 0.35 -0.55 -0.21 -0.53 -0.15 0.38 0.25 
IT 0.30 0.36 0.24 1.00 -0.27 -0.50 0.27 -0.52 0.24 0.31 0.38 
fy-y*) 0.38 0.36 0.35 -0.27 1.00 -0.32 -0.64 -0.32 -0.60 0.12 0.07 
s -0.39 -0.48 -0.55 -0.50 -0.32 1.00 0.47 0.99 0.45 -0.45 -0.28 
1 (s-s*) -0.08 -0.13 -0.21 0.27 -0.64 0.47 1.00 0.47 0.99 0.10 0.19 
l~ -0.40 -0.48 -0.53 -0.52 -0.32 0.99 0.47 1.00 0.47 -0.46 -0.33 
. (q-q*) 
-0.03 -0.08 -0.15 0.24 -0.60 0.45 0.99 0.47 1.00 0.12 0.17 
; 0.20 0.26 0.38 0.31 0.12 -0.45 0.10 -0.46 0.12 1.00 0.86 
r' 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.38 0.07 -0.28 0.19 -0.33 0.17 0.86 1.00 
Notes: rib rt~ and rei denote real deposit rates, real money market rates, and real treasury hill rates 
respectively; 1C denotes the inflation; (y-y*) denotes the output gap based on the GDP Volume Index 
(2000=100); s, (s-s*), q, and (q-q*) denote nominal exchange rates, real exchange rates, the nominal 
exchange rate gap and the real exchange rate gap respectively; t and I denote foreign nominal and real 
interest rates respectively. 
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Table 3.5. Standard Deviations 
Indonesia Korea Philippines Malaysia 
1993( 1 )-2005(2) 1984(1 )-2005(2) 1988( 1 )-2005(2) 1988(1 )-2005(2) 
ra 0.0574 0.0202 0.0301 0.0126 
rb 0.0574 0.0248 0.0341 
rc 0.0936 0.0338 0.0143 
rd 0.0397 0.0124 
TT 0.1289 0.0219 0.0371 0.0123 
(y-y*) a 0.0188 
(y-y*) b 0.0556 0.0191 
(y-y*) c 0.0344 0.0290 
(y-y*) d 0.0329 
s 0.6534 0.2267 0.3327 0.1918 
(s-s*) 0.2555 0.0841 0.0717 0.0685 
q 0.3314 0.1564 0.1756 0.1755 
(q-q*) 0.2166 0.0773 0.0685 0.0648 
i' 0.0172 0.0202 0.0208 0.0200 
rf 0.0162 0.0161 0.0159 0.0153 
;Votes: 1'". rho 1', and I'd del10le real discount rate, real deposit rate, real money market rate, and real 
IreaslII:l' hill rate rcspeclil'cly: 7T denotes inflation: (y-y*)", {y-y*h, (y-y*)" and (y-y*)" denote the olltPlit 
gap /lused on 0DP "Ollllllt' Index, CDP "olllJllL' Index (l995=/()()). CDP Volume Index (2()()()=/f)(J), and 
real GDP (= CDP cllrrclIl GDP de./lator) respecti\'e~l': s. {s-s*}, q, and (q-q*) denote nominal ('xc//(Il1ge 
rah's, reul exchange roles, 110minal exchange rates gap and real exchange rates gap rc,\pective~l': i' and ,; 
denote foreigll nominal and real interest rates re.\,/h'ctil·L'ly. 
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Table 3.6. Unit Root Tests 
Level Indonesia Korea Philippines Malaysia 
1993( 1)-2005(2) 1984( I )-2005(2) 1988( I )-2005(2) J988( I )-2005(2) 
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP 
fa -3.25**) -4.24***) -2.47 -3.24**) -3.51**) -3.90***) 
fb -2.77*) -2.61 *) -1.98 -2.24 -2.62*) 
-2.92**) -2.00 
-2.29 
fc -2.22 -2.53 -1.27 -2.06 
-2.11 
-2.15 
fd -2.35 -2.48 -1.64 -2.27 
7r -2.02 -2.39 -1.93 -2.62*) -1.40 -2.56 -1.71 -2.12 
(y-y*) a -2.81*) -2.94**) -4.29***) -11.13***) -3.81***) -12.75***) 
(y-y*) b 
-3.62***) -12.55***) 
(y-y*) c -4.18***) -2.93**) -3.64***) -12.54***) 
(y-y*) d -6.26***) -12.95***) 
-5.45***) -5.38***) 
(y-y*) e -3.36**) -2.91 *) 
(y-y*) f -6.31***) -12.94***) 
s -1.25 -1.27 -1.27 -1.38 -0.66 -0.60 -0.93 -1.06 
(s-s*) -2.55 -2.69*) -3.63***) -3.38**) -3.68***) -3.02**) -3.09**) -2.88*) 
q 
-1.60 -1.93 -1.82 -1.81 -0.95 -1.10 -0.85**) -1.08 
(q-q*) 
-2.66*) -2.90*) -3.59***) -3.42**) -3.73***) -3.09**) -3.02**) -2.96**) 
!l -1.21 -1.42 -1.76 -1.76 -2.53 -1.47 -2.53 -1.47 
rl -0.51 -1.04 -1.44 -2.01 -1.30 -1.75 -1.30 -1.75 
lsI Diflerence 
Indonesia Korea Philippines Malaysia 
1993( I )-2005(2) 1984( I )-2005(2) J988( 1)-2005(2) 1988( I )-2005(2) 
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP 
fa -4.31***) -8.80***) -6.10***) -7.76***) -5.37***) -8.65***) 
fb -4.21***) -5.00***) -4.51 ***) -8.76***) -5.01 ***) -6.57***) -3.47**) -6.00***) 
fc -4.67***) -6.18***) -5.51***) -8.08***) -3.69***) -6.73***) 
fd -4.89***) -6.53***) -3.78***) -9.13***) 
7r -2.58 -2.86*) -5.39***) -7.58***) -3.49**) -6.01***) -3.63***) -5.32***) 
(y-y*) a -3.45*) -8.36***) -4.52***) -27.18***) -3.41 **) -27.76***) 
(y-y*) b -3.12**) -28.44***) 
(y-y*) c -2.96**) -7.16***) -3.11**) -28.42***) 
(y-y*) d -4.43***) -28.23***) -4.15***) -10.24***) 
(y-y*) e -3.24**) -7.68***) 
(y-y*) f -4.47***) -28.24***) 
s -3.02**) -S.07***) -3.71 ***) -6.S7***) -4.62***) -S.08***) -3.63***) -5.07***) 
(s-s*) -3.39*} -S.27***} -4.43~**) -6.96***) -5.40***) -S.34***) -4.34***} -5.39***} 
q 
-3.24 -S.60***} -3.6S***) -6.S6***) -4.30***) -5.69***} -3.72***} -S.17***) 
(q-q*) 
-3.49 -S.74***) -4.38***) -6.98***) -5. 15***} -6.01***) -4.41***) -S.46***l 
if 
-3.42**) .-3.40**) -2.93**) -S.SS***) -3.12**) -3.86***) -3.12**) -3.86***} 
rf 
-2.69*) -S.9S***) -3.86***) -7.92***) -2.92**) -6.69***) -2.92**) -6.69***) 
.. 
Notes: */**/*** denote sign~ficance at the /09/0/5%//% level respectlvely/ollowmg MacKmnon critical 
value. Ii for rejection qf hypothesis of a unit root. 
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Table 3.7. Baseline Model 
Indonesia Korea Philippines Malaysia 
Sample 1993( 1 )-2005(2) 1984( 1 )-2005(2) 1988( 1 )-2005(2) 1988( 1)-2005(2) 
c -0.001321 -0.006862 0.003763 0.003410 
(0.014534) (0.002844)** (0.006256) (0.002385) 
P 0.574780 0.827520 0.487918 0.584885 (0.120537)*** (0.064317)*** (0.094906)*** (0.098457)*** 
f3 0.489844 0.849954 0.733705 0.448284 
(0.210227)** (0.488482)* (0.155245)*** (0.182200)** 
r 1.973352 0.443781 0.557594 0.199550 (0.562975)*** (0.252591 )* (0.317309)* (0.088409)** 
R- 0.668579 0.712568 0.696011 0.666597 
SE.R 0.057938 0.010449 0.021447 0.006906 
DW 1.725262 1.667056 1.392900 1.983897 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The model for Indonesia: r,= c + p r,.,+(1-
p){f3Tr ,.-1 +r (y-Y*},..d+ u,: The model for Korea: r,= c + p r,.,+(1- p){f3 Tr ,--I +r (y-y*), ,j+ u,: The 
modelfor Philippines: r,= c + p r,.,+(1- p){f3 Tr,-I +r(Y-Y*),)+ u,; The modelfor Malaysia: r,= c 
+ p r,.,+(1- p){f3 Tr,-I +r(y-y*),}+ u,,' R2 is the coefficient o.fdetermination. S.E.R stands for 
standard error regression and DWrepresents Durhin Watson statistic. 
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Table 3.8. Augmented Taylor Rule: OLS 
Indonesia Korea Philippines Malaysia 
Sample 1993( 1 )-2005(2) I 984( I )-2005(2) 1988( 1 )-2005(2) 1988( I )-2005(2) 
C -0.012312 -0.275364 0.009405 0.000862 
(0.017615) (0.054428)*** (0.006857) (0.002259) 
P 0.250728 0.742655 0.710543 0.528407 
(0.121679)** (0.060261)*** (0.090485)*** (0.099126)*** 
/3 0.233399 0.993854 1.211702 0.812772 (0.102969)** (0.327058)*** (0.493788)** (0.172701 )*** 
Y 1.267558 0.346493 0.392789 0.282745 (0.272812)*** (0.138137)** (0.205370)* (0.097390)*** 
¢ 0.223000 0.145848 0.261129 0.107188 
(0.047490)*** (0.041178)*** (0.144378)* (0.037475)*** 
A 1.394008 0.851355 2.380589 -0.340633 
(0.636476)** (0.281603)** (0.713363)*** (0.149584)** 
R2 0.677241 0.791175 0.737755 0.705462 
S.E.R 0.057842 0.009031 0.020916 0.006608 
OW 1.760793 1.854717 1.882978 1.867237 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The model for Indonesia: r,= c + p r,_,+ (1-
p){/3 1C ,.4 +y (y-y*),.,1+¢ (q-q*)" 2 +A l,'2)+ u,; The model for Korea: r,= c + p r,.,+(1- p){/3 1C ,.4 
+y(y-y*),. I+¢ q'.4 +A I,I}+ u,; The model for the Philippines: r,= c + p r,_,+(1- p){/3 1C I I +y 
(y-y*},+¢ (q-q*), +A l,)+ u,; The modelfor Malaysia: r,= c + p r,.,+(1- p){/31C, 4 +y(y-y*), 4+¢ 
(q-q*), 4 +A I, 41+ u,; R2 is the coefficient of determination. S.E.R stands for standard error 
regression and DWrepresents Durbin Watson statistic. 
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Figure 3.1. Inflation 
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Figure 3.2. Asia's Economic Gro\vth 
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Figure 3.3. Indonesian Growth 
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Figure 3.4. Indonesia's Output Gap 
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Figure 3.5. Indonesia's Interest Rates 
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Figure 3.6. Indonesia's Real Interest Rates 
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Figure 3.7. Korea's Inflation 
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Figure 3.8. Korea's Exchange Rate 
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Figure 3.9. Korea's Real Output 
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Figure 3.10. Korea's Interest Rates 
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Figure 3.11. Korea's Output Gap 
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Figure 3.12. Philippine's Interest rates and Inflation rates 
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Figure 3.13. Philippine's Inflation and output gap 
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Figure 3.14. The Malaysia's Interest Rates, Inflation, and Growth 
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Figure 3.15. The Real Growth 
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CHAPTER IV 
ASYMMETRY AND NON LINEAR MONET AR\' 
POLICY REACTION FUNCTIONS: 
Inflation Effect 
-L l. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, there ha\e been a number of studies challenging the assumption that the 
central bank responds in a linear fashion to intlation and output. These studies suggest 
that monetary authorities gi n? different \\ eights to positin~ and negati\ e price pressures 
as \\ L'li as econOI11 ic UPS\\ ings and downs\\ings. They also imply that their response 
coefficients \ary \\ ith the size of the shocks. If so. the linear monetary policy reaction 
functions based on the assumption that the loss function of the Central Bank is quadratic 
no IOllgl'r appropriate. 
196 
Researchers identify two possible sources of non-linear monetary policy response. 
Firstly, the source of asymmetric monetary reaction is the bank's preferences. \\ hich may 
be non-quadratic. Nobay and Peel (1998), Gerlach (1999), and Ruge-Murcia (2000) 
assume different weights for positive and negative inflation and output deviations from 
the target. Dolado et al (2004) develop a model that integrates a nonlinear aggregate 
supply curve and asymmetric preferences of the central bank. They find that the source of 
the asymmetry derives from the Federal Reserves responding differently to positive and 
negative inflation gaps. This implies that US monetary policy can be distinguished by a 
nonlinear policy rule as a result of asymmetric inflation preferences of the Federal 
Reserve after 1983. 101 Independent monetary authorities tend to be biased towards 
undershooting rather than overshooting their inflation targets. 
Goodhart (1998) supports this argument saying that, in order to maintain price 
stability and policy credibility, monetary authorities would prefer to have inflation below 
rather than above the target. Orphanides and Wieland (2000) analyze a Taylor rule in 
which the Central Bank prefers to increase interest rates by a larger amount when 
inflation is above the target than it will reduce them by when inflation is below the target. 
On the other hand, Martin and Milas (2004) argue that the response of the Bank of 
England to expected inflation differs according to the size of deviation from the inflation 
target. The bank does not react as long as inflation remains within set thresholds. This 
response is seen to be asymmetric as the bank's upper and lower thresholds are different. 
Secondly, a non-linear association between inflation and output may also generate 
asymmetry in the optimal monetary policy rule. For instance, nominal wages may be 
sticky downwards but flexible upwards. This situation will create a non-linear Phillips 
101 The rule was found to be linear prior to 1979. 
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curve. Dolado et al (2002) suggest that an optimal monetary policy requires an 
asymmetric policy response to offset a non-linear Phillips curve. Accordingly. the central 
bank may deal more severely with positive deviations in inflation than \\ ith neoati\e 
b 
deviations. If the Phillips curve is convex, inflation is more responsive to higher output 
than to lower output. 
In summary, existing empirical evidence on non-linear monetary policy reaction 
functions suggests the presence of a non-linear Phillips curve and/or non-quadratic 
preferences. Consequently, conclusions drawn from linear policy rules may be 
misleading. 
In this chapter we test for the presence of non-linear and asymmetric 
policymaking behaviour at the Bank Indonesia, Bank of Korea, Bank ng Pilipinas. and 
Bank Negara Malaysia. Non-linearity is a hypothesis which we can test formally using 
the testing approach proposed by Saikonnen and Luukkonen () 988), Luukkonen et al 
(1988). Granger and Terasvirta () 993) and Terasvirta () 994). In the presence of such 
non-linear and asymmetric responses, we then estimate a model of non-linear interest rate 
behaviour in these four countries. 
We model monetary policy by allowing the behaviour of policy makers to differ 
between an inner regime, when inflation is close to the desired level and an outer regime. 
We do not assume that the boundaries between these regimes are symmetric. 
We obtain a number of novel and interesting findings. Firstly, using a formal 
testing approach proposed by Saikkonnen and Luukkonen (1988), Luukkonen et al 
(1988), Granger and Terasvirta (1993), Terasvirta (1994) we reject linearity. 
198 
Secondly, we find that within the inner regime. the sole determinant of 
Indonesia's monetary policy is inflation, whereas in Malaysia. the determinants are 
output gap and foreign interest rates. In the case of Korea and the Philippines. \\e tind 
none of the variables - inflation, output gap, exchange rates. and foreign interest rates _ 
are statistically significant. Policy makers are passive in the inner regime. 
Thirdly, in the outer regime, we find that the major determinant of all countr!es' 
monetary policy is inflation, although other variables such as output also playa role in 
the determination of monetary policy in Indonesia and Korea. The U.S interest rate is 
important in all countries, with the exception of Indonesia, while the exchange rate plays 
a significant role in Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Finally, our results also lead us to speculate that policymakers may have been 
attempting to keep inflation within the range of 1.20/0 to 8.7% in Korea. 5.7% to 9.2% in 
the Philippines, and 2.7% to 3.5% in Malaysia, rather than pursuing a point inflation 
target as we find in Indonesia. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 presents 
literature review; section 4.3 discusses our methodology. In particular, section 4.3.1 
presents formal tests for non-linear interest rate behaviour; section 4.3.2 presents the 
estimates of the non-linear monetary policy models; section 4.4 presents data and 
preliminary observation; section 4.5 discusses our empirical results; Finally, section 4.6 
summarizes and offers some concluding remarks. 
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4.2. Literature Review 
In this section we survey recent studies and major empirical results on the 
asymmetric loss function. Traditionally, the preferences of monetary authorities have 
been modelled using quadratic loss functions, which imply that the monetary authorities 
respond proportionately to any and all deviations of inflation and output from desired 
values. Svensson (1997, 1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), and Clarida et al 
(1999) demonstrate that a linear monetary policy rule can be deri"ed from the optimizing 
behaviour of a central bank seeking to minimize a quadratic loss function with respect to 
the deviations of inflation and output from their target and trend values, and assuming 
that the Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply curves are linear. In summary. the 
theoretical foundations of linear monetary policy reaction functions of this nature rest on 
two main assumptions. Firstly, the monetary authority employs a quadratic loss function 
and secondly, the Phillips curve, i.e. the aggregate supply relation, is linear. 102 
However, there have been a number of recent studies which have challenged these 
two assumptions. The argument that the preferences of decision makers at monetary 
authority may be asymmetric has received a lot of interest in recent literature. Promising 
strands in the literature have recently emphasized that political pressures, labour market 
frictions and heterogeneity in portfolio holdings can lead to the costs of business 
fluctuations and inflation variation being asymmetric. We discuss two recent strands in 
the literature on monetary policy rules that seek to extend the traditional linear-quadratic 
model. Firstly, the monetary authority has asymmetric preferences regarding inflation 
102 See Clarida et al (1999). 
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and/or output. Secondly, the Phillips curve, i.e. the aggregate supply relation. IS non-
linear. 
4.2.1. Asymmetric Preferences 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) suggest an intlation 
bias in which the monetary authority is assumed to have a twin objective of price stability 
and higher desired level of employment. With respect to the latter objective, the authority 
prefers to have a level of employment above its natural level. As a result, the authority is 
tempted to generate inflation shocks so as to drive employment up above its natural level. 
However, the relevance of inflation bias' presumption that policymakers aim at 
achieving a level of employment above potential outlined by Kydland-Prescott and 
Barro-Gordon has recently been challenged by several economists. McCallum (1995) 
argues that monetary authorities are typically reluctant to do what Kydland-Prescott and 
Barro-Gordon suggest because they recognize that increasing output by an expansionary 
monetary policy is ineffective. Rational economic agents will respond to such an 
expansionary policy by calculating the true level of inflation as they realize the monetary 
authoritis strategy. Their actions will considerably reduce the effects of inflation on 
employment and, as a result, in the medium run, employment persists at its natural level. 
Additionally, Blinder (1998) claims that in fact the Federal Reserve always attempts to 
keep employment at the natural level rather than above it. 
Cukierman (2000, 2002), and Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) argue that an 
inflation bias remains possible even if central banks are assumed to target the natural 
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level of employment if central bankers are more worried about under- rather than over-
employment. For instance, imagine an event where there is the possibility of an adverse 
supply shock, pushing employment below its natural rate. Economic agents \\ould expect 
the monetary authority to implement an expansionary policy so as to bring employment 
back to its target value, leading to upward pressure on prices. 
On the contrary, if a positive supply shock pushes employment above the natural 
level, central banks may take no action. For a given level of inflation, they have no 
interest in offsetting positive output gaps. The suggestion is that the political authority is 
vulnerable to the social costs of recession and that in democratic societies even 
independent central banks are not entirely immune to social and political concerns. In 
addition, Blinder (1998) states that monetary authorities will take more political heat 
when they tighten monetary policy to prevent higher inflation than when they ease policy 
to prevent higher unemployment. Therefore, this asymmetry will possibly emerge in the 
monetary authority's loss function. 
Gerlach (2000) supports Cukierman (2000),s arguments, finding that the Fed has 
a greater aversion to contraction than to expansion, which suggests that the bank has 
asymmetric preferences. Nobay and Peel (2003) follow Cukierman (2000) in seeking 
asymmetric preferences with regard to output and finding the same inflation bias. By way 
of contrast, they also investigate asymmetric preferences with respect to inflation. They 
demonstrate that an asymmetric preference with regard to the inflation target tends to 
stimulate a 'deflationary bias' if policy makers are less concerned about a policy that 
results in undershoots rather than overshoots of the inflation target. This is consistent 
with Mishkin and Posen (1997) who find that the Bank of Canada and the Bank of 
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England have an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative deviations of inflation 
from its target. 
Dolado et al (2000) investigate the behaviour of policy makers at the central 
banks of France, Germany, Spain, and the US using data after 1980 in order to assess an 
asymmetric policy rule that depends on the sign of the inflation gap. The results suggest 
that the monetary authorities, with the exception of the central bank of Spain. respond 
more robustly to positive than negative deviation of inflation. Policy makers increase 
interest rates by a larger amount when inflation is above target than the amount it will 
reduce them by when it is below target. 
Surico (2004) also provides empirical support for asymmetric preferences. He 
examines the empirical relevance of a model of monetary policy in which central bankers 
are permitted to response in different ways to positive and negative deviations of inflation 
and output from the target values. His paper shows that US monetary policy can be 
characterized by a nonlinear policy rule only during the pre-Vo\Cker regime, with an 
interest rate response to the state of the business cycle being the dominant type of 
nonlinearity. Reduced-form and structural estimates of the central bank first order 
condition point out that preferences of the Fed are extremely asymmetric, with the 
response to output contractions being larger than the response to output expansions of the 
same magnitude. This asymmetry is revealed to generate an average inflation bias that 
played an important role during the great inflation of the 1 960s and 1970s. 
In contrast to Cukierman's precautionary demand for expansions, Goodhart 
(1998) introduces a precautionary demand for price stability. Goodhart (1998) observes 
that a central bank wishing to prove its credibility as an inflation combatant would 
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respond to uncertainty favouring negative instead of positive deviation from the inflation 
target. In these circumstances, the monetary authority would have a precautionar~ 
demand for price stability, from which a deflationary bias would rise. IO) If inflation is a 
pro-cyclical variable, Goodhart (1998) argues that this precautionary demand for price 
stability may offset Cukierman's precautionary demand for expansions. 
4.2.2. Non-Linear Phillips Curves 
Given these two alternative premises with regard to the source of the asymmetric 
preferences, some economists attempt a different methodology. They concentrate their 
interest on the estimation of non-linear policy reaction functions, concluding that if 
central bank preferences are asymmetric, then the optimal policy rule is non-linear. 104 
Schaling (1999, 2004) and Dolado et al (2002, 2005) analyze the implication of 
convexity of the Phillips curve for optimal monetary policy. They find that the disparity 
between the actual and expected intlation is a convex function of the output gap, 
implying a nonlinear aggregate supply (Phillips) curve. Once the nonlinear aggregate 
supply (Phillips) curve is combined with a standard quadratic loss function, the optimal 
interest rate rule is also nonlinear and implies that the central bank will boost the interest 
rate more strongly when inflation is above the target than when inflation is below. 
103 See also Fischer (1994) regarding a new commitment to low inflation by developed countries during the 
19805 and its relation to deflationary bias. 
104 See Bee et al (2002). Kim et al (2002). Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002). Martin and Milas (2004). 
Karagedikli and Lees (2004). and Bruinshoofd and Candelon (2005). 
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Dolado et al (2003, 2005) argue that during the 1980s and 1 990s. policy makers at 
the central banks of France, Germany and Spain, but not the USA, showed nonlinearities 
when setting the short-term interest rate as an instrument of monetary policy. Previously. 
however, Dolado et al (2004) analysed a model that integrates asymmetric preferences of 
the central bank and a specific nonlinear aggregate supply curve. Applying this model to 
US data, they find that asymmetry stems from the Fed's different reactions to positive 
and negative inflation gaps. These findings show that, after 1983, US monetary policy 
can be described by a nonlinear policy rule due to the asymmetric inflation preferences of 
the Federal Reserve, while prior to 1979 the rule is found to be linear. lOS 
4.3. Methodology 
In this section, we examine the possible existence of asymmetries In the 
behaviour of the central banks of Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia in 
response to its determinants. We estimate models to assess whether the reaction function 
of central banks have presented size and/or sign effects in the response of interest rates to 
changes in inflation. 
We investigate whether central banks respond differently to negative and positive 
deviations of inflation from their target values as well as attempting to find out whether 
larger shocks imply a stronger response than smaller shocks. For that purpose, our 
lOS We do not have information regarding the behaviour of the USA inflation between 1979 and 1983. 
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augmented Taylor rules are re-specified so that the coefficients of the predetermined 
variables are now allowed to depend on the 'sign' and/or 'size' of the changes. 
4.3.1. Tests/or non-linear interest-rate adjustment 
In this section we attempt to improve on the results of the linear models estimated 
in section 3.6.2 of chapter 3 by capturing the effects of any possible non-linearities in 
these four countries' monetary policy. For the existence of the latter to be established, 
formal tests are needed. We use the testing approach proposed by - Saikkonnen and 
Luukkonen (1988), Luukkonen et al (1988), Granger and Terasvirta (1993), Terasvirta 
(1994), using the artificial regression to test for linearity. In its general form, this 
regression takes the form of equation (4.1) below: 
k 
(r-r), =Poo + I{Yo,(r-r)'-i +PI,(r-r),_,(r-r),_d +P2I(r-r),_,(r-r);_d 
1=1 
+ P3i (r - r)'_1 (r - r):_d} + P4 (r - r);_d + P'S (r - r):_J + U, (4.1 ) 
In (4.1), (r - ;-), is the deviation of the real interest rate from its equilibrium 
level, measured by the estimated residual term obtained from the augmented Taylor rule 
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using equations (3.10) to (3.20) of chapter 3,106 and d is the delay parameter of the 
transition function, and Ut is a white-noise error term ( ~ niid (0,(J2». 
The null hypothesis of linear real interest rate misalignment (r - r), can be tested 
using an LM-type test, estimated for all plausible values of d. This is described b~ H11 : 
[p If = Pl.; = {J3J =p 4 =p 5 = 0] for all j E (I ,2 ... ,k), with the autoregressive parameter k 
being determined by the partial autocorrelation function of (r - r), .107 The testing 
procedure involves estimating (4.1) for all plausible values of d, testing in each 
estimation round the statistical significance of the linearity restrictions. Non-linearity is 
rejected if any of the resulting LM-statistics is significant. If linearity is rejected for more 
than one values of d, the latter's optimal value is determined by the test score with the 
lowest p-value (i.e. the highest value for the test's LM score). 
4.3.2. Non-linear reaction function 
We estimate models similar to those in Martin and Milas (2004), to model non-
linear interest rate behaviour identified above. \08 The model we estimate is described by 
equation (4.2). 
r,= (), rll +( 1- ()/) rOI + lE, (-1.2) 
lOtI The optimal interest rate rule for all these countries can be seen in Table 3.& of chapter 3. 
107 Granger and Terisvirta (1993) and TerAsvirta (1994) advise against choosing k using infonnation 
criteria such as the Akaike on the grounds that this may result in a downward bias. affecting the results of 
the non-linearity tests. 
108 A thorough discussion of the models which follow can be found in van Dijk et a!. (2002) 
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where rl" ro" and 0, are defined in equations (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) respectively. 
(-1.3) 
(-1.-1) 
0, = pr r-l7S. A'±n 7S.ru} = 1 - I I , 
1 + e -a[A,t" -r HA,." -r 1 (-1.5) 
where r, is the real interest rate, p (07S. p < 1) is the partial adjustment (the degree of 
interest rate smoothing), A is the level of inflation '7r', or the deviation of inflation from 
its target value '(7r - 7r*)', (y-y*) is the deviation of actual from potential output, (I" is the 
(nominal 'I' or real '/') foreign interest rate, F is the (nominal's', or real 'q', or nominal 
gap '(.s-s*) " or real gap '(q-q*)') exchange rate, u, is a white noise term, andj,k,l,m,and n 
are lags or leads with the value ofO, 1, ... ,8 (i.e.j E(-8, ... ,-L 0, +1, ... , +8). 
We define / = f - tf. in which the desired or equilibrium nominal foreign interest 
rate f is equal to the sum of the equilibrium real foreign interest rate / and the foreign 
CPI inflation. The model compares the results using, firstly, real, and, secondly, nominal 
foreign interest rates and assesses whether the foreign inflation CPI plays a key role in 
determining domestic real interest rates. 
As we are not fully clear which measure of exchange rate should be considered. 
we include nominal's', real 'q', nominal gap '(s-s*)', or real gap '(q-q*t) exchange rates 
alternately in equations (4.3) to (4.5). We define in log term q=s+p*-p, where p* is 
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foreign national pnce level and p is domestic price level. Variable (s-s*) denotes the 
deviation of actual nominal exchange rate from its trend. With respect to variable (s-s*) 
and (q-q*). an increase means a depreciation and vice versa. 
Equations (4.3) and (4.4) are reaction functions similar to linear augmented 
Taylor rule including exchange rates and foreign interest rates. The only substantive 
difference here is that our augmented Taylor rules use both inflation and inflation relative 
to the target with different time of observation either forward or backward looking. or 
contemporaneous. 
The nonlinear monetary policy rule of Quadratic Logistic Function as shown in 
equation (4.2) distinguishes two different inflation regimes. These are defined as being 
the inner (r/t) and the outer (rOt) regime, where inflation 'A' (forward or backward 
looking, or contemporaneous) takes a value inside and outside a band which is defined by 
an upper and a lower critical threshold value, '[u and '[L respectively. Inside the inner 
regime, when 'A' (the level of inflation '1C' or the deviation of inflation from its target 
interest rates are determined by (4.3); outside, when 'A' (the level of inflation '1C' or the 
deviation of inflation from its target value '(1C - 1C*)') is away from the bands '[u ("nu, or 
'(1l' - 1l'*)u'» and '[L ('nL, or '(1C - 1C*)L,», they are determined by (4.4). In this way. the 
Quadratic Logistic Function captures the impact of inflation size effects on monetary 
policy. 109 
Equation (4.5) models interest rates as a weighted average of the two regimes. 
with the weight term fJ, modeled in (4.5) denoting the probability of inflation (Au,,) being 
IOQ The Quadratic Logistic Function also captures a certain type of sign effects, namely those implied from 
non-symmetric regime threshold (rL+ rtl :1= 0). This asymmetry, if validated by the data. may imply that 
monetary policy considers a positive output gap more costly than a negative gap - or vice versa. 
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in the inner regime. The model simplifies to the linear model in previous chapter if c, = 
Cl.PI = Pl, PI =P2. 11 = Y2, f/JI =f/J2, and AI = A2. It also simplifies to the linear model iff} is 
either I or O. 
The quadratic logistic function used to model the regime weight in equation (-L5) 
has the properties that (i) 8 becomes constant (0.5) as cr--O and (ii) as cr--Cf". 8=0 if 
'A' L 'A'> U d 8-1 'f L<'A'< U 110 R.c.· G . <'t or 't an - I 't 't . elerrmg to ranger and Terasvlrta (1993) 
and Terasvirta (1994), we set cr dimension-free by dividing it by the variance of inflation 
'A '. Furthermore, van Dijk et al (2002) argue that the I ikel ihood function is very 
insensitive to cr, suggesting that an accurate estimation of this parameter is unlikely in our 
relatively short sample. Therefore, we do not try to use estimates of cr to test our model 
against the alternative of a linear model. 
Our model has paralleled with models developed by Granger and Terasvirta 
(1993) and van Dijk et al (2002). In their STAR (Smooth Transition Auto-Regressive) 
models. the endogenous variable is determined by a weighted average of regimes with 
endogenous regime weights. Our model also has similarities with quadratic logistic 
function used by Martin and Milas (2004) when modelling UK monetary policy. 
However. while Martin and Milas (2004) differ their model from STAR models in using 
a forward-looking variable to determine the regime weights, we distinguish our model 
from STAR models in using either a forward or backward-looking or contemporaneous 
variable to determine the regime weights. Arghyrou (2004) also uses a quadratic logistic 
function to examine the compatibility of European and Greek Monetary Policies. 
110 See Jansen and Terlisvirta (1996). 
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However, he models the regime weights using a function similar to (4.5) \\here the 
regime weight depends on the lagged output gap rather than inflation. 
4.3.3. Alternative models to compare 
In this section, we compare estimates of our Quadratic Logistic Function 
discussed in section 4.3.2 to those alternative models developed by Dolado et al (2000) 
and those optimal models from our augmented Taylor rules discussed in section 3.6.2 of 
chapter 3. We then investigate which model is better able to explain monetary policy in 
these four countries. 
-1.3.3.1. Linear reaction/unctions modified/or size inflation effects 
Dolado et al (2000) propose a model to analyse monetary policy where 
policymakers are more responsive to inflation when it is further from the inflation target. 
We construct the following model allowing for size inflation effects in our augmented 
Taylor rule: 
where all variables and parameters in equation (4.6) are the same as those in equations (4.3) 
through (4.5). This model allows for inflation 'size' effects in monetary policy. For this 
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purpose, a large deviation from target is now represented by a coefficient of P2. We test 
the null hypothesis of symmetry, Ho: P2 = 0, using a Wald test. 
-1.3.3.2. Linear reactionfunctions mod(fiedfor sign inflation effects 
While a distinction between symmetry and asymmetry would apparently enhance 
understanding about the preferences of central bankers, standard formal asymmetry tests 
have not been established in the literature. Asymmetry in monetary policy might be 
analysed using an augmented Taylor rule, including exchange rates and foreign interest 
rates, in line with the analysis in Martin and Milas (2004), of the form as illustrated by 
the following equation (4.7), a modification of our augmented Taylor rule, so that the 
coefficients on the predetermined variables are now allowed to depend on the 'sign' of 
the changes: 
r, = c+p r,_1 +(1 - p) {/31 (n:-n*)\t:j+ /32 (n-n*) -,±lc+ r (Y-Y*)'±I+¢ F,±m+ A d,±nl + u, 
(-1.7) 
where all variables and parameters in equation (4.7) are the same as those in equations (4.3) 
through (4.5). In equation (4.7) we define (n-n*)+,±) = (n-n*)'±j if (n-n*)'±j~ 0 and (n-n*F,!", 
is (1t-1t*),±lc if (n-n*)'±k :s O. This model includes inflation and deflation rates as separate 
variables and so allows for differential responses from policymakers. For this purpose. 
positive and negative changes are now represented by two coefficients on each variable. 
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~I and ~2' respectively. The null hypothesis of symmetry, Ho: ~I = ~2 is then tested using 
a Wald test. This type of model has been used by Dolado et al (2000) to analyze 
monetary policy in Germany, France, Spain and the US in the period before European 
• III 
monetary unron. 
4.3.4. Sensitivity Analysis 
We try to find out whether contemporaneous, backward-looking, forward-looking 
specifications and a combination of the three show non-linearity and asymmetry in 
monetary policymaking with respect to inflation shocks described by equations (4.2) to 
(4.7). 
In addition, we use an alternative measure of all variables involve in our estimates 
in order to obtain an optimum and robust model. We include the level of inflation or 
inflation from its target value, the deviation of actual from potential output, the nominal 
or real foreign interest rate, and the (nominal, or real, or nominal gap, or real gap) 
exchange rate as discussed above. 
4.4. Data 
We use quarterly data for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines for 
different time periods based on their availability. The estimation sample runs from 
1984(1) to 2005(2) for the Korea model, J988( J) to 2005(2) for both Philippines and 
III See also Gerlach (2000) and Surico (2002). 
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Malaysia, and from ] 993(]) to 2005(2) for Indonesia. All the data used in this analysis 
were obtained from the International Financial Statistics published by the International 
Monetary Fund provided by DataStream. 
Following the specification of the estimated model in the previous chapter. \\e 
define r, as the real money market rate/federal funds/call money rate for Indonesia: the 
real discount rate for Korea; the real treasury bill rate for the Philippines: and the real 
money market rate for Malaysia. Inflation 1C is defined as the percentage increase of the 
price level relative to its value in the same quarter of the previous year. We calculate lr 
using the consumer price index (CPI) because we believe CPI to be the most suitable 
measure for the key anchor of monetary policy operation. It also represents the inflation 
indicator most familiar to the public. Real interest rates are calculated using r= ;-lr, \vhere 
r, i, and 1C respectively denote real interest rate, nominal interest rate and inflation. We 
denote (rr-rr*) as the deviation of the current from (implicit or explicit) target inflation 
rates in which the target inflation 1C* is the sample average of CPI inflation. We make an 
exception in the case of Indonesia, as the inflation rate in this country during the financial 
crisis was extremely large. Accordingly, we exclude the inflation rate from I 998( I) to 
1999(2) in calculating target inflation rates of Indonesia. The target inflation rr* is 6.5% 
(11.950/0 if the inflation rate from 1998( I) to 1999(2) is included) for Indonesia. 4.570/0 
for Korea, 7.08% for the Philippines, and 2.86% for Malaysia. 
The output gap (y-y*) is a measure of the difference between actual output (r) and 
the potential output (y*).112 Since it cannot be observed we estimate potential output. 
Theoretically, productivity growth, labour force developments and other conditions 
affecting productive capacity in the economy may change (raise) the potential output. In 
112 PotentiaJ output is a level of output that over time is consistent with stable inflation. 
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this study, we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter since it is the most commonl) accepted \\a) 
of measuring potential output. We fit the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter into y using the 
suggested smoothing parameter for quarterly data in order to obtain an estimate of 
potential output (y*). We then construct the output gap as the difference between .1', and 
y*,. The output gap in these four countries represents the overall assessment of resource 
utilization in their economy. 
The nominal exchange rate s is expressed as units of the domestic currency per 
U.S. dollar. The real exchange rate q is defined as nominal exchange rates adjusted for 
differences in national price levels p or defined in log terms as q=s+p*-p. \vhere p* is 
foreign national price level and p is domestic price level. The HP filtering process is used 
to estimate trend values for the nominal and real exchange rates. The nominal exchange 
rate gap (s-s*) is determined as the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its trend 
value. Similarly, the real exchange rate gap (q-q*) is then determined as the deviation of 
the real exchange rate from its trend value. According to our optimum findings in 
previous chapter, for our analysis, we use the real exchange rate gap for all countries. 
with the exception of Korea and Malaysia, where we consider the level of real exchange 
rate. 
The nominal foreign interest rate / is the U.S treasury bill rate. The real foreign 
interest rate (I) is calculated using the equation, I = / - TI, where I, / and .,to respectively 
denote real interest rate, nominal interest rate and CPI inflation in the US. Referring to 
our results in the previous chapter regarding the most robust model of the augmented 
Taylor rule. we use nominal foreign interest rates for all countries, with the exception of 
Korea. where we consider real foreign interest rates. 
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Given that the time series properties of the data will play an important role in the 
discussion below, it is worth noting that all variables are assumed stationary, for the 
reasons discussed in section 3.5 of chapter 3. 
4.5. Empirical Results 
4.5.1. Formal tests/or non-linear interest rate adjustment behaviour 
This section reports the relevant tests with respect to non-linear interest rate 
adjustment behaviour as discussed in section 4.3.1, and the results of which are presented 
in Table 4.1. In the case of Indonesia, we obtain <1>= I and the reported LM-statistics are 
statistically significant, with the highest test statistic being obtained for d=3. We reject 
the hypothesis of linear interest rate adjustment at the I per cent level or better. which 
implies that the linear equations reported in column (i) of Table 3.8 in chapter 3 are 
mispeficied. We therefore conclude that interest rates in Indonesia show non-linear 
behaviour. 
In the case of Korea, as shown in Table 4.1, the formal tests for non-linear interest 
rate behaviour suggest that <1»= 1 and the reported LM-statistics are statistically significant. 
with the highest test statistic being obtained for d=2. We therefore conclude that interest 
rates in Korea display non-linear behaviour. 
The formal tests for non-linear interest rate behaviour in the Philippines suggest 
that <1»=2 and the reported LM-statistics presented in Table 4.1 for this misalignment is 
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statistically significant, with the highest test statistic being obtained for d=4. We therefore 
conclude that interest rates in the Philippines show non-linear behaviour. implying that 
the linear equations reported in column (iii) of Table 3.8 in chapter 3 are mispeticied. 
The formal tests for non-linear interest rate behaviour in Malaysia suggest that 
~=I and the highest test statistic for this rate is statistically significant at 10/0 or better 
which is obtained when d=3. We therefore conclude that interest rates in Malaysia 
present non-linear behaviour. This implies that the linear equations reported in column 
(iv) of Table 3.8 in chapter 3 are mispeficied. 
4.5.2. The Non-linear reaction function 
The quadratic logistic function allows us to investigate the conduct of monetary 
policy in these four countries to seek evidence whether the behaviour of the monetary 
authorities differed between regimes. Using a simple non-linear structural framework to 
analyze Indonesia's monetary policy between 1993 and 2005, as shown in column (i) of 
Table 4.2, we estimate 1[L = -8% and 1[u = 26%. Our estimates suggest that the regime 
boundaries are wide, implying monetary policy is irresponsive to inflation before the 
adoption of inflation targeting framework in July 2005. This situation is also found in the 
case of developed countries. For instance, Martin and Milas (2004) find that UK 
monetary policy is tolerant to high inflation before the adoption of inflation targeting 
framework in 1992 as they find wider regime boundaries in that the estimate of 1[L is 
1.9010 and XU is 21.1 %. 
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We reject the hypothesis Ho: nU + nL = 0, implying there is evidence of asymmetr~ 
in this model. This means that monetary policy makers in Indonesia see deviations of 
inflation above and below the target unequally bad. We also find there are size etfects in 
this model, since we reject the hypothesis Ho: nU = nL. It means that monetary policy 
makers in Indonesia are more responsive to inflation when it is further from the target. 
We also find that the estimate of (J is large, implying rapid transitions between the 
regimes. However, van Dijk et al (2002) argue that this parameter is imprecise in our 
relatively short sample as the likelihood function is very insensitive to this parameter. I I., 
For this reason, we follow Martin and Milas (2004) to not use estimates of (J to test our 
model against the alternative of a linear model. 
In the inner regime, we find that all parameters, with the exception of inflation. 
are statistically insignificant. In the outer regime, with the exception of foreign interest 
rates, we find that all parameters are statistically significant, suggesting policymakers 
adjust the interest rate in response to changes in inflation, output, and exchange rates. The 
long-run response of interest rates to inflation in the outer regime (0.66) exceeds that in 
the inner regime (0.47), both are positive, suggesting that policymakers do conform to the 
Taylor principle that monetary policy should not accommodate inflation. Our results also 
suggest that the central bank pursued a point target rather than a target range. The 
estimated output gap parameter (1.92) is significantly greater than that of inflation (0.66). 
This implies that prior to 2005,114 the influence of output was stronger than that of 
inflation. 
113 See the detailed discussion in van Dijk et al. (2002). 
114 In July 2005, Bank Indonesia officially adopts the inflation targeting framework. 
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The exchange rate also plays a significant role. As shown in column (i) of Table 
4.2, the estimated exchange rate parameter in the outer regime is sionificanth greater 
~ ..... 
than zero (1.70), so the monetary policy makers raise the interest rate III response to 
depreciation of the Rupiah against the US dollar in the outer regime. 
Our estimates for Korea are presented in column (ii) of Table 4.2. The quadratic 
logistic function allows us to estimate separate upper and lower bands with the value of 
XL = 1.2% and 1[u = 8.70/0 respectively. In addition. these regime boundaries are smaller 
than those found in Indonesia. 
Our test results show that we reject the hypothesis Ho: 1[u + 1[L = 0. implying there 
is evidence of asymmetry in this model. We also find there are size effects in this model. 
since we reject the hypothesis Ho: 1[u - 1[L = O. In addition, the estimate of cr is large, 
implying rapid transitions between the regimes. However, as we discussed in the case of 
Indonesia previously, this parameter is imprecise as the likelihood function is very 
insensitive to this parameter. 
In the inner regime, we find that all parameters are statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that policymakers do not adjust interest rates to move intlation towards the 
target. In contrast to the results in Indonesia, we find that /31=0, suggesting policy makers 
in Korea pursued a target range rather than a point target. On the other hand, in the outer 
regime, with the exception of exchange rates, we find that all parameters are statistically 
significant, suggesting policymakers adjust the interest rate in response to changes in 
inflation, output, and foreign interest rates in order to move intlatbn towards the target. 
The long-run response of interest rates to intlation (1.040) is similar to its 
response to the output gap (1.042). In contrast to Indonesia, in Korea, the exchange rate 
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does not playa significant role. On the other hand. \vhi Ie in the case of Indonesia the 
foreign interest rate is not considered as the determinant of our model. in the case of 
Korea, it is highly significant (2.505). It implies that the monetary policy makers raise the 
interest rate in response to increasing U.S t-bill rates. 
Column (iii) of Table 4.2 presents estimates of the model for the Philippines. We 
estimate nL = 5.7% and nU = 9.2%. Our model has narrow regime boundaries implying 
monetary policy becomes more responsive to inflation. There is evidence of asymmetry 
effects in this model as we reject the hypothesis Ho: nU + nL = O. There is also evidence of 
size effects in this model as we reject the hypothesis Ho: nlJ - nL = O. 
In the inner regime, we find that all four parameters included in our study are 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that policymakers do not adjust interest rates to 
move inflation towards the target. Similar to the case in Korea, we find that /3,=0. 
implying policymakers in the Philippines pursued a target range rather than a point target. 
In the outer regime, all parameters are statistically significant, with the exception 
of the output gap, so that monetary policy becomes more responsive to inflation and 
irresponsive to the output gap. The long-run response of interest rates to exchange rates 
in the outer regime (0.232) suggests that policymakers do not accommodate depreciation. 
In other words, Bank ng Pilipinas raises the interest rate in response to depreciations of 
the Peso against the US dollar. The estimate of the foreign interest rate parameter (0.685) 
is significantly greater than that of inflation (0.302), so that monetary policy in the outer 
regime becomes more responsive to foreign interest rates and less responsive to inflation. 
Our results suggest that increasing U.S t-bill rate is responded to by raising the domestic 
interest rate. 
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When we consider Malaysia, as shown in column (iv) of Table 4.7. our model 
suggests that the estimate of nL is 2.7% and of nU is 3.5%. These narrO\\ rl?llime 
:= 
boundaries imply that monetary policy is more responsive to inflation. With respect to the 
asymmetry test, our results show that we reject the hypothesis Ho: nll+nL= O. implying 
strong evidence of asymmetry in this model. We also find size effects in this model. since 
we reject the hypothesis Ho: nU _nL= O. 
In the inner regime, we find that monetary policy authority will react to changes 
in output and foreign interest rates. The long-run response of interest rates to foreign 
interest rates in the inner regime (0.523) exceeds that to output gap (0.296). suggesting 
that policymakers are more concerned with changes in US t-bill rates than the output gap. 
Similar to the case in Korea and the Philippines, we find that /3,=0. suggesting that 
monetary policy in Malaysia pursued a target range rather than a point target. 
In the outer regime, we find that inflation and foreign interest rates parameters are 
statistically significant, suggesting policymakers adjust the interest rate in response to 
changes in inflation and foreign interest rates. The estimate of the inflation parameter 
(0.619) is statistically significant and positive, implying that Bank Negara Malaysia 
responds to changes in inflation by increasing the interest rates. 
The foreign interest rate also plays a significant role In the outer regime. 
However, the long-run response of interest rates to foreign interest rates in the inner 
regime (0.523) exceeds that in the outer regime (0.242), suggesting that in the outer 
regime. monetary policy is less responsive to changes in US t-bill rates compare with its 
respond in the inner regime. Considering the foreign interest rates parameters are 
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statistically significant in both the inner and the outer regime. we conclude that Bank 
Negara Malaysia does not accommodate foreign interest rates. 
4.5.3. Compare to Alternative Models 
4.5.3.1. Linear Augmented Taylor Rule 
Comparing our estimates of nonlinear policy rule in Table 4.2 with those of 
augmented Taylor rule in Table 3.8 of Chapter 3, we find that our nonlinear policy rule 
dominates a linear augmented Taylor rule over the 1984-2005 periods as it has a 
substantially lower standard error. In addition, the formal tests for non-linear interest rate 
behaviour as discussed in section 4.5.1 suggest that interest rates in all four countries 
under observation present non-linear behaviour. This implies that the linear equations 
reported in Table 3.8 of chapter 3 are mispeficied. 
4.5.3.2. Linear reaction/unctions modified/or size inflation effects 
Table 4.3 presents estimates of equation (4.6), where our augmented Taylor rule 
is extended to include a quadratic inflation effect. In all cases, with the exception of 
Malaysia, we find that the quadratic inflation term is significant, suggesting that 
monetary policy responds more strongly when inflation is far from the target. To confirm 
these findings, we test for non-linear responses using the Wald test on the inflation terms. 
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where the null hypothesis assumes a linear response to the inflation effects. We find tnat. 
with the exception of Malaysia, monetary policy has been non-linear. That is to say. in 
three of the four countries the monetary authority response differently according to the 
size of inflation deviations, increasing the interest rate by a larger amount \\ hen intlation 
is far above or below the target than it will reduce it by when inflation is close to its 
target. However, in the case of Korea the coefficient is considerably larger than \\ hat \\ e 
would expect the central bank to adjust interest rates by. 
We also find a medium-sized degree of interest rate smoothing and a statistically 
significant inflation term. Models in Indonesia and Korea suggest that the pre-dominant 
factor influencing these two countries' monetary policy in the 1990s was US interest 
rates with an estimated coefficient higher than unity. 
In the case of Korea and the Philippines, as shown in Table 4.3, we find that the 
output gap is statistically insignificant, suggesting these countries' monetary policy do 
not response to output changes. This implies that possibly the adoption of inflation targets 
by Bank of Korea in 1998 and Bank ng Pilipinas in 2002 has lead to significant changes 
in monetary policy. In the case of Malaysia, as shown in Table 4.3, although the 
monetary authority has never adopted the inflation targeting framework, the magnitudes 
of the parameter estimates suggest that the Bank Negara Malaysia reacts more 
aggressively to large deviations of inflation from its target than other variables involved 
in our augmented Taylor rule. However, as shown in Table 4.3, we find that the 
behaviour of Bank Negara Malaysia in conducting monetary policy with respect to 
inflation is always linear, no matter whether inflation is further from the target. 
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Given all above findings, however, these augmented Taylor rules cannot be used 
to address the other issues considered in this chapter, such as asymmetry in monetan 
. . 
policy. In addition the standard errors of these estimates, with the exception of Malaysia. 
are slightly higher than those of our quadratic logistic functions discussed in section 
4.5.2, so this model is dominated by our nonlinear monetary policy rule. 
4.5.3.3. Linear reaction/unctions modified/or sign inflation effects 
Table 4.4 presents estimates of equation (4.7), where positive and negative 
deviations from the inflation target are entered as separate explanatory variables. The 
point estimates suggest that monetary policy in all countries, with the exception of the 
Philippines, responds more strongly when inflation is below the target, whereas the 
response is statistically insignificant when inflation is above the target. However, in the 
case of Korea and Malaysia, we find that the coefficient for sign effect contradicts our 
expectation as it suggests the monetary authority raises the interest rate when dealing 
with falling inflation rather than decreasing it. In the case of Indonesia, the coefficient for 
negative deviations of inflation consistent with the theory, suggesting an asymmetric 
policy regime where movements of inflation below the target lead to a more sluggish 
policy response in that Bank Indonesia tends to decrease the interest rate. On the other 
hand, in the case of the Philippines, we find the central bank deals more severely with 
positive deviations of inflation, whereas the response to negative deviations is statistically 
insignificant. 
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We test for asymmetric responses employing the Wald test on the response of 
interest rates to inflation, where the null hypothesis assumes a symmetric response to the 
deviation of inflation from the target. We confirm that the responses of all four countries 
are asymmetric. This suggests that central banks respond differently depending on 
whether inflation is above or below the target. 
However, these augmented Taylor rules cannot be used to address the other issues 
considered in this chapter, such as non-linear in monetary policy in that large and small 
shocks have different importance for monetary policy. In addition, the standard errors of 
these estimates are higher than those of our Quadratic Logistic functions as discussed in 
section 4.5.2. We conclude that this model is also dominated by our nonlinear monetary 
policy rule. 
4.6. Conclusions 
We estimate a class of models to test the hypothesis of asymmetric monetary 
policy responses to the inflation rate at Bank Indonesia, Bank of Korea, Bank ng 
Pilipinas, and Bank Negara Malaysia. In the presence of such asymmetric responses, we 
then create a model of non-linear interest rate behaviour in these four countries. 
We obtain a number of novel and interesting findings. Firstly, using a more 
formal testing approach proposed by Saikkonnen and Luukkonen (1988), Luukkonen et 
al (1988), Granger and Terasvirta (1993), Terasvirta (1994) we reject linearity. 
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Secondly, our quadratic logistic function suggests that monetary authorities in 
these four emerging economies are subject to non-linear inflation effects and that the\ 
respond more vigorously to inflation when it is further from the target. 
Thirdly, we find that within the inner regime, the sole determinant of Indonesia's 
monetary policy is inflation, whereas in Malaysia, the determinants are output gap and 
foreign interest rates. In the case of Korea and the Philippines, we find none of the 
variables - inflation, output gap, exchange rates, and foreign interest rates - are 
statistically significant. Policy makers are passive in the inner regime. 
Fourthly, in the outer regime, we find that the major determinant of all countries' 
monetary policy is inflation, although other variables such as output also playa role in 
the determination of monetary policy in Indonesia and Korea. The U.S interest rate is 
important in all countries, with the exception of Indonesia, while the exchange rate plays 
a significant role in Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Finally, in the case of Indonesia, we find that the long long-run response of 
interest rates to inflation in the inner and outer regime are statistically significant and 
positive, suggesting that the central bank pursued a point target rather than a target range, 
while in the case of the other three countries, we find that the long-run response of 
interest rates to inflation only statistically significant and positive in the outer regime. 
suggesting that these central banks pursued a target range rather than a point target. Our 
results provide evidence that policymakers may have been attempting to keep inflation 
within the range of 1.2% to 8.1% in Korea, 5.1% to 9.2% in the Philippines. and 2.7% to 
3.5% in Malaysia, rather than pursuing a point inflation target. 
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Table 4.1 Linearity Test 
~ d LM [p-\'alue] 
Indonesia 1 3 18.4016[.00'"'1* * * 
Korea 1 / 30.1655[.000]*** 
Philippines / 4 37.5432 [.000]* * * 
Malaysia 1 3 21.1826[.001]*** 
Sole: The Tahle reports the F-scores (~lthe L\llest in equation (-1.1): XUl11her.\ in S£ll/(/I"(' 
hrackets ore the prohahility l'alw!s qlthe test slalistics: the ·\lIlh'r.\crip/ ***/**1* deno/e 
statistical sign(jicance at the 1% 5% 10% level re.'pecti\'e~r. 
:':'7 
e ua ra IC oglstic Function 
Table 4.2. The Non-Linear Monetary Policy Response Using 
Th Q d fL' 
Indonesia Korea Philippines I\lala) ~ia 
Sample 1993( 1) - 2005(2) 1984(1) - 2005(2) 1988( I) - 2005(2) 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient 
1988( I ) - 2005( 2) 
Std. Error Coetlicient Std. Errnr 
(i) (i i) 
Inner regime 
(i ii) (i\) 
c 0.040 0.0182** 0.306 0.163* 0.008 0.009 -0.012 O.OO!~ 
r I_I 0.276 0.1463* 0.942 0.107*** 1.064 0.090*** 
r 0.465 0.193** lr I I 
(y-y*) I-I 0.296 0.0"'8*** 
·r /' 1_7 0.523 0.080*** 
Outer regime 
c -1.194 1.532 -1.276 1.376 O'()66 0.019*** 0.005 0.00'" 
r I_I -0.734 0.179*** 
.' 0.663 0.210*** 1.040 0.497** lr I ! 
(lr-lr) r I " 0.619 0.168*** 
(lr-lr) r I 8 0.302 0.147** 
(y-y*) 1-4 1.919 0.621 *** 
(y-y*) I II 1.042 0.612* 
(q-q*) 1-7 1.704 0.704** 0.232 0.073*** 
;f 1-] 0.685 0.3579* 
-/ 
I 1-7 0.242 0.134* 
r' I 8 2.505 1.382* 
(f 2.097 0.841 ** 4.489 7.084 -95.710 558.100 85.220 1'()20.000 
7t
1l 0.255 0.018*** 0.087 0.003*** 0.092 0.006*** 0.035 0.007*** 
7tL -0.080 0.026*** 0.012 0.004*** 0.057 0.001*** 0.027 0.001 *** 
R.S.E 0.0180053 0.0057438 0.016585 0.0060413 
DW 2.32 1.72 1.76 1.74 
F -statiCh jI'2 F -statiChil\2 F-statiChil\2 F -statiCh il\2 
AR 1.553 [0.23051 1.932 [0.1064] 1.028 [0.4053] 1.391 [0.2572 
ARCH 0.490 [0.6935] 0.431 [0.785 J] 0.278 0.88991 0.987 [0.4293 
Normality 1.285 [0.5260] 1.436 [0.48781 1.898 0.3870] 1.788 [0.4091 
Hetero 31.718 [0.2862] 0.732 rO.78621 0.215 0.99971 0.690 [0.7824] 
Chil\2 Chil\2 Chil\2 Chi"2 
Test: r II +r L 31.612 [0.00001 2514.7 [0.00001 691.25 rO.00001 14019 [0.00(0) 
Test: r U -r L: 216.12 [0.00001 113.2 [0.00001 26.279 rO.00001 283.29 [0.0000 J 
Test: 
rU+rL=O & 
216.12 rO.00001 3.684.50 rO.00001 4.990.30 10.00001 15.513 [0.0000 tll_tL=Q 
Notes: The F-test and Chi-square statistics for the null hypothesis of valid over identifymg restriction ... are 
rejected The superscript ***/**/* denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is =ero 
at the /%15%//0% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.3: Linear Model Modified for Size Effect 
Indonesia Korea Philippine s Malaysia 
Sample 1993Q 1- 2005Q2 1984Ql- 2005Q2 1988Q 1- 2005Q2 1988Q 1- 2005Q2 
Coefficient Std. Error Co efficient Std. Error C oe fficient Std. Error Co efficient Std. Error 
c 0.0553 0.0200*** -0.0050 0.0059 0.0060 0.0055 0.0031 0.0029 
't-1 0.4084 0.1736** 0.7515 0.0747*** 0.3592 0.0899*** 0.7057 0.0803*** 
(11-11*) -0.7663 0.3905* 1.2446 0.5123** 0.6392 0.1248*** 1.0370 0.3025*** 
{11-11*):2 1. 6383 0.7504** -37.4199 18.4719** 4.4623 1.7420** -0.9035 16.6784 
(y-yj 1.1405 0.3867*** 0.0868 0.2945 0.2995 0.2286 0.2778 0.1444** 
q* 0.3865 0.0868*** 0.1947 0.1199 0.1801 0.0600*** 0.1028 0.0500*** 
,f 2.3449 0.8818** 1. 6859 0.5842*** -11.6100 0.2967 -0.3624 0.2072* 
Reg. SE 0.0488 0.0167 0.0192 0.0056 
Statistic Pro b ability Statistic Pro b ability Statistic Pro b ability Statistic Pro b ability 
F-test for 
inflation size 4.715158 0.0354** 4.1038 0.0466** 6.5618 0.0132** 0.0029 0.9570 
effects 
Chi-square 
for inflation 4.71568 0.0290** 4.1038 0.0428** 6.5618 0.0104** 0.0029 0.9568 
size effe cts 
Notes: The F-test and Chi-square statisticsfor the null hypothesis of valid over identi.tYing restrictions are rejected. 
The supeTSCTJpt * * */**/* denote the rejech'on of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 %15%11 0% 
signijicance levels, Tespech·vely. 
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Table 4.4: Linear Model Modified for Sign Effect 
Indonesia Korea Philippine s Malaysia 
Sample 1993Q 1- 2005Q2 1984Q 1- 2005Q2 1988Ql- 2oo5Q2 1988Q 1- 2oo5Q2 
Coefficient Std. Error C oe fficient Std. Error Co efficient Std. Error Co efficient Std. EtTOr 
c 0.0102 0.0113 0.0128 0.0051 ** 0.0297 0.0102*** 0.0129 0.0053*** 
't-1 0.3333 0.1968* 0.7263 0.0769*** 0.3657 0.0895*** 0.7892 0.0846*** 
(11-I1*)+ 0.1385 0.1836 -0.3795 0.6128 1.1231 0.1786*** -0.5783 0.6329 
(11-I1*)- -1.6491 0.7101** 2.4992 0.9865** 0.2140 0.2323 2.2281 1.1845** 
(y-yj 1.3000 0.3669*** 0.0805 0.2537 0.2956 0.2404 0.2639 0.2219 
q* 0.3430 0.0729*** 0.1874 0.1089* 0.1891 0.0604*** 0.1473 0.0824* 
,f 1.7269 0.8369** 1. 5464 0.5125*** 0.0140 0.2699 -0.5664 0.4223 
Reg. SE 0.0492 0.0168 0.0192 0.0062 
Statistic Pro b ability Statistic Pro b ability Statistic Pro b ability Statistic Pro b ability 
F-test for 
inflation 5.4810 0.0247** 4.2284 0.0435** 7.7030 0.0076*** 3.1497 0.0818* 
sign eft'e cts 
Chi-square 
for inflation 5.4810 0.0192** 4.2284 0.0398** 7.7030 0.0055*** 3.1497 0.0759* 
sign eft'e cts 
Notes: The F-test and Chi-square statisticsjor the nullhypothesis ojvalid over idennlYing restricn·ons are rejected. 
The su.pcr5Cript ......... , ...... , ... denote the relecn·on ojthe null11ypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 g,n;5g,n;1 0% 
si gmjfcance levels. respecn·l1ely. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we conclude the thesis by detailing what has been achieved 
throughout the course of this research. In our research we studied and modelled exchange 
rates and monetary policy in four emerging Asian economies, namely Indonesia. Korea. 
the Philippines, and Malaysia using non-linear econometric approach. We will briefly 
discuss the results and the implications of our main findings. 
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In the first part of our thesis, chapter I and chapter 2, we examined the US dollar 
nominal and real exchange rates of these countries, respectively, for the period during 
which they implemented a policy of managed exchange rate floating. Over the past three 
decades, the currencies of all four countries have experienced a prolonged nominal and 
real depreciation against the US dollar. In particular, during the tinancial crisis of 
1997/98, the nom inal and the real exchange rate depreciated and appear to be non-
stationary. This evidence cannot be explained by the benchmark model of nominal and 
real exchange rate determination, Purchasing Power Parity CPPP), which predicts a 
constant real exchange rate or a cointegrated nominal exchange rate with domestic and 
foreign price levels. We modelled equilibrium exchange rates using a general behavioural 
specification consistent with a variety of theoretical approaches; and short-run dynamics 
using a general non-linear adjustment model. 
Our econometric analysis yields a number of interesting results. Firstly, in all 
countries examined, equilibrium exchange rates are a function of permanent relative 
output and one or more variables from domestic and foreign price levels, nominal and 
real interest rate differentials, the level of and changes in net foreign assets, and a time 
trend. These results imply that individual countries present significant elements of 
idiosyncratic behaviour, casting doubt on empirical models using panel-data techniques. 
The behaviour of nominal exchange rate differs from that of real exchange rates in that 
the latter takes into account the deterministic time trend in its long-run model but 
excludes domestic and foreign prices. 
Secondly, we found strong evidence of non-linear exchange rate adjustment. with 
exchange rates following a random walk pattern when currency misalignment is small. 
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but converging to their equilibrium level fast when misalignment is larne Furthe 
. e . rmore. 
we found in Indonesia and Malaysia that the reversion to real exchange rate equilibrium 
is a function of the sign of the misalignment term. In contrast to !he results in modellin u 
eo 
nominal exchange rates in that asymmetric adjustment only in the case of Indonesia. 
These results suggest that the evidence in favour of sign misalignment etTects in 
exchange rate behaviour is not as strong as that in favour of size effects. 
Thirdly, our findings suggest that the currency devaluations that took place in 
1997-98 were entirely justified by economic fundamentals, as prior to the financial crisis 
that hit the region, the exchange rates of all four countries, especially the one of 
Indonesia, were significantly overvalued against the US dollar. 
In the second part of this thesis, we examined monetary policy in these four 
economies. In Chapter 3, we examined monetary policy reaction function in four Asian 
countries, namely Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines, based on an o!Jen 
economy augmented Taylor rule including the real exchange rate (level or difference 
from its trend) and the foreign interest rate (nominal or real). Using more recent quarterly 
data, we reach major findings as follows. 
Firstly, the real interest rate reacts positively and significantly to inflation, the 
output gap, the exchange rate, and the foreign interest rate. Secondly, we find that the 
timing of the impact sometimes differs considerably. According to our findings, 
monetary policy conducted by central banks of Indonesia and Korea is essentially a 
combination of forward and backward-looking, while policy of central bank of the 
Philippines is composite looking between forward and contemporaneous looking. In the 
case of Malaysia, monetary policy is essentially forward-looking. Surprisingly, we do not 
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find any central bank considering purely backward-looking or contemporaneous 
specifications. 
Thirdly, we find the initial adjustment in interest rates varies bet\\een ~60 0 and 
75%. Fourthly, we find that it is an aggressive response of monetary policy. \\ hich has 
played a more important role in Asia since the financial crises of 1997-98 rather than. as 
claimed in the literature, the fiscal policy. 
Fifthly, we find that, only in Indonesia, does the central bank appear to be less 
sensitive to inflation, though it has indeed been stabilizing the output gap by and large 
through its key policy rate. This quantitative evidence supports the fact that the central 
bank's main task is not to achieve price stability during period of observations. 
Sixthly, with the exception of Korea and Malaysia, the foreign interest rate is 
more influential in explaining the variance of the interest rate than other endogenous 
variables, suggesting that the major focus of the monetary policy in these countries is to 
consider foreign interest rates. 
However, there have been a number of studies challenging the assumption that the 
central bank responds in a linear fashion to inflation and output. These studies suggest 
that monetary authorities give different weights to positive and negative price pressures 
as well as economic upswings and downswings. They also imply that their response 
coefficients vary with the size of the shocks. If so, the linear monetary policy reaction 
functions based on the assumption that the loss function of the Central Bank is quadratic 
no longer appropriate. Consequently, conclusions drawn from linear policy rules may be 
misleading. For these reasons, in chapter 4, we estimate the class of models to test the 
hypothesis of asymmetric monetary policy responses to the inflation rate at Bank 
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Indonesia, Bank of Korea, Bank ng Pilipinas, and Bank Negara Malaysia. In the presence 
of such asymmetric responses, we then create a model of non-linear interest rate 
behaviour. 
We obtain a number of novel and interesting findings. Firstly. uSing a more 
formal testing approach proposed by Saikkonnen and Luukkonen (1988). Luukkonen et 
al (1988), Granger and Terasvirta (1993), Terasvirta (1994) we reject linearity. 
Secondly, our quadratic logistic function suggests that monetary authorities In 
these four emerging economies are subject to non-linear inflation effects and that t:ley 
respond more vigorously to inflation when it is further from the target. 
Thirdly, we find that within the inner regime, the sole determinant of Indonesia's 
monetary policy is inflation, whereas in Malaysia, the determinants are output gap and 
foreign interest rates. In the case of Korea and the Philippines, we find none of the 
variables - inflation, output gap, exchange rates, and foreign interest rates - are 
statistically significant. Policy makers are passive in the inner regime. 
Fourthly, in the outer regime, we find that the major determinant of all countries' 
monetary policy is inflation, although other variables such as output also playa role in 
the determination of monetary policy in Indonesia and Korea. The variable of exchange 
rates is important in models applied by Indonesia and the Philippines, while the other 
variable, namely U.S t-bill rates, also plays a significant role in the models applied by 
Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia. 
Finally, in the case of Indonesia, we find that the long long-run response of 
interest rates to inflation in the inner and outer regime are statistically significant and 
positive, suggesting that the central bank pursued a point target rather than a target range. 
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while in the case of the other three countries we find that the long run t' 
. .... - respons~ 0 
interest rates to inflation only statistically significant and positive in the outer regime, 
suggesting that these central banks pursued a target range rather than a point target. Our 
results provide evidence that policymakers may have been attempting to keep intlation 
within the range of 1.20/0 to 8.7% in Korea, 5.7% to 9.2% in the Philippines. and 2.7% to 
3.5% in Malaysia, rather than pursuing a point inflation target as found in the case of 
Indonesia. 
In conclusion this thesis provides strong evidence that exchange rates and 
monetary policy in four emerging Asian economies present non linear behaviour. These 
studies suggest that these monetary authorities should consider to model exchange rates 
and monetary policy reaction functions using non-linear approach. 
However, there are some more issues need to discuss. These include link between 
real and nominal exchange rate, possible on reliability on the data we use. the relationship 
between our non-linear model and earlier analysis such as Miller-Orr SS model and the 
possibility that our estimation procedure has induced serial correlation in the residuals. 
On the first of these, the relationship between the model of nominal and real 
exchange rate. Our econometric analysis in modeling exchange rate, in particular in the 
case of Malaysia, yields an interesting result in that all variables determining the nominal 
exchange rate model discussed in chapter I also play similar roles when modelling real 
exchange rate behaviour discussed in chapter 2. These include permanent relative output. 
real interest rate differentials, the level of and changes in net foreign assets. The only 
distinction between the nominal exchange rate model, as shown in Table 1.4. and the real 
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one, as shown in Table 2.2, is the latter' positive sign for real net foreign assets. \\hile \\e 
find a negative sign when modelling nominal exchange rate behaviour. 
In relation to the above, a new empirical finding. also observed in the case of 
nominal exchange rates, is that the relationship between real exchange rates on the one 
hand and real net foreign assets and/or current account balances on the other may be non-
monotonic, depending upon the sign of net foreign assets and the current account 
balance. For instance, in the case of Korea, our robust real exchange rate model presents 
a positive sign for the changes in real net foreign liabilities. while in the case of the 
Philippines we find a negative sign. 
On the one hand our results seems to support the argument that the results of 
Table 1.4 show support for the homogeneity of relative prices in the case of Malaysia. 
which explains why there is no difference in the estimates for the real exchange rate in 
table 2.2. On the other hand, we differ from that argument in that our nominal exchallge 
rate model, as shown in Table lA, gives a negative sign for real net foreign assets. while 
in the real one, as shown in Table 2.2, gives positive sign. These results suggest that the 
relationship between exchange rates, nominal and real term, on the one hand and real net 
foreign assets and/or current account balances on the other may be non-monotonic. 
depending upon the sign of net foreign assets and the current account balance. 
Similar non-monotonic results are obtained in the case of South Korea. where the 
link is even more complex with the exchange rate depreciating when the change in real 
net foreign assets increases and appreciating when net foreign liabilities increase. These 
findings reaffirm the ambiguity of the nature of the link between exchange rates on the 
one hand and current account/real assets' accumulation on the other, but add an extra 
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element to it, as they suggest that the nature of the link may differ not only across 
countries, but also within the same country, depending on the sign of the current account 
balance and the net foreign assets' position (surplus/deficit. net assets/net liabilities). 
Providing a theoretical explanation for this ambiguity exceeds the scope of an empirical 
study such as the present one; however our empirical findings can motivate theoretical 
work rationalizing and formalizing the non-monotonic link identified here. 
A possible criticism of our approach is that if the price variable is independent of 
the error, simply subtracting relative price from the nominal exchange rate will give the 
real exchange rate and the results of Table 2.2 could be got from simply re-
parameterising Table 1.4. In fact, as said above, although all variables determining the 
nominal exchange rate model discussed in chapter ] also play similar roles when 
modelling real exchange rate behaviour discussed in chapter 2. we find distinction 
between the nominal exchange rate model, as shown in Table 1.4. and the real one. as 
shown in Table 2.2, in particular the latter' positive sign for real net foreign assets, while 
we find a negative sign when modelling nominal exchange rate behaviour. Therefore. it 
is not true to claim that the results of Table 2.2 are obtained simply by re-parameterising 
Table] .4. 
In addition, the cointegration ADF tests reported at the end of Table ].4 suggest 
that three out of four equations are clearly cointegrated at the 5 per cent level or better. 
which ensures that the findings discussed above are not reflecting spurious correlation 
among the variables involved. For the remaining equation (Malaysia), the cointegration 
test is less clear, with the ADF score being significant only at the ] 0 per cent level. This 
ambiguity may reflect the low-power of the ADF test and/or the existence of non-linear 
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cointegration. Compare these results with the results in chapter 2. in particular as shO\\ n 
in Table 2.2, in that the reported ADF tests suggest that all equations. including Mala\sia. 
are clearly cointegrated. These empirical results also cast doubt critics upon the potential 
problem of misspecification of the equilibrium exchange rate and the problems it poses 
for the identification of a non-linear system. 
Moreover, the reported equations are generally well-specified. with their 
explanatory power being rather mixed. Nonetheless, in the case of Malaysia. the real 
exchange rate model fits the data better than that of the nominal exchange rate one in that 
the former' coefficient of determinations show relatively higher values. In the case of 
Indonesia, we find that the R-squares in real and nominal exchange rate models are 
similar (0.98), indicating that we have accounted for almost all of the variability with the 
variables specified in these models. 
However, it would be beneficial to have further work that exploring the use of 
Monte-Carlo to evaluate the potential of type 2 errors conditional on a misspecified 
model of the equilibrium exchange rate in order to provide robust conclusion and support 
findings in this thesis. 
Secondly, considering the possible reliability on the data, our results are valid and 
provide no evidence that the data are suspect. Tables 1.7 and 2.5 present estimates of 
non-linear error correction equations for nominal and real exchange rates, respectively. 
We report estimates of parsimonious models obtained using a general-to-specific 
specification starting with 16 lags and gradually reducing the model so that it only 
includes statistically significant terms and give a more parsimonious representation. Our 
estimates of exchange rates present relatively long lags. For instance in the inner regime 
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in the case of Indonesia our model for nonlinear real exchange rates depend on the 
fifteenth lags of dependent variable (the first difference of observed real exchange rates). 
This situation is also found by Arghyrou, Boinet, and Martin (2004) in the case of ti\e 
Central European Economies that recently joined the EU in that the linear error 
correction model in these countries is the function of twelve lags of its explanatory 
variables. In our case, the results of long lags response in explanatorv variables may 
. . 
reflect the long period of time needed to construct and revise the data. This may have 
affected our results. A source of data other than datastream may be worth considering 
since datastream data may not be automatically updated when the source data is updated. 
As a result, in modelling exchange rates, we may have been !ed to use an improper 
equilibrium model and the test of linearity may be misleading. However, we do not find 
this problem as we are sure about the accuracy of our data taken from data stream. In 
addition, our models include as many lagged differences as was necessary for the 
elimination of serial correlation. Our models are proved to be generally well-specified. 
To summarise, our empirical findings suggest that over the past three decades 
nominal exchange rates in all four Asian economies examined by our analysis have been 
influenced by both monetary and output shocks and, at different degrees and ways, by 
factors such as nominal and real interest rate differentials, foreign assets' accumulation 
and changes in current account balances. These, combined with the fact that the exchange 
rate effects of changes in relat ive output differs across coulltries, leads us to the 
conclusion that the exchange rates of the four Asian economies we examine presents 
similarities but, at the same time, strong elements of idiosyncratic behaviour. 
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Thirdly, there is an issue considering Miller-Orr SS model as a precursor of the 
inner and outer non-linear model employed in the thesis. This model deals \\ ith cash 
balance (inflows and outflows) that change on a daily basis because most firms don't use 
their cash flows uniformly and also cannot predict their daily cash inflows and outtlo\\s. 
The assumption made here is that the net cash flows are normally distributed \\ ith a zero 
value of mean and a constant standard deviation. The Miller-Orr Model helps tirms in 
managing their cash balance by allowing daily cash flow variation \vithin the IOlver and 
upper limits. 
The Miller-Orr Model provides a formula for determining the optimum/target 
cash balance or return point, the point at which to sell securities to raise cash (lower 
control limit) and when to invest excess cash by buying securities and lowering cash 
holdings (upper control limit). This depends on transaction costs of buying or selling 
securities, variability of daily cash (incorporates uncertainty), and return on short-term 
investments. 
As long as the cash balance remains within the control limits the firm will make 
no transaction, The firm allows the cash balance to fluctuate between the upper control 
limit and the lower control limit, making a purchase and sale of marketable securities 
only when one of these limits is reached. 
The lower control limits for the cash balance can be related to a minimum safety 
margin or its desired minimum "safety stock" of cash in hand decided by management. It 
implies that the lower control limit can be set according to the firm's liquidity 
requirement. 
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To use the Miller-Orr model, the firm should also determine an interest rate for 
marketable securities, a fixed transaction cost for buying and selling marketable 
securities, and the standard deviation of its daily cash flows. To determine the standard 
deviation of net cash flows the pasty data of the net cash flow behaviour can be used. 
Managerial attention is needed only if the cash balance deviates fr~m the limits. 
The upper control limits and return path are then calculated by the Miller-Orr 
Model as follows: 
The spread/distance between the lower control limits and the upper control limits IS 
computed as: 
S d 3( 
3 Transaction cost x Variance of cash flow J prea = J-X 
4 Daily interest rate (5.1 ) 
The return point is computed as: 
Return point = Lower limit + (spread/3) (5.2) 
The upper control limit is computed as: 
Upper Limit = Lower Limit + Spread (5.3) 
The upper control limit is specified by Miller-Orr to be three times above the 
lower control limits and the return point lies between the upper and lower limits. 
As shown in the following Figure 5.1, under the model, when the firm's cash in 
hand fluctuates at random and touches the upper limit, the firm buys sufficient 
marketable securities to come back to a normal level of cash balance (the return point). In 
other words. when cash reaches an upper limit, it's invested. Similarly, when the firm's 
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cash flows wander and touch the lower limit. it sells sufficient k bl .. mar eta e seCUrities to 
bring the cash balance back to the normal level (the return pOI'nt) I th d 
. n 0 er \\ or s. \\ hen 
cash reaches a lower limit, investments are sold to raise cash. 
Figure 5.1 Miller-Orr Model 
_. I;~ ~er limit 
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The upper control limit and lower control limit will be far off from each other 
whenever the transaction cost increases or cash flows shows greater variation. On the 
other hand, the limits will come closer whenever the interest rate increases. 
However, our QL-STECl'v1 model differs from the Miller-Orr model in that the 
former model allows the speed of adjustment to equilibrium to be a function of both the 
size and the sign of misalignment term, whereas the Miller-Orr model does not. 
Unlike on the Miller-Orr SS model, on the QL-STECM, the lower and upper 
limits, along with equilibrium, are determined by the data rather than being set by the 
investigator. 
lIS See http://21O.21O.18.II4IEnlightenmentorAreasifinancelCFAlmiller.htm 
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Our QL-STECM models exchange rate changes as a weighted average of the 
linear adjustment models of the inner regime, in which misalignment is small, and the 
outer regime, where misalignment is larger, whereas Miller-Orr SS model considers onl\ 
fluctuation within the band (inner regime only). This suggests that the QL-STECI\1 
regards that fluctuation may not only happen in the inner regime (within the bands) but 
also in the outer regime (beyond the limits). In other words, In Miller-Orr model, 
variation can only occur in the inner regime, whereas in QL-STECM model, it can be in 
the outer regime. This implies that QL-STECM model can estimate what variables are 
important in the inner regime and/or in the outer regime. The case was not found when 
using Miller-Orr model. 
Fourthly, there is an issue of inducing serial correlation in that sometimes serial 
correlation may be induced as a result of using actual leading values for expected leading 
values in econometric estimation. For instance, the expectation of inflation becomes 
problematic if there is a correlation between this expected price increase and the actual 
change in prices. The problem of serial correlation in the residuals could also be appeared 
as a result of using leads and lags in the model. However, our results in chapter 3 provide 
evidence against these potential problems. 
Nonetheless. if there are concerns about whether our residuals have serial 
correlation because of the use of leads and lags in the model, for further work. we may 
follow Bardsley and Olekalns (1999) and Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994). in 
applying a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator with lags and/or leads of our 
variables as our instruments. For reference, Bardsley and Olekalns describe the 
relationship between consumption and price in that, "Prices are suitable instruments in 
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this context since the optimal consumption in any period depends on the past histor~ and 
expected future course of prices" (p. 233). They suggest adopting a 2SLS model in order 
to resolve any problems of serial correlation. Although we did not find any problems of 
serial correlation in chapter 3 and 4, in further work, we might consider using this 2SLS 
model to extend our augmented Taylor rule analysis. 
Finally, we might also discuss the use of calibrated model. It is often implicitly 
assumed that once a model has been carefully calibrated to reproduce previoush 
observed behaviour, then it will have some level of predictive capability. although this 
may be limited. In further work, we might use our calibrated linear and non-linear models 
to generate data and compare these to the properties of real data as an alternative 
methodology for testing non-linearity. If our model does not have predictive capability, 
then the model may need to be improved in some way. 
Our work can be extended in several ways. In the empirical level, we could use 
our empirical methodology to study the dynamics of nominal and real exchange rates as 
well as monetary policy reaction functions in other sets of countries and determine 
whether the asymmetric or non-linear dynamics identified in the Asian economies 
examined by our analysis are a common future of exchange rate and accordingly 
monetary policy reaction functions behaviour. In the theoretical level. we can use the 
empirical findings of our study such as, firstly, to motivate a theoretical model of non-
linear exchange rate behaviour based on asymmetric policy preferences and. secondly. to 
establish a formal non-monotonic link between the current account and the real exchange 
rate. 
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With respect to monetary policy reaction functions, in particular. this research can 
also be expanded in numerous approaches. As the results show that the intlation did not 
justify as much variation in the real interest rate as we had expected, it may be possible to 
restructure this variable differently. Otherwise, it would also be interesting to take into 
account other monetary pol icy variables such as the stock price~ and monetary base in 
empirical work. 
Furthermore, it is also more challenging to develop an empirical work tm'-'ard a 
formal model of non-linear monetary reaction functions relating to the output gap. \\ hich 
allows for size and sign output gap effects, i.e. different monetary policy reaction to small 
and large deviations from potential output as well as different respond to positive and 
negative values of the output gap, suggesting different reaction of monetary policy during 
periods of high and low aggregate demand relative to potential output. If do so. it would 
provide a clearer theoretical grounding for empirical work in this area. 
246 
REFERENCES 
Ab uaf, N. and Jori on, P. (I 990);'Purchas ing Power Parity in the Long Rub; ' The Journal 
of Finance, vo l. 45, pp. 157-174. 
Adam , C., Cobham, D., Girardin, E. (2005), "Monetary Frame,vorks and Institutional 
Constraints: UK Monetary Policy Reaction Funct ions, 1985-2003", Oxford 
Bu ll etin of Economics and Stat istics, 67, 497-516 . 
Affandi. Y (2002), "The Opt imal Monetary Policy Instruments: The Case of Indones ia," 
Bulet in Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan , 5(3), pp. 57-74. 
_ _ __ (2004). "Estimating Monetary Policy Rule in Post Cri s is Indon esia," 
November 2004, unpubli shed. 
Ahmad, Y and Glosser, S. (2006),"Search ing for Non-linea rity in Real Exchange Rates," 
Un iversity of Wisconsin Whitewater. 
Ajayi R. and Karemera D. (1996), "A variance ratio test of random wa lks in exchange 
rates: Ev idence from Pacific Bas in econom ies," Pacific Basin Finance .fournal 
vo l. 4, pp. 77-9 1. 
Alamsyah, H., Agung, J .. Budiman, A .. and Affandi. Y., (2003), "Perubahan Stru ktural 
dan Kebijakan Moneter Pasca Krisis [Structural Changes and Monetary Policy in 
the Aftermath of Cri sis]," Paper submitted to the XV Confe rence of Indonesian 
Economist Association , Ma lang, Indones ia. 
247 
Alamsyah H., Joseph C., Agung and Doddy Zulverdyn (2001). "Towards Implementation 
of Inflation Targeting in Indonesia", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. 
Vol. 37, No.3, pp. 309-24, Bank Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Alexius, A (2000), "Supply shocks and real exchange rates," Sveriges Riksbank 
Alexius, A. (200 I), "Uncovered interest parity revisited", Review of International 
Economics 9, 505-517. 
Allen, William A. (2000), 'Some Aspects of Inflation Targeting,' in Charles Joseph and 
Anton H. Gunawan (eds), Monetary and Inflation Targeting in Emerging 
Economies, Proceedings of an International Conference organised by BI and the 
IMF, Bank Indonesia, Jakarta. 
Allsopp L. and Zurbruegg R. (2004), "Purchasing Power Parity and the impact of the 
East Asian currency crisis", Journal ~lAsian Economies vol. 15, pp. 739-758. 
Almekinders, GJ. and Eijffinger, S. (1996),"A friction model of daily Bundesbank and 
Federal Reserve intervention", Journal of Banking and Finance, 20, 1365-1380. 
Arghyrou M., Martin C., Milas C. (2003), "Non-linear Inflationary Dynamics: Evidence 
from the UK," Brunei University Working Paper. 
Arghyrou, Michael G. (2004), "The Cost of Joining the EMU: Testing the compatibility 
of European and Greek Monetary Policies Using Linear an Non-linear Policy 
Reaction Functions," A Macroeconomic Study Prepared for The Centre of 
Planning and Economic Research (KEPE), The Ministry of National Economy of 
the Hellenic Republic, Greece. 
248 
Arghyrou M., Boinet V. and Martin C (2005), "Non-linear and non-symmetric exchange-
rate adjustment: evidence from medium- and high inflation countries". The 
Journal of Economics and Finance, forthcoming. 
Ariff, Mohamed. (1991), "The Pacific Economy: Growth and External Stability:' North 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd. 
Baharumshah A.Z., Lau E. and Sen L.K (2002), "Nonlinear adjustment to purchasing 
power parity: empirical evidence from Asian exchange rates," Proceedings of 
Asian Pacific Economics and Business Conference 2002, Malaysia, University 
Putra Malaysia Press, pp. 902-910. 
Bahmani-Oskooee M (1992) A time-series approach to test the productivity bias 
hypothesis in purchasing power parity. Kyklos 45:227-236 
Bahmani-Oskooee M, Rhee H-J (1996), "Time-series support for Balassa's productivity-
bias hypothesis: Evidence from Korea," Review of International Economics 
4:364-370. 
Balassa B. (1964), "The purchasing power parity doctrine: A reappraisal," Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 72, pp. 584-596. 
Balke, N. and Fomby, T. (1997),"Threshold cointegration'" International Economic 
Review, 38, pp. 627-645. 
Ball, Laurence (1999), "Policy Rules for Open Economies," in John B. Taylor (Ed.) 
Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press. 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (2002): Annual Report, Manila, Philippines. 
Bank Indonesia (2000), The 1999 Annual Report, Jakarta, Indonesia. 
249 
Bank Negara Malaysia (2001 ), Annual Report 2000, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
Bank of Korea (2003): Monetary policy in Korea, Seoul. 
Barro, RJ. and Gordon, D.B. (1983), 'A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy In a 
Natural Rate Model', Journal of Political Economy. 9 I. 589-610. 
Barro R. and Gordon D. (1983), "Rules, Discretion, and Reputation In a Model of 
Monetary Policy," Jurnal of Monetary Economic 12, pp. 101-22 
Barro, Robert J and David B Gordon (1983), "A positive theory of monetary policy in a 
natural rate model", Journal of Political Economy, 91, pp 589-610. 
Batini, Nicolleta, Richard Harrison and Stephen Millard (2000), "Monetary Policy Rules 
for Open Economies," Bank of England Working Paper, September. 
Batini, Nicoletta & Nelson, Edward (2000), "Optimal Horizons for Inflation Targeting," 
Working Paper Series 103, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden). 
Baum C.F., Barkoulas J.T. and Caglayan M. (2001), "Non-linear adjustment to 
purchasing power parity in the post-Bretton Woods era," Journal of International 
Money and Finance, Vol. 20, pp. 379-399. 
Bautista R.M. (1987),"Multisectoral Analysis of Trade Liberalization:The Philippines, 
1978," Philippine Economic Journal 26. 
Bec, F., Salem, M.B. and Collard, F. (2002), 'Asymmetries in Monetary Policy Reaction 
Function: Evidence for US, French, and German Central Banks', Studies in Non-
Linear Dynamics and Econometrics, 6, 1-21. 
250 
Bekaert G., Erb C.B., Harvey C.R. and Viskanta T.E. (1998), "Distributional 
characteristics of emerging market returns and asset allocation". Journal ol 
Por([olio Management, Winter, pp. 102-116. 
Benninga S. and Protopapadakis A.A. (1988), "The equilibrium pricing of exchange rates 
and assets when trade takes time," Journal ol International Monev and Finance 
. . ' 
Vol. 7, pp. 129-149. 
Bergman, U. Michael and Hansson, Jesper (2000), "Real Exchange Rates and Switching 
Regimes" Lund University, Economics Working Paper No. 1999:4. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=292805 or 001: 10.2139/ssrn.292805 
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler (1995), "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of 
Monetary Policy Transmission," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), Fall 
1995, pp. 27-48. 
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler (1999), "Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility," 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 84(4), Fourth Quarter 
1999, pp. 17-51. 
Bharucha, N. and C. Kent (1998), "Inflation Targeting in a Small Open Economy", 
Discussion Paper No. 1998-07, Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Bird, G. and R. Rajan (2002). "Optimal Currency Baskets and the Third Currency 
Phenomenon: Exchange Rate Policy in Southeast Asia", Journal of International 
Development, 14, pp.1 053-1 073. 
251 
Bird, G. and R. Rajan (2004). "Does Devaluation Lead to Economic Recovery or 
Economic Contraction?: Examining the Analytical Issues with Reference to 
Thailand", Journal of International Development, 16 (2), 2004, pp.141-156. 
Bleany, L. and Laxton, D. (1999), "Real Interest Rates and Real Exchange Rates 
Evidence from Indexed Bonds," Computing in Economics and Finance. 942, 
Society for Computational Economics. 
Blinder, A.S. (1998), Central Banking in Theory and Practice. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
Boediono (1998), "Merenungkan Kembali Transmisi Kebijakan Moneter di Indonesia 
[Revisiting the Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Indonesia]," Buletin 
Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, 1 (1), pp. 1-4. in Alamsyah H., Charles Joseph, 
Juda Agung and Doddy Zulverdy, "Towards Implementation of Inflation 
Targeting in Indonesia", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 37, No.3, 
2001: 309-24, Bank Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia. 
Boorman, J., T. Lane, M. Schultze-Ghattas, A. Bulir, A. Ghosh, J. Hamann, A. 
Mourmouras and S. Phillips (2000),"Managing Financial Crises: The Experience 
in East Asia", Working Paper No.OO/l 07, IMF. 
Boughton J. M. (1987), "Tests of the Performance of Reduced-Form Exchange Rate 
Models", Journal of International Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 41-56. 
Branson W.H. (1983), "Macroeconomic determinants of real exchange risk", in Herring 
RJ. (ed.), Managing Foreign Exchange Risk. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
252 
Bruinshoofd, W.A. and B. Candelon (2005). '"Nonlinear Monetary Policy In Europe: 
Myth or Fact?", Economics Letters, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 399-403 
Bullard, James B. and Eric Schaling (2002), '"Why the Fed Should Ignore the Stock 
Market?" Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. 84(2), March-April 2002. 
pp.35-41. 
Calvo, G.A. and Reinhart C.M (2000)," Fear of Floating," NBER Working Paper No. 
W7993 
Campbell, J. Y. and Clarida, R. H. (1987). 'The Dollar and Real Interest Rates" 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 27, pp. 103-140. 
Canjels, Eugene, Gauri Prakash-Canjels and Alan M. Taylor (2004),"Measuring Market 
Integration: Foreign Exchange Arbitrage and the Gold Standard, 1879-1913," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 86:4. 
Canzoneri M., Cumby, R. and Diba, B. (1999), "Relative labor productivity and the real 
exchange rate in the long-run: evidence for a panel of OECD countries," Journal 
of International Economics, Vol. 47, pp. 245-266. 
Caporale G.M. and Spagnolo N. (2004), "Modelling East Asian exchange rates: a 
Markov-switching approach" Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 14, pp. 233-242. 
Cargill. Thomas F. (2001), "Central Bank Independence in Korea," Journal of the Korean 
Economy, 2(1). Spring 2001, pp. 1-33. 
Cassel. Gustav (1921 ),"The World's Monetary Problem", New York, E.P. Dutton, and 
Co. 
253 
Cavallo, M. and Ghironi, F. (2002), "Net Foreign Assets and the Exchange Rate: Redux 
Revived," Economics Department Working Papers, Boston College. 
Cecchetti, Stephen G., and Michael Ehrmann (1999), . Does Inflation Targeting Increase 
Output Volatility? An International Comparison of Policymakers' Preferences and 
Outcomes', NBER Working Paper No. W7426, Cambridge MA. 
Cerrato, Mario and Nick Sarantis (2006), "Nonlinear Mean Reversion in Real Exchange 
Rates: Evidence from Developing and Emerging Market Economies." Economics 
Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 6(7), pages 1-14. 
Cerrato, Mario, Neil Kellard, and Nicholas Sarantis (2004), "The Purchasing Power 
Parity Persistence Paradigm: Evidence from Black Currency Markets," Money 
Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005, at 
http://repec.org/mmfc05/paper34.pdf. 
Chadha B. and Prasad E., (1997), "Real exchange rate fluctuations and the business 
cycle: Evidence from Japan", International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 44, pp. 
328-355. 
Chan, K. S. and Tong, H. (1986) On estimating thresholds in autoregressive models. 
Journal of Time Series Analysis, 7,179-90. 
Chen S. and Wu 1. (2000), "A Re-Examination of Purchasing Power Parity in Japan and 
Taiwan," Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 22, pp. 271-284. 
Cheong, Latifah Merican (2004), "Globalisation and the operation of monetary policy in 
Malaysia", BIS Paper no. 23 
254 
Cheung Y. W. and Lai K.S. (] 998), "Economic growth and stationarity of real exchange 
rates: Evidence from some fast-growing Asian countries". Pac!fic-Basin Finance 
Journal Vol. 6, pp. 6]-76. 
Chinn, Menzie and Louis Johnston (] 996), "Real Exchange Rate Levels. Productivity and 
Demand Shocks: Evidence from a Panel of]4 Countries," NBER Working Paper 
#5907. 
Chinn M. (] 997) "The Usual Suspects? Productivity and Demand Shocks and Asia-
Pacific Real Exchange Rates" NBER Working Paper 6]08. 
Chinn, M. (2000), "The Empirical Determinats of the Euro: Short and Long Run 
Perspectives", University of California, Santa Cruz, mimeo. 
Chortareas, Georgios E. and Driver, Rebecca L. (200]), "PPP and the Real Exchange 
Rate - Real Interest Rate Differential Puzzle Revisited: Evidence from Non-
Stationary Panel Data," Bank of England Working Paper No. 138. 
Chung. Chae-shick. Yang, Doo-yong and Joo, Sangyoung (2000), "Foreign Exchange 
Market Liberalization: The Case of Korea," Korea Institute for International 
Economic Policy (KIEP) 
Clarida, Richard H. and Gali, Jordi (1994), "Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations: 
How Important are Nominal Shocks?" NBER Working Pa.,er No. W4658. 
Clarida R .• Gali 1. and Gertler M. (1998), "Monetary policy rules in practice: some 
international evidence", European Economic Review Vol. 42, pp. 1033-1077 
(1999),"The science of monetary policy: a new 
Keynesian perspective", Journal of Economic Literature, 37, pp. 1661-1707. 
255 
(2000)," Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic 
stability: evidence and some theory". Quarterly Journal of Economics. 11-). pp. 
147-180. 
Coakley, J and Ana-Maria Fuertes (2001), "Bootstrap LR Tests for Sign and Amplitude 
Asymmetries," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 262. Societ\ for 
Computational Economics. 
Cochrane, J.Y. (1988), "How big is the random walk in GNP?", Journal of Political 
Economy, 96, 893-920. 
Corbae, D., and Ouliaris, S. (1988)," Cointegration and Test of Purchasing Power 
Parity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 70(3), 508-511. 
Corbo, Vittorio (2002): "Monetary policy in Latin America in the I 990s", in Norman 
Loayza and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (eds), Monetary Policy: Rules and 
Transmission Mechanisms, Central Bank of Chile, pp 117-65. 
Crespo-Cuaresma, J., J. Fidrmuc and R. MacDonald. (2003),"The Monetary Approach to 
Exchange Rates: Panel Data Evidence for Selected CEECs", Focus on Transition, 
2, Vienna: Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 138-151. 
Cukierman, Alex (2000), "Establishing a reputation for dependability by means of 
inflation targets," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 53-76, 03. 
______ (2002),"Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic 
models and objectives and what difference does it make?" Review, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 15-36. 
256 
Cukierman, A. and Gerlach, S. (2003), 'The Inflation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some 
International Evidence', Manchester School, 71, 541-65. 
Cukierman, Alex and Muscatelli, V. Anton (2002), "Do Central Banks have 
Precautionary Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability? -- Theory and 
Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 764. 
de Broeck, M. & S10k, T (2001), "Interpreting Real Exchange Rate Movements in 
Transition Countries," IMF Working Papers 01/56, International Monetary Fund. 
De Grauwe, Paul and Vansteenkiste, Isabel (2001), "Exchange Rates and Fundamentals a 
Non-Linear Relationship?" CESifo Working Paper Series No. 577. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=287677 
Dibooglu S. (1996), "Real disturbances, relative prices and purchasing power parity". 
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier. Vol. 18, pp. 69-87. 
Diebold, F. X., Husted, S., & Rush, M. (1991). Real Exchange Rates under the Gold 
Standard. Journal of Political Economy, 99(6), 1252-1271. 
Dixit A.K. (1989), "Hysterisis, Import Penetration and Exchange Rate Pass-Through," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, pp. 205-228. 
Dolado, J.1., Maria-Dolores, R. and Naveira, M. (2000), "Asymmetries in Monetary 
Policy Rules: Evidence for Four Central Banks," Centre for Economic Policy 
Research. London, Discussion Paper 2441. 
(2002),"Are monetary policy reaction 
functions asymmetric? The role of nonlinearity in the Phillips curve". mimeo. 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
257 
---------------__ (2005), 'Are Monetary Policy Reaction 
Functions Asymmetric? The Role of Non-linearity in the Phillips Curve'. 
European Economic Review, 49, 485-503. 
Dolado, J.J., Maria-Dolores, R. and Ruge-Murcia, FJ. (2004). 'Non-linear Monetary 
Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the US', Studies in Non-Linear Dynamics 
and Econometrics, 8, 1-32. 
Domenech, R., Ledo, M. and Taguas, D. (2002), "Some New Results on Interest Rate 
Rules in EMU and in the US", Journal of Economics and Business 54, 431-446. 
Dornbusch R. (1976), "Expectations and exchange rate dynamics," Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 84, pp.1161-1176. 
Dornbusch, R. and Fischer, S. (1980), "Exchange Rates and the Current Account." 
American Economic Review, Vol. 70, pp. 960-971. 
(1994). Macroeconomics. 6th edition. 
McGraw Hill. 
Duisenberg, W. F., (2001), "The EC8's monetary policy strategy and the quantitative 
definition of price stability", http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2001/html/ 
spO 11217 .en.html 
Dumas B. (1992), "Dynamic equilibrium and the real exchange rate in a spatially 
separated world," Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 5, pp. 153-180. 
---
(1994), "A Test of the International CAPM Using Business Cycles Indicators as 
Instrumental Variables," NBER Working Papers 4657, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc. 
258 
Dutta J and H Leon (2002),"Dread of Depreciation: Measurir.g Real Exchange Rate 
Interventions", IMF Working Paper WP/02/63, Washington, D.C. 
Edison, H. J. and Fisher, E.O. (1991),"A long-run view of the European monetary 
system", Journal of International Money and Finance, 10, 53-70. 
Edison HJ and Pauls BD (1993),"A re-assessment ofthe relationship between real 
exchange rates and real interest rates: 1974-1990. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 31: 165-187. 
Egert, Balazs (2000), "Exchange Rate Regime and Disinflation in the Transition: The 
Experience of the Pre-Announced Crawling Peg in Hungary" University of Paris 
X, MODEM Working Paper No. 2000-23. 
_____ (2002),"Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates in Central Europe's Transition 
Economies: Knocking on Heaven's Door," William Davidson Institute Working 
Papers Series 480, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan 
Stephen M. Ross Business School. 
Egert, Balazs and Amina Lahreche-Revil (2003),"Estimating the Fundamental 
Equilibrium Exchange Rate of Central and Eastern European Countries: The 
EMU Enlargement Perspective," Working Papers 2003-05, CEPII research center. 
Eichenbaum, M. and Evans, C. (J 995), "Some empirical evidence of the effects of shocks 
to monetary policy on exchange rates," Quarterly Journal of Economic.\ .. Vol. 
110, pp. 975-1010. 
259 
Enders, W. and B. Falk (1998), Threshold-Autoregressive, Median-Unbiased. and 
Cointegration Tests of Purchasing Power Parity, International Journal of 
Forecasting, Vol. 14, pp. 171-186. 
Enders W. and S. Dibooglu (2001), "Long Run Purchasing Power Parity with 
Asymmetric Adjustment", Southern Economic Journal Vol. 68, pp. 433-445. 
English, W.B., Nelson, W.R. and Sack, B.R. (2003), 'Interpreting the Significance of the 
Lagged Interest Rate in Estimated Monetary Policy Rules', Contributions to 
Macroeconomics, 3, 1073-89. 
Escribano A and 0 Jorda. (1999),"Improved Testing and Specification of Smooth 
Transition Autoregressive Models", In P Rothman (ed.) Nonlinear Time Series 
Analysis of Economic and Financial Data, 289-319, Kluwer Academic Press: 
Boston. 
Eusepi, Stefano (2005), "Comparing Forecast-Based and Backward-Looking Taylor 
Rules: A "Global" Analysis," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, 
no. 198 
Faruqee, H. (1995), "Long-Run Determinants of the Real Exchange Rate: A Stock-Flow 
Perspective," IMF Staff Papers 42, pp. 80-107. 
Feenstra, Robert C., and Jon D. Kendall (1997), "Pass-through of Exchange Rates and 
Purchasing Power Parity:' Journal of International Economics 43, 237-261. 
Filosa. Renato (200 I): "Monetary policy rules in some mature emerging economies", BIS 
Papers, no 8, pp 39-68, November. 
Fisher. I. (1930), "The theory of interest," Macmillan, New York. 
260 
Fischer, Stanley (1994) "Modern Central Banking," Paper prepared for the tercentenary 
of the Bank of England Central Banking Symposium. London: Bank of England. 
Frankel J. (1979), "On the Mark: A Theory of Floating Exchange Rates Based on Real 
Interest Differentials," American Economic Review, Vol. 69, pp.61 0-622. 
Frankel, Jeffrey and Andrew Rose (1994)," A survey of empirical research on nominal 
exchange rates," NBER Working Paper, 4865. 
____________ (1996), "A Panel Project on Purchasing Power Parity: 
Mean Reversion within and between Countries," Journal of International 
Economics 40 (1/2) (February): 209-224. 
Fredj. J and Youra L., "Threshold Cointegration between Stock Returns: An application 
of STECM Models," 
Frenkel J.A. (1976), "A monetary approach to the exchange rate: doctrinal aspects and 
empirical evidence", Scandinavian Journal of Economics Vol. 78, pp. 200-224. 
Frenkel, Jacob A. and Razin, Assaf (1986), "Deficits With Distortionary Taxes: 
International Dimensions" NBER Working Paper Series, Vol. w2080. 
Gagnon, Joseph E. (1996), "Net Foreign Assets and Equilibrium Exchange Rates: Panel 
Evidence," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International 
Finance Disc. Paper 574. 
Gavin, Michael (1991 ),"Terms of Trade, the Trade Balance, and Stability: The Role of 
Saving Behaviour," International Finance Discussion Papers No. 397, U.S. Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C. 
261 
Gerlach, Stefan (1999), "Who targets inflation explicitlyT'. European Economic Revie\\, 
43, pp.1257-1277. 
----- (2000),"Asymmetric Policy Reactions and Inflation", mimeo, Bank for 
International Settlements. 
Gerlach, S. and Schnabel, G. (2000), "The Taylor Rule and Interest Rates in the EMU 
Area", Economics Letters 67, 165-171. 
Goodhart, Charles (1998),"Central Bankers and Uncertainty,'" In Proceedings of the 
British Academy: 1998 Lectures and Members, Oxford University Press, J 999. 
_______ (200 I), 4 What Weight Should be Given to Asset Prices in the 
Measurement of Inflation?', The Economic Journal, III, pp 335-56 
Grafe, C., and C. Wyplosz (1999). "A model of the real exchange rate determination in 
transition economies." In M. Blejer and M. "Skreb (eds.), Balance of Payments. 
Exchange Rates, and Competitiveness in Transition Economies. Boston: Kluwer 
Academic, pp. 159-184. 
Granger C.W.J. and Terasvirta T. (1993), "Modelling Non-linear Economic 
Relationships," Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Grilli. V. and G. Kaminsky (I 991),"Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes and the Real 
Exchange Rate: Evidence from the United States and Great Britain, 1885-1986", 
in: Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 27. pp. 191-212. 
Gross. Alexander (1987),"The role of the current account in asset market models of 
exchange rate determination," European University Institute Series D. Economics, 
no 2. New York and Berlin:de Gruyter. 1987. pp xiii, 391. 
262 
Guinigundo, D. (2000), "Problems and issues on inflation targeting: The case of the 
Philippines", unpublished manuscript, paper presented during the BSP pUDlic 
hearings on inflation targeting, March 2000, in Salas. John Michael Ian S .... The 
Philippine Central Bank's monetary policy reaction function from 1992 to 2003". 
University of the Philippines, May 2004. 
Gujarati, Damodar N. (2006),"Essential of Econometrics". Third edition. McGraw Hill. 
International edition 2006. 
Haldane, A.G. (1995), "Targeting Inflation," Proceedings of a conference of central 
banks on the use of inflation targets, Bank of England, London. 
Hallwood C.P. and MacDonald R. (2000), International Money and Finance, third 
edition, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford. 
Halpern, Lionel and Charles Wyplosz (1996),"Equilibrium Exchange Rates in Transition 
Economies," IMF Working Papers 961125, International Monetary Fund. 
(1997) "Equilibrium Exchange Rates in 
Transition Economies" International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 44(4): 430-61. 
Han, Young Wook (2003), "Long Memory Property and Central Bank Intervention 
during the Currency Crisis in the Daily Korean Won-US Dollar Exchange Rates," 
Journal of the Korean Economy, 4(1), Spring 2003,pp. 93-116. 
Haskel, Jonathan & Wolf, Holger (2001) " The Law of One Price--A Case Study." 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1 03( 4), pages 
545-58, December. 
263 
Heckscher, Eli F (19) 6), "Vaxelkursens Grundval vid PappersmyntfoC. Ekonom isk 
Tidskrift ) 8: 309-3) 2. 
Hegwood N.D. and PapeJl D.H. (1998), "Quasi Purchasing Power Parity". International 
Journal ~f Finance and Economics Vol. 3, pp. 279-289. 
Hetzel, R. L. (2000), "The Taylor Rule: Is It a Useful Guide to Understanding Monetary 
Policy?", Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 86, 1-33. 
Hodrick RJ. and Prescott E.C. (J 997), "Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical 
Investigation", Journal ~f Money, Credit and Banking Vol. 29, pp. 1-16. 
Hooper P. and Morton J. (1982), "Fluctuations in the Dollar: A Model of Nominal and 
Real Exchange Rate Determination," Journal of International Money and 
Finance, Vol. J, pp. 39-56. 
Hsing, Yu (2004), "Estimating the Monetary Policy Reaction Function for Canada: A 
V AR Model," CABE Journal (formerly the Canadian Business Economics), 3(2), 
April 2004. 
Hsing, Yu and Sang H. Lee (2004), "Estimating the Bank of Korea's Monetary Policy 
Reaction", The Journal of the Korean economy, vol. 5, no. ) (spring 2004), 1-16 
Huang, A., Margaritis, D. and Mayes, D. (200), "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: 
Evidence from New Zealand", Multinational Finance Journal 5, 175-200. 
Hutabarat, A., R. Anglingkusumo, F. Majardi and R. Wimanda (2000), "Policy Rules 
untuk Pengendalian Intlasi secara Forward Looking [Policy Rules for Forward 
Looking Intlation Targeting]," Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, 3 (3). 
pp.81-103. 
264 
IIjas, Achjar (1999), Peranan Bank Indonesia dalam Pengendalian Intlasi [The Role of 
Bank Indonesia in Intlation Control], Unpublished paper, Jakarta. 
IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restriction (lMF) 
Inoue, A. (1999)," Tests of cointegrating rank with a trend-break." Journal of 
Econometrics, 90, 215-237. 
International Financial Statistics (2002), International Monetary Fund, Washington 
Ito Takatoshi, Yuri N. Sasaki and Kiyotaka Sato (2005), "Pass-Through of Exchange 
Rate Changes and Macroeconomic Shocks to Domestic Intlation in East Asian 
Countries," RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-020, April 2005 
Jansen, E.S. and Tedisvirta, T. (1996). Testing parameter constancy and super exogeneity 
in econometric equations. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 58, 735-
768. 
Jensen, M. J., (1999) "Using wavelets to obtain a consistent ordinary least squares 
estimator of the long-memory parameter", Journal of Forecasting, 18: 17-32. 
Johansen, S., Mosconi, R., & Nielsen, B. (2000),"Cointegration analysis in the presence 
of structural breaks in deterministic trends", Econometrics Journal, 3, 216-249. 
Judd, John P. and Glenn D. Rudebusch (1998), "Taylor'S Rule and the Fed: 1970-1997," 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francesco Economic Review, 0(3), 1998, pp. 3-16. 
Kaminski, G., Lizondo, S., and Reinhart, C. (1997): "Leading Indicators of Currency 
Crises" IMF Working Paper, 97179. 
265 
Kanas, Angelos (2005), "Modelling the US/UK Real Exchange Rate-Real Interest Rate 
Differential Relation: A Multivariate Regime Switching Approach." Manchester 
School, Vol. 73, No.2, pp. 123-140. 
Kapetanios, G.; Shin, Y.; and Snell, A. (2003). "Testing for a Unit Root in the Nonlinear 
STAR Framework," Journal of Econometrics. 112: 359-379. 
Karagedikli, Ozer and Kirdan Lees (2004), "Do inflation targeting central banks behave 
asymmetrically? Evidence from Australia and New Zealand." Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand Discussion Paper Series DP 2004/02, Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand. 
Kawai M (1986),"International finance and open macro economics," in Miyakoshi T. 
(2003), "Real exchange rate determination: Empirical observations from East-
Asian countries," Empirical Economics,28,173-180 
Kilian, Lutz & Taylor, Mark P. (2001), "Why is it so difficult to beat the random walk 
forecast of exchange rates," Working Paper Series 088, European Central Bank. 
----------------------
(2003), "Why is it so difficult to beat the random walk 
forecast of exchange rates?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier. vol. 
60( I), pages 85-107. May. 
Kim, Ginil (2000), "Did the IMF-Prescribed High Interest Rate Policy Really Work in 
Korea? An Empirical Test," Asian Pacific Journal of Economics and Business. 
4(2), December 2000, pp. 95-106. 
Kim, Yang Woo (2002), '''Optimal Horizons for Inflation Targeting in Korea:' Bank of 
Korea Economic Papers, 5( I), July 2002, pp. 1-21. 
266 
Kim, D. H., Osborn, D. R., & Sensier, M. (2002),"Nonlinearity in the Fed's monetary 
policy rule", Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper 
Series 18, University of Manchester. 
Krajnyak, K., and J. Zettel meyer (1998). "Competitiveness in transition economies: What 
scope for real appreciation?" IMF Staff Papers, 45: 309-362. 
Krugman, P. (1989),"Exchange Rate Instability", MIT Press: Cambridge MA. 
Kydland, F.E. and Prescott, E.C. (1977), 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans', Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473-9\. 
Lane, Philip R. and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria (2004), "The Transfer Problem Revisited: 
Net Foreign Assets and Real Exchange Rates," Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 86, No.4, Pages 841-857. 
Lee D. Y. (1996), "Purchasing Power Parity and dynamic error correction: Evidence from 
Asia Pacific economies", International Review of Economics and Finance Vol. 8, 
pp. 199-212. 
Lee, Geung-Hee (1999), "A Price Model of the Korean Economy", Economic Papers, 
Vol. 2, No.1, The Bank of Korea, March 1999, pp. 188-239. 
Leitemo, K. and Soderstrom, U. (2001), "Simple Monetary Policy Rules and Exchange 
Rate Uncertainty", Working Paper No. 122, Sveriges Riksbank. 
Leon H.L. and Najarian S.(2003), "Asymmetric Adjustment and Nonlinear Dynamics in 
Real Exchange Rates," IMF Working Paper No. 03/159 
267 
Lestari, T. K., Kim, J., & Silvapulle, P. (2003),"Examination of Purchasing Power Parity 
in Indonesia: Asymmetric Cointegration Approach," Paper presented at the The 
16th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, Sydney, Australia. 
Leu, S.C.-Y. and Sheen, J. (2005), Asymmetric Monetary Policy in Australia. The 
Economic Record, Vol. 82, Special Issue, September, 2006, S85-S96 
Levin, Andrew, Volker Wieland and John C. Williams (1999), "Robustness of simple 
monetary policy rules and model uncertainty"; in: John B. Taylor, ed .• Monetary 
policy rules, Chicago University Press, Chicago. 
Levin, A., Wieland, V. and Williams, J. C. (2001), "The Performance of Forecast-Based 
Monetary Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty". Working Paper. Federal 
Reserve Board. 
Liew, V.K.S., T.T.L. Chong and K.P. Lim (2003), "The inadequacy of linear 
autoregressive model for real exchange rates: empirical evidences from A~ian 
economies," Applied Economics 35, 1387 - 1392. 
Liew V.K., Baharumshah A.Z. and Chong T.T. (2004), "Are Asian real exchange rates 
stationary?", Economics Letters Vol. 83, pp. 313-316. 
Lo, M.C. and Zivot E. (2001), "Threshold Cointegration and Nonlinear Adjustment to the 
Law of One Price," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press. Vol. 
5. pp.533-76. 
Lothian, J. and M.P. Taylor (1996) 'Real Exchange Rate Behavior: The Recent Float 
from the Perspective of the Past Two Centuries', Journal of Political Economy. 
104: 488-509. 
268 
Lucas R E (1982) 'Interest rates and currency prices in a two-country \\ orld·. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 10, 335-359. 
Lundbergh S, and T Terasvirta (2003),"A Time Series Model for an Exchange Rate in a 
Target Zone with Applications", SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics 
and Finance, Number 533, Stockholm: Sweden. 
Luukkonen R., Saikonnen P. and Terasvirta T. (1988), '"Testing linearity against smoo~h 
transition autoregressive models", Biometrika, Vol. 75, pp. 491-499. 
MacDonald, R. (1996)," Panel unit root tests and real exchange rates", Economics 
Letters, 50, 7-11 
___ (1997), "What Determines Real Exchange Rates?" The Long and The Short of 
It", Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol 8, pp. 
117-153. 
-----
, (1998), "What do we really know about real exchange rates?" Working 
Paper No 28, Oesterreichische Nationalbank. 
(2000), "Concepts to calculate Equilibrium Exchange Rates: An 
overview", Economic Research Group of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion 
Paper No 3/00. 
MacDonald, R., and I. W. Marsh (1997), "On Casselian PPP, Cointegration and Exchange 
Rate Forecasting", Review of Economics and Statistics, November. 
Macfarlane, Ian and Tease, Warren (I 989),"Capital Flows and Exchange Rate 
Determination", RBA Research Discussion Papers number rdp8908. 
269 
Martin C. and Milas C. (2004),"Modelling monetary policy: inflation targeting In 
practice", Economica, (forthcoming). 
McCallum, B.T. (1995), 'Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence'. 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. 85, 207-11. 
McCallum, Bennett T., (1999a), "Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules" in John 
B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics. Elsevier 
Science, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1483-1530. 
(1999b), "Recent Developments in the Analysis of Monetary 
Policy Rules", Federal Reserves Bank of St.Louis Review. 
McCallum, P. (2000)," Alternative monetary policy rules: A comparison with historical 
settings for the United States, the Uunited Kngdom and Japan". NBER Working 
Papers 7725, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
McCallum, B. T. and Nelson, E. (1999), "Nominal Income Targeting in an Open-
Economy Optimizing Model", Journal of Monetary Economics 43, 553-578. 
McLeod, Ross H. (1997a), 'Survey of Recent Developments', Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies 33 (1): 3--43. 
____ (1997b). 'Explaining Chronic Inflation in Indonesia', Journal of Development 
Studies, 33 (3), February: 392--410. 
____ (1997c). 'Policy Conflicts in Indonesia: The Impact of the Current Account 
Deficit Target on Growth, Equity and Stability', ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 
July: 32--45. 
270 
Meese R. and Rogoff K (l988),"Was it real? The exchange rate-interest differential 
relation over the modern floating-rate period," Journal of Finance. 43. 933-948 
Michael P, Nobay A.R. and Peel D.A. (1997), "Transaction Costs for Non-linear 
Adjustment in Real Exchange Rates: An Empirical Investigation:' The Journal (~l 
Political Economy, Vol. 105, pp. 862-879. 
Mishkin, F.S. and Posen, A.S. (1997), 'Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Four 
Countries', Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review. 3. 9-
110. 
Miyakoshi T. (2003), "Real exchange rate determination: Empirical observations from 
East-Asian countries," Empirical Economics,28,173-180. 
Mohanty, M S and Marc Klau (2004), "Monetary policy rules m emerging market 
economies: issues and evidence," BIS Working Papers No 149, Monetary and 
Economic Department, March 2004, Switzerland 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (2000): "Kicking the habit and turning over a new leaf: 
monetary policy in East Asia after the currency crisis", Occasional Paper, 21, 
December. 
Nelson, E. (2000), "UK Monetary Policy 1972-97: A Guide rules", Working Paper No. 
120, Bank of England. 
Nelson, C. R., and Plosser, C. I. (1982),"Trends and Random Walks in Macroeconomic 
Time Series: Some Evidence and Implications," Journal of Monetary Economics, 
10, 139-162. 
271 
Nobay, R. And D. Peel (1998),"Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model of Asymmetric 
Central Bank Preferences," Discussion Paper No. 306, Financial Markets Group, 
LSE. 
Nobay, A.R. and Peel, D.A. (2003), 'Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a Model 
of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences', Economic Journal. 113,657-65. 
Nyberg, D. (2002), "Should Exchange Rates be Ignored in the Setting of Monetary 
Policy?", Working Paper 2002:8, Department of Economics, Stockholm 
University. 
Obstfeld, M. and Rogoff K. (1995), "The Intertemporal Approach to the Current 
Account," in Grossman and Rogoff, eds., Handbook of International Economics, 
Amsterdam: North Holland Press. 
(1996), "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Obstfeld M. and Taylor A. (1997), "Non-linear aspects of goods market arbitrage and 
adjustment: Hecksher's commodity price points revisited", Journal of Japanese 
and International Economies, Vol. II, pp. 441-479. 
O'Connell P.GJ. (1997), "The overvaluation of purchasing power parity", Journal of 
International Economics 44, pp. 1-19. 
(1998), "'Market Frictions and Real Exchange Rates", Journal or 
International Money and Finance, Vol. 17, pp. 71-95. 
272 
O'Connell, Paul, and Wei, Shang-Jin (2002), "'The Bigger They Are, The Bigger They 
Fall: How Price Differences Across U.S. Cities Are Arbitraged:' Journal of" 
International Economics, Vol. 56, pp. 21-53. 
Orphan ides, A. (200 I), "Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data", American 
Economic Review 91,964-985. 
Orphan ides, 0 and V Wieland (2000),"Inflation zone targeting:' European Economic 
Review, 44, pp 1351-87 
Osterholm, Par (2003), "The Taylor Rule: A Spurious Regression?", Department of 
Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, August 2003. 
Pantula, S.G., (1991), "Asymptotic distributions of unit-root tests when the process is 
nearly stationary", Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 9, 63-71. 
Papell, D. H. (1997),"Searching for Stationarity: Purchasing Power Parity under Current 
Float," Journal of International Economics, 43, 313-332. 
Peersman, Gert, and Frank Smets (1999), "The Taylor Rule: A Useful Monetary Policy 
Benchmark for the Euro Area?", International Finance 2, 85-116. 
Perron, P. (1989),"The Great Crash, the oil price shock, and the unit root hypothesis", 
Econometrica, 57(6),1361-1401. 
Prawiro, Radius (1998), "Indonesia's Struggle for Economic Development," Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
Rajan, R .. and C.H. Shen (2003). "'Why are Crisis-Induced Devaluations Contractionary?: 
Exploring Alternative Hypotheses", mimeo (April). 
273 
Razin, 0., and Collins, S. (1997): "Real Exchange Rate Misalignments and GrO\\1h". In: 
Razin, A., and Sadka, E. (eds.): International Economic Integration: Public 
Economics Perspectives. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1997. 
Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2004), "The Modern History of Exchange 
Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
MIT Press, vol. 119( 1), pages 1-48, February 
Rigobon, Roberto and Brian Sack (2003), "Measuring the Reaction of Monetary Policy to 
the Stock Market," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), May 2003, pp. 639-
669. 
Rogers, J. (1999), "Monetary shocks and real exchange rates", Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 269-288. 
Rogoff, K. (1996), 'The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle," Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 34, pp.647-668. 
Romeo M. Bautista (1987): Production Incentives in Philippine Agriculture: Effects of 
Trade and Exchange Policies. 
Romer, David (2001), "Advanced Macroeconomics," second edition, Boston, MA: 
McGraw Hill. 
Rotemberg, J.J. and Woodford, M. (1998), 'Interest-Rate Rules in an Estimated Sticky 
Price Model', National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6618, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Rudebusch, G. D. (2002a), "Term Structure Evidence on Interest Rate Smoothing and 
Monetary Policy Inertia", Journal of Monetary Economics 49, 1161-1187. 
274 
------- (2002b), "Assessing Nominal Income Rules f0r Monetary Polic~ \\ith 
Model and Data Uncertainty", Economic Journal 112,402-432. 
Rudebusch, G. D. and L. E. O. Svensson (1998), 'Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting'. in 
John B. Taylor (ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press for 
NBER 
(1999). Policy rules for inflation targeting. in J. 
Taylor (ed.), Monetary policy rules, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
______________ (2002) Eurosystem monetary targeting: lessons 
from U.S. data, European Economic Review, 46, 417-442. 
Ruge-Murcia, FJ. (2000), "Uncovering financial markets' beliefs about inflation targets," 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(5). pages 483-
512. 
------
(2002), 'A Prudent Central Banker', IMF Staff Papers, 49, 456-69. 
------
(2004), 'The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets the Natural 
Rate of Unemployment', European Economic Review, 48, 91-107. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Wyplosz, Charles (1984), "Real Exchange Rate Effects of Fiscal 
Policy".NBER Working Paper Series, Vol. w1255, pp.-. 
Said, E and David A. Dickey (1984), "Testing for unit roots in autoregressive-moving 
average models of unknown order", Biometrika, December 1984; 71: 599 - 607. 
Saikonnen P. and Luukkonen R. (1988), "Lagrange multiplier tests for testing non-
linearities in time series models," Scandinavian Journal of Statistics, Vol. 15. pp. 
55-68. 
275 
Salas, John Michael Ian S. (2004),"The Philippine Central Bank"s monetary polic~ 
reaction function from 1992 to 2003", University of the Philippines. 
Samuelson, P. (1964), "Theoretical notes on trade problems," Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 46, pp.145-154. 
Sarantis, N. (1999), "Modeling non-linearities in real effective exchange rates:" Journal 
o/International Money and Finance, Vol. 18, pp. 27-45. 
Sarno, L. (2000a),"Real Exchange Rate Behaviour in High Inflation Countries: Empirical 
Evidence from Turkey, 1980-1997," Applied Economics Letters, 7,285-291. 
____ (2000b),"Real exchange rate behavior in the Middle East: a re-examination:' 
Economics Letters 66, 127-136. 
____ (200 I ),"The behavior of US public debt: a nonlinear perspective," Economics 
Letters 74, 119-125. 
Sarno, L., Chowdhury, I, and Taylor, M.P. (2004), "Non-Linear Dynamics in Deviations 
from the Law of One Price: A Broad-Based Empirical Study," Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 23: I, pp. 1-25. 
Sarno, L. and Taylor M.P. (1998), "The behavior of real exchange rates during the post-
Bretton Woods period", Journal of International Economics Vol. 46, pp. 281-312 
(2002a),"Purchasing Power Parity and the Real Exchange 
Rate," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 49( I), 65-105. 
(2002b), The economics of exchange rates, Cambridge 
University Press. 
276 
Sarwono, H.A. and P. Warjiyo (1998), "Mencari Paradigma Baru Kebijakan !\1oneter 
dalam Sistem Nilai Tukar Bebas [In Searching for New Paradigm for Monetar) 
Management under Flexible Exchange Rate System]," Buletin Ekonomi Moneter 
dan Perbankan, 1 (1), pp. 5-23. 
Saxena, Sweta Chaman (2002), "Exchange rate dynamics in Indonesia: 1980-1998." 
Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier. vol. 13(4), pages 545-563. 
Schaling, E. (1999)," The nonlinear Phillips curve and inflation target forecasting," Bank 
of England working paper No. 98. 
____ (2004), 'The Non-linear Phillips Curve and Inflation Forecast Targeting: 
Symmetric versus Asymmetric Monetary Policy Rules', Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, 36, 361-86. 
Schwert, G. W. (1989), "Tests for unit roots: A Monte Carlo investigation". Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 7, 147-160. 
Sercu P., Uppal R. and van Hulle C. (1995), "The Exchange Rate in the Presence of 
Transaction Costs: Implications for Tests of Purchasing Power Parity," Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 50, pp. 1309-1319. 
Shafer J. and Loopesko B (1983),"Floating exchange rates after ten years," Brooking 
Papers on Economic Activity, I, 1-70. 
Shleifer A. and Vishny R. W. (1997), "The Limits of Arbitrage," Journal 0.( Finance, Vol. 
52, pp.35-55. 
277 
Sidaoui, Jose (2003): "Implications of fiscal issues for central banks: Mexico's 
experience", in fiscal issues and central banking in emerging economies. BIS 
Papers, 20, (December). 
Sims, C. and T. Zha (2002). Macroeconomic switching. The paper can be downloaded 
from http://eco-072399b.princeton.edu/yftp/switchingl 
Soderlind, P., Soderstrom, U. and Vredin, A. (2003), "Taylor Rules and the Predictability 
of Interest Rates", Working Paper No. 147, Sveriges Riksbank. 
Sollis, R., Leybourne, S. and Newbold, P., 2002, "Tests for Symmetric and Asymmetric 
Nonlinear mean reversion in Real Exchange Rates", Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 34, 686-700. 
Solnik B. (2004), "International Investments, " fifth edition, Pearson Addison Wesley 
Stefan Collignon, Jean Pisani-Ferry and Yung Chul Park (1999), "Exchange Rate 
Policies in Emerging Asian Countries," London: TJ International Ltd. 
Stockman A C (1980), 'A theory of exchange rate determination', Journal of Political 
Economy, 88, 673-698. 
Surico, P. (2002).,"US Monetary Policy Rules: the Case for Asymmetric Preferences," 
Mimeo, Bocconi University 
Svensson, Lars E.O. (1997a), 'Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and 
Monitoring Inflation Targets, European Economic Review, 41, pp 1111-46 
(1997b), "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central 
Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," Amer. Econ. Rev. 87, pp. 98-114. 
278 
-------- (1999), "Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule". Journal 
of Monetary Economics 43, 607-654. 
-------- (2000), "The First Year of the Eurosystem: Inflation Targeting or 
Not?" American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 90, 95-99 
------__ (2002), "What is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in 
Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules", Forthcoming in Journal of Economic 
Literature. 
Taylor A. (2001), "Potential Pitfalls for the Purchasing-Power Parity Puzzle? Sampling 
and Specification Biases in Mean-Reversion Tests of the Law of One Price," 
Econometrica, Vol. 69, pp. 473-498. 
Taylor, J.B. (1993), 'Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice', Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195-214. 
(1995), "The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: An Empirical 
Framework," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), pp.l1-26. 
----
(1998a), "Applying Academic Research on Monetary Policy Rules: An 
Exercise on Transactional Economics," The Manchester School, 66, Supplement 
I 998a, pp. 1-16. 
(l998b), "Monetary Policy and the Long Boom," Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis Review, 80(6), November/December 1998b, pp. 3-11. 
----
(1999a), "Monetary Policy Rules," edited, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
279 
----- (1999b), 'A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules', in Tavlor. J.B. 
. . 
(ed.), Monetary Policy Rules. University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 319-48. 
----- (2000), "Using monetary policy rules in emerging market economies", 
Stabilisation and Monetary Policy, Banco de Mexico, pp 441-57. 
Taylor M.P. (1988), "An Empirical Examination of Long-Run Purchasing PO\\l:~r Parity 
Using Cointegration Techniques", Applied Economics Vol. 20, pp. 1369-1382. 
(1995), "The Economics of Exchange Rates," Journal (?l Economic 
Literature, Vol. 33, pp. 13-47. 
Taylor, M. P. and Peel, D. A. (1997), "Nonlinearities in real exchange rate adjustment 
during the recent float: Empirical evidence and Monte Carlo analysis:' Discussion 
Paper. Institute of Economics and statistics, University of Oxford. 
----------
(2000), "Non-linear adjustment, long-run equilibrium and 
exchange rate fundamentals," Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 
19, pp. 33-54. 
Taylor M.P., Peel D.A. and Sarno L. (2001), "Non-linear mean-reversion In real 
exchange rates: toward a solution to the purchasing power parity puzzles," 
International Economic Review, Vol. 42, pp.t 0 15-1 042. 
Terasvirta T. (1994), "Specification, estimation and evaluation of smooth transition 
autoregressive models," Journal o/the American Statistical Association, Vol. 89, 
pp. 208-218. 
280 
_____ (1998), "Comment on The demand for broad money In the United 
Kingdom, 1878-1993 by Ericsson, N.R., Hendry, D.F. and Prestwich. K.r-..1:" 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 100, 325-328. 
Terasvirta, T. and H.M. Anderson (1993), 'Characterising Non-linearities in Business 
Cycles using Smooth Transition Autoregressive Models', in M.H. Pesaran and 
S.M. Potter (eds.), Nonlinear-linear Dynamics, Chaos and Econometrics. Ne\\ 
York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Tkacz, Greg (2001), "Estimating the Fractional Order of Integration of Interest Rates 
Using a Wavelet OLS Estimator," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & 
Econometrics, Volume 5, Issue 1 Article 2. 
Tong, H. (1983),"Threshold Models in Non-linear Time Series Analysis", Volume 21 of 
Lecture Notes in Statistics, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg. 
----
(1990), "Non-linear Time Series," Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
(1993)," Non-linear time series: A dynamical system approach'" Oxford 
Science Publications, Oxford UK. 
Uppal R. (1993), "A general equilibrium model of international portfolio choice," 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 529-553. 
Van Dijk, D. (1999),"Smooth Transition Models: Extensions and Outlier Robust 
Inference," Tinbergen Institute Research Series, 200, 1-212. 
van Dijk, D., P.H. Franses and A. Lucas (1999), "Testing for smooth transition 
nonlinearity in the presence of additive outliers", Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics 17,217-235. 
281 
van Dijk D., Terasvirta T. and Franses P.H.(2002), "Smooth Transition Autoregressive 
Models - A Survey of Recent Developments," Econometric Reviews. Vol. 21. pp. 
] -47. 
Warjiyo, P. and D. Zulverdy (1998), "Penggunaan Suku Bunga sebagai Sasaran 
Operasional Kebijakan Moneter [The Use of Interest Rate as Operational Target 
of Monetary Policy in Indonesia]," Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan. 
(]), pp 25-58. 
Warjiyo P. and J. Agung (200 I), "Monetary Transmission Mechanisms in Indonesia." 
Bank Indonesia. 
Weber, A. (] 997)."Sources of Purchasing Power Disparities between the G3 Economies", 
Journal of Japanese and International Economies, Vol 11 .. pp. 548-583. 
Wei, S. and D. Parsley (1995), 'Purchasing Power Parity during the Floating Rate Period: 
Exchange Rate Volatility, Trade Barriers and other Culprits', Working Paper 
5032, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Woodford, Michael (1999), "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," unpublished paper, 
Princeton University, in: John B. Taylor, ed., Monetary policy rules, Chicago 
University Press, Chicago. 
Woodford, Michael. (2001), "The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy." American 
Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 91, pp. 232-237. 
World Currency Yearbook (1984), International Currency Analysis, Inc., New York. 
Wu, Hsiu-Ling (1996), "Testing for the Fundamental Determinants of the Long-Run Real 
Exchange Rate: The Case of Taiwan," NBER Working paper #5787 (October). 
282 
Wu J.L., Tsai L.J and Chen S.L. (2004), "Are real exchange rates non-stationary'? The 
Pacific Basin perspective", Journal of A sian Economics Vol. 15. pp. ~25-~J8. 
Yilmaz K. (200 I ),"Martingale Property of Exchange Rates and Central Bank 
Interventions," Mimeo, K09 University, Turkey. 
Zussman, Asaf (2003),"The Limits of Arbitrage: Trading Frictions and eviations from 
Purchasing Power Parity." Stanford University. 
283 
